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FOR E. B. MILLER 
■ S. MARIN 
F.'. LEAVENWORTH, KANS. 

DEC 9 1921 



U. 5. War- depf. breneval -fa£ 



THE 

WAR WITH GERMANY 



A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 



LEONARD P. AYRES 

Colonel, General Staff 
CHIEF OF THE STATISTICS BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STAFF 




Second Edition with data revised to August 1, 1919 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



IP REPLACE LOE^ CttRF- 

f] 

DEC \ 1958 




"p 






LETTER OF INSTRUCTION. 



War Department, 

Washington, May 10, 1919. 
Sir : Now that the negotiations of the peace commission are draw- 
ing to a close there is general desire for a stock-taking of the efforts 
made and the results achieved by the United States in the war. In 
addition to the other reports being prepared by the different divisions 
of the War Department there is need for a statement which shall 
set forth the significant facts and figures with respect to those major 
steps in our military preparation and action which, taken together, 
constitute the record of our participation in the war. 

These main steps are not difficult to distinguish from the innumer- 
able details connected with them. They include such major enter- 
prises as raising the men, training them, transporting them overseas, 
furnishing small arms, artillery, and airplanes, conducting battle 
operations, and caring for the sick and wounded. It is important 
that there should be available at an early date an authoritative ac- 
count giving the important facts about these consecutive operations 
of the war so that the more detailed reports that are beginning to 
appear may be judged in their proper setting and perspective. 

For these reasons I wish you would have prepared as promptly as 
possible a brief and simple statistical report showing what was ac- 
complished by the department and the cooperating agencies during 
the war. 

Very truly, yours, 

Newton D. Baker, 

Secretary of War. 
Col. Leonard P. Atres, 

Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff. 

3 



LETTER OF TRANSMISSION. 



War Department, 

Washington, May 31, 1919. 

Sir: In accordance with your instructions there is transmitted 
herewith a statistical summary of the larger steps in the military 
preparation and action of the United States in the late war. The 
data presented have been compiled by the several sections of the 
Statistics Branch of the General Staff. In the main they set forth 
facts taken from the reports made by the Branch each week during 
the war to the President, to yourself, and to the Chief of Staff. 
These have been supplemented by facts and figures secured from the 
offices of the Statistics Branch maintained during the war at General 
Headquarters and at the headquarters of the Services of Supply in 
France. Some of the data have also been secured from the office of 
the Statistics Branch maintained at the headquarters of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. Other data have been 
taken from the reports of the Interallied Bureau of Statistics, of 
which the Statistics Branch has been the American agency, and from 
the files of the Supreme War Council at Versailles with which the 
Branch has maintained close contact. 

While it is still impossible to secure final figures on some points 
or entirely reliable ones on others, care has been taken to insure such 
degree of reliability in the data presented as is reasonably feasible. 
Since most of the data have been taken from compilations which 
have been currently maintained for many months, and which have 
been subjected to repeated checking and revision, it is believed that 
they are in the main fairly trustworthy. 
Very truly, yours, 

Leonard P. Afres, 
Colonel, General Staff, Chief of /Statistics Branch. 

Hon. Newton D. Baker, 

Secretary of War. 
4 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page. 



Letter of instruction 4 

Letter of transmission ~~ " g 

List of diagrams 9 

List of tables _______ 10 

List of maps : -^ 

Figures of American participation in the war 

Chapter I. Four million men : 13 

The men who served ^T~T~T~n 

The American Expeditionary Forces and the British Lx- ^ 

peditionary Forces 

Army at home and in France— 

The selective service Q ^ 

Rejections for physical reasons 

200,000 officers—- 22 

The share of each State ^ 

Summary : 

II. Six months of training: 9g 

The average man 25 

The divisions 2g 

Camps and cantonments 

Instructors for training 4,000,000 men ^ 

French and British instructors 

Length of training 

Summary 

III. Transporting 10,000 men a day : ^ 

Sending the troops overseas o§ 

Growth of the transport fleet ° 

Where the ships came from ^ 

Embarkation and debarkation 

Help from the Allies 44 

Cargo movement ; 

Losses at sea 

Return of troops 4g 

Summary 

IV. Food, clothing, and equipment : ^ 

The problem of purchase 

Machinery of distribution " 

Narrow-gauge railways and motor trucks 

47,000 telegrams a day 5? 

Construction in the United States 

Construction in the A. E. F ^ 

Food and clothing at the front 

Summary "." 



b TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Chapter V. Springflelds, Enfields, and Brownings : p age . 

Rifles ( g3 

Machine guns 65 

Rifles and machine guns used in Prance 68 

Pistols and revolvers 69 

Small-arms ammunition 69 

Arms and the men 69 

Preparing for the campaign of 1919 71 

Summary ; 72 

VI. Two thousand guns on the firing line : 

Artillery 73 

Artillery ammunition 75 

British and American artillery production 77 

Smokeless powder and high explosives 77 

Toxic gases 78 

Tractors and tanks SO 

Our artillery in France SO 

Guns needed v. guns available S2 

Summary 83 

VII. Airplanes, motors, and balloons : 

Prewar equipment 85 

Training S5 

Training planes and engines 87 

Service planes 88 

Service engines 90 

Raw materials 91 

Accessories 92 

Balloons 93 

Forty-five squadrons in action «_i 94 

Important operations 96 

Chateau-Thierry 96 

St. Mihiel 97 

Meuse-Argonne 97 

The test of battle ^ 9S 

Summary 99 

VIII. Two hundred days of battle : 

Two out of three 101 

Tipping the balance of power 103 

Thirteen battles 105 

German offensives 106 

Allied offensives 107 

Battle of St. Mihiel 10D 

Battle of Meuse-Argonne 111 

Records of 29 combat divisions 113 

Summary 118 

IX. Health and casualties : 

The deadliest war 119 

Battle deaths by services 121 

Wounded, prisoners, and missing 122 

Battle and disease losses 123 

The control of disease 125 

Venereal disease 127 

Hospitalization 128 

Summary 129 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Chapter X. A million dollars an hour : Page. 

Total war expenditures 131 

Army expenditures 133 

Where the dollar went 134 

Permanent assets 134 

War expenditures of all nations 134 

Summary 135 

Some international comparisons : 

Duration of war 137 

Cost of war 138 

Battle deaths 139 

Per cent of front held by each army 140 

Ration strength 141 

Guns organized in batteries 142 

Airplanes in each army 143 

Airplanes per 100,000 men 144 

Production of ordnance 145 

Merchant shipping lost 146 

Merchant shipping before and after the war 147 

National debts 14S 

Comparative strength of armies 149 

Index 151 



DIAGRAMS, TABLES, AND MAPS. 



LIST OF DIAGRAMS. 

Page. 

Diagram 1. British and American forces on western front 1-1 

2. Thousands of soldiers in Army each month 15 

3. Sources of the Army 16 

4. Male population registered and not registered 18 

5. Thousands of men drafted each month 19 

6. Sources of the commissioned personnel 22 

7. Soldiers furnished by each State 23 

8. Composition of National Guard divisions 27 

9. Officers commissioned from training camps, by ranks 30 

10. Officers commissioned from training camps, by services 30 

11. French instruction officers 31 

12. British instruction officers 31 

13. Time from organization of divisions to entering line 33 

14. Monthly sailings to France and home 37 

15. Growth of the trans-Atlantic fleet 39 

16. Growth of the cross-Channel fleet 40 

17. American troops carried by ships of each nation 43 

18. Turnarounds of transports 44 

19. Cargo shipped by months 45 

20. Cargo carried by corps 46 

21. Time for converting cargo ships to troop transports 47 

22. American production and Army purchases 50 

23. Motor trucks needed and available 55 

24. Costs of construction 58 

25. Stocks of food in France 60 

26. Springflelds and Enfields 64 

27. Machine guns made in America 67 

28. Small arms available 70 

29. Artillery made in America 75 

30. Artillery ammunition made in America 76 

31. British and American artillery production 77 

32. Gas 79 

33. Artillery available " 82 

34. Flying officers S6 

35. Training planes and engines 88 

36. Service planes 89 

37. Service engines 91 

38. Observation balloons 93 



DIAGRAMS, TABLES, AND MAPS. 9 

Page. 

95 

Diagram 39. Battle squadrons 96 

40. Planes sent to zone of advance og 

41. Hours of flying ~ 09 

42. Airplanes and balloons brought down in action.— — ^ 

43. Divisions in France 1Q3 

44. Front line held by each army ^ 

45. Rifle strength 114 

46. Divisions in quiet and active sectors 

47. Kilometers advanced against the enemy ^ 

48. German prisoners captured 

49. Casualties by divisions 19Q 

50. Battle deaths each week 

51. Death rates of officers and men ^ 

52. Men missing in action ^ 

53. Total deaths— ^ 

54. Disease and battle deaths 

55. Deaths by kinds of disease - 

56. Deaths from disease, weekly rates ^ 

57. Venereal diseases ~ g 

132 



58. Hospital beds in France 

59. Cost of war per day ^~~ 

138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 



60. Where the dollar went 

61. Cost of the war by nations— 

62. Battle deaths by nations 

63. Per cent of front held by each army 
64*. Ration strengths of each nation. — 

65. Artillery of each nation 

66. Airplanes of each nation 

67. Airplanes per each 100,000 men 

68. Production of munitions "~ 

69. Shipping lost 147 

70. Merchant fleets of the nations ^ 

71. National debts 14q 

72. Comparative strengths of the armies 



68 
68 
81 



LIST OF TABLES. 

Page. 

Table 1. Men registered and inducted OQ 

2. Organization and sources of divisions ^ 

3. Clothing produced for the Army 

4. Machine guns produced 

5. American machine guns used in France --- 

6. American artillery in France ^ 

7. Thirteen American battles 

8. Data of the Meuse-Argonne battle ^ 

9. Battle deaths of the nations i22 

10. American battle casualties 12g 

11. Hospital construction 133 

12. Army expenditures 135 

13. War expenditures of the nations ^ 

14. Duration of the war 



10 DIAGRAMS, TABLES. AND MAPS. 

LIST OF MAPS. 



Page. 

Map 1. Results of physical examinations, by States 20 

2. Camps and. cantonments 28 

3. Where the ships came from 41 

4. Embarkation and debarkation 42 

5. American supply lines in France 53 

6. American telegraph and telephone lines in France 56 

7. Construction projects in the United States 57 

8. Construction projects in France 59 

9. German offensives 106 

10. Allied offensives - 108 

11. Battle of St. Mihiel - 110 

12. Battle of the Meuse-Argonne 112 



FIGURES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. 



Total armed forces, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps, etc._ 4, 800, 000 

Total men in the Army 4,000,000 

Men who went overseas 2, 086, 000 

Men who fought in France 1, 390, 000 

Greatest number sent in one month 306, 000 

Greatest number returning in one month 333, 000 

Tons of supplies shipped from America to France 7, 500, 000 

Total registered in draft 24,234,021 

Total draft inductions 2, 810, 296 

Greatest number inducted in one month 400, 000 

Graduates of Line Officers' Training Schools SO, 568 

Cost of war to April 30, 1919 $21, 850, 000, 000 

Cost of Army to April 30, 1919 $13,930,000,000 

Battles fought by American troops 13 

Months of American participation in the war 19 

Days of battle 200 

Days of duration of Meuse-Argonne battle 47 

Americans in Meuse-Argonne battle 1,200,000 

American casualties in Meuse-Argonne battle 120, 000 

American battle deaths in war 50, 000 

American wounded in war 206, 000 

American deaths from disease 57, 500 

Total deaths in the Army 115, 500 

11 



Chapter I. 
FOUR MILLION MEN. 



THE MEN WHO SERVED. 

About 4,000,000 men served in the Army of the United States dur- 
ing the war (Apr. 6, 1917 to Nov. 11, 1918) . The total number of 
men serving in the armed forces of the country, including the Army, 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the other services, amounted to 
4,800,000. It was almost true that among each 100 American citizens 
5 took up arms in defense of the country. 

During the Civil War 2,400,000 men served in the northern armies 
or in the Navy. In that struggle 10 in each 100 inhabitants of the 
Northern States served as soldiers or sailors. The American effort 
in the war with Germany may be compared with that of the Northern 
States in the Civil War by noting that in the present war we raised 
twice as many men in actual numbers, but that in proportion to the 
population we raised only half as many. 

It would be interesting and instructive to make comparisons be- 
tween the numbers in the American armies during the present war 
and those of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, but unfor- 
tunately this is most difficult to do fairly and truly. The reason for 
the difficulty lies in the diverse military policies of the nations. 

It was the policy of France, for example, to mobilize and put into 
uniform most of the able-bodied men in the population who were 
not beyond middle age. Some of these were sent into the combatant 
forces and services of supply of the active armies. Thousands of 
others were put at work in munitions factories. Others worked on 
railroads or cultivated their farms. In general, it was the policy of 
the Government to put its available man power into uniform and then 
assign these soldiers to the work that had to be done, whether it was 
directly military in nature or not. 

In the United States it was the policy to take into the Army only 
those men who were physically fit to fight and to assign them, save in 
exceptional cases, only to work directly related to the ordinary duties 
of a soldier. The work of making munitions, running railroads, 
and building ships was done by men not enrolled in the armed forces 
of the Nation. 

13 



14 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY 



The policies of the other Governments were all different from the 
two just described. These are the reasons why accurate international 
comparisons of armies will not be possible until figures are available 
showing the numbers and lengths of service of the men in the com- 
batant forces of the different nations rather than the figures now at 
hand showing the total numbers called to the colors and placed on 
the rolls. 



THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCES. 



There is, however, one comparison which may fairly be made. 
This is the comparison between the American Expeditionary Forces 



Troops 
2,500,000 



2,000,000 



1,500,000 



1,000,000 



500,000 



















































/ 
/ 
/ 








. — 
















7 


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1915 1916 1917 1918 

Diagram 1. — British and American Expeditionary Forces 

front. 



on tlie western 



and the British Expeditionary Forces. Both countries devoted their 
major efforts to building up and maintaining their armies in France. 
The results are set forth in diagram 1, which shows the strength of 
the two forces at different dates. 

The British curve mounts rapidly at first and falls off in the latter 
part of the period. The American starts slowly and then shoots up 
very rapidly. The British curve is in general convex in shape and 
the American is concave. 

The British sent to France many more men in their first year in 
the war than we did in our first year. On the other hand, it took 



FOUR MILLION MEN. 



15 



England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France 
and the United States accomplished it in one-half of that time. 

It must, however, be borne in mind that the British had to use 
men from the beginning to fill gaps caused by casualties, while the 
American forces were for many months built up in strength by all 
the new arrivals. 







1060 


1149 






883 


996 




646 


516 











icsa 


ltrs 


4W 


1990 


in 





UNITED 5TATE5 

AND 

POSSESSIONS 

Him 



EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES I 



578 






572 


(30 





200 290 390 500 551 691 949 JlOO 

APR. ttAV JUfl JUL AUS SEPT OCT MOV. DEC JAM. TEB MAR APR NAY JUM JUL AUG SEPT OCT fto'V DEC. JAM FEB WR APR rw j'u'fi Jul Aug 



Diagram 2. — Thousands of soldiers in the American Army on the first of 

eaeh month. 



ARMY AT HOME AND IN FRANCE. 

The most difficult feature of the American undertaking is to be 
found in the concentration of the major part of the effort into the 
few months of the spring and summer of 1918. When the country 
entered the war it was not anticipated in America, or suggested by 
France and England, that the forces to be shipped overseas should 
even approximate in numbers those that were actually sent. 



16 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



It was not until the German drive was under way in March, 1918, 
that the allies called upon America for the supreme effort that car- 
ried a million and a half soldiers to France in six months. Diagram 
2 shows the number of soldiers in the American Army each month 
from the beginning of the war and the number of them who were 
overseas. 

When war was declared there were only 200,000 in the Army. Two- 
thirds of these were Kegulars and one-third National Guardsmen who 
had been called to Federal service for duty along the Mexican border. 
When the war ended this force had been increased to 20 times its size 
and 4,000,000 men had served. 



£?;>, 





APRIL 19ir 



TOTAL FOR WAR 



Diagram 3. — Sources of the Army. 



After the signing of the armistice, demobilization of troops was 
begun immediately. As diagram 2 indicates, more than 600,000 were 
discharged during December. Forces in this country were at once 
cut to the lowest point consistent with carrying on the storage of 
equipment and settlement of contracts, and the discharge of men 
returning from overseas. In spite of the time necessary for return 
of overseas forces, demobilization was carried forward more rapidly 
in proportion to the number under arms than in any previous Ameri- 
can war. 

Diagram 3 shows the three sources from which the Army came. 

More than half a million came in through the Kegular Army. 
Almost 400,000 more, or nearly 10 per cent, entered through the 
National Guard. More than three-quarters of all came in through 
the selective service or National Army enlistments. Of every 100 



FOUR MILLION MEN. 



17 



men 10 were National Guardsmen, 13 were Regulars, and 77 be- 
longed to the National Army, or would have if the services had 
not been consolidated and the distinctions wiped out on August 7, 
1918. 

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE. 

The willingness with which the American people accepted the 
universal draft was the most remarkable feature in the history of 
our preparation for war. 

It is a noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given by 
the country to the war program that, despite previous hostility to 
the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months 
after the selective service law was passed, the standing of the drafted 
soldier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions 
and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted 
voluntarily. Moreover, the record of -desertions from the Army 
shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller 
percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who 
volunteered. The selective service law was passed on May 19, 1917, 
and as subsequently amended it mobilized all the man power of 
the Nation from the ages of 18 to 45, inclusive. Under this act, 
24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000 were 
inducted into the military service. All this was accomplished in a 
manner that was fair to the men, supplied the Army with soldiers as 
rapidly as they could be equipped and trained, and resulted in a 
minimum of disturbance to the industrial and economic life of the 
Nation. 

The first registration, June 5, 1917, covered the ages from 21 to 31. 
The second registration, one year later (June 5, 1918 and Aug. 24, 
1918), included those who had become 21 years old since the first reg- 
istration. The third registration (Sept. 12, 1918), extended the age 
limits downward to 18 and upward to 45. The total number regis- 
tered with the proportion who were actually inducted into the service 
is shown in Table 1. 

Table 1. — Men registered and inducted. 



Registration. 


Age limits. 


Registered. 


Inducted. 


Per cent 
inducted. 




21 to 31 

/ 18 to 20 

\ 32 to 45 

18 to 45 


10, 679, 814 

1 13,228,702 

325, 445 


2,666,867 
120, 157 
23, 272 


25 


Third 


1 




7 






Total 


18 to 45 


24, 234, 021 


2, 810, 296 


12 







132966°— 19- 



18 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



At the outbreak of the war, the total male population of the coun- 
try was about 54,000,000. During the war some 26,000,000 of them, 
or nearly half of all, were either registered under the selective-service 
act or were serving in the Army or Navy without being registered. 
Diagram 4 shows the percentages of the male population who were 
included in each of the registrations and the proportion who were 
not registered. 

The experience of the Civil War furnishes a basis for comparing 
the methods used and the results obtained in the two great struggles. 
This comparison is strikingly in favor of the methods used in the 
present war. During the Civil War large sums were paid in bounties 



48% 



op 






.% 



1* .REGISTRATION 



\ 



REGISTERED 



3^ REGISTRATION 



g 



& 



J> 






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ooo 



aft 



Diagram 4. — Male population registered and not registered. 



in the hope that by this means recourse to the draft might be made 
umiecessary. This hope was frustrated and the draft was carried 
through by methods which were expensive and inefficient. This may 
be summed up by noting that during the War with Germany we 
raised twice as many men as we raised during the Civil War, and at 
one-twentieth of the cost. This does not mean one-twentieth of the 
cost per man, but that 20 times as much money was actually spent by 
the Northern States in the Civil War in recruiting their armies as was 
spent for the same purpose by the United States in the War with 
Germany. In this war 60 per cent of all armed forces were secured 



FOUR MILLION MEN. 



19 



by the draft as compared with 2 per cent in the case of the Civil 
War. Diagram 5 shows the number of men inducted through the 
draft each month. 

The columns and the figures of the diagram illustrate the manner in 
which the men came into the service. In the fall of 1917 the first 
half million came in rapidly. During the winter the accessions were 
relatively few, and those that did come in were largely used as 



401 




249 



Sap Pot Hot Deo Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jon Jul Aug Sep Pot Hoy 
1917 1918 

Diagram 5. — Thousands of men drafted each month. 

replacements and for special services. In the spring of 1918 came 
the German drive and with it urgent calls from France for unlimited 
numbers of men. Then over a period of several months the num- 
bers of new men brought into the service mounted into the hundreds 
of thousands, and reached their highest point in July, when 400,000 
were inducted. During the succeeding months the numbers fell off 
considerably on account of the epidemic of influenza, and with 
November the inductions ceased entirely due to the unexpected ending 
of the war. 



20 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



REJECTIONS FOR PHYSICAL REASONS. 

Under the operation of the draft, registrants were given physical 
examinations by the local boards in order that those men who were 
not of sufficient physical soundness and vigor for military life might 
be sorted out. After those who were found to be qualified for serv- 
ice had been sent to camp, they were given another examination by 
the Army surgeons, and additional men were rejected because of 
defects which had not been discovered in the first examination. 

An attempt has been made to compute from the records of these 
two sets of physical examinations data which will show how the 
men from the different States compared in their physical qualifica- 




70 TO 80 
^B 65 TO 69 
V77A 60 70 64 

■■ SO TO 59 



Map 1. — Per cent of drafted men passing physical examination, toy States. 

tions. Eesults are presented in map 1 on this page which shows four 
classifications of the States. 

First come those States which are indicated in outline. These are 
the States which sent men of so high an order of physical condition 
that from 70 to 80 per cent of them survived the two examinations 
and were accepted into the military service. It is noteworthy that 
these States constitute about one-quarter of all and are mostly 
located in the Middle West. Next come the States from which 65 to 
69 per cent of the applicants were accepted, and these are indicated 
by light cross hatching. This group is about equal in numbers with 
the first, and most of them are contiguous to the first group either 



FOUK MILLION MEN. 21 

on the east or west. The third group makes still poorer records. 
Here from 60 to 64 per cent of the young men passed the tests. The 
States are indicated by heavy diagonal bars. Most of them were in 
the South and far West. Finally, there is a group of States, includ- 
ing, like each of the other groups, about one-quarter of all, and indi- 
cated on the map in solid black. Here are the States from which 50 
to 59 per cent of the candidates were accepted. They are found in 
the Northeast and the far West, especially in those portions of the 
West which have in recent years become popular as health resorts 
and so have attracted large numbers of physically subnormal people. 
In general, it is noteworthy that the best records are made by those 
States that are agricultural rather than industrial and where the 
numbers of recently arrived immigrants are not large. Conversely, 
most of the States making low records are preeminently manufac- 
turing States and also have in their populations large numbers of 
recently arrived immigrants. 

Further analysis of the records of physical examinations shows 
that the country boys made better records than those from the cities ; 
the white registrants better than the colored ; and native-born better 
records than those of alien birth. These differences are so consider- 
able that 100,000 country boys would furnish for the military service 
4,790 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys. Simi- 
larly, 100,000 whites would furnish 1,240 more soldiers than would 
an equal number of colored. Finally, 100,000 native-born would 
yield 3,500 more soldiers than would a like number of foreign-born. 
The importance of these differences may be appreciated by noting 
that 3,500 men is equivalent to an infantry regiment at full war 
strength. 

2 0,000 OFFICERS. 

About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the Army. 
Of this number, less than 9,000 were in the Federal service at the 
beginning of the war. Of these, 5,791 were Regulars and 3,199 were 
officers of the National Guard in the Federal service. Diagram 6 
shows with approximate accuracy the sources of the commissioned 
strength of the Army. 

The figures show that of every six officers one had had previous 
military training in the Eegular Army, the National Guard, or the 
ranks. Three received the training for their commissions in the 
officers' training camps. The other two went from civilian life into 
the Army with little or no military training. In this last group the 
majority were physicians, a few of them were ministers, and most 
of the rest were men of special business or technical equipment, who 
were taken into the supply services or staff corps. 



22 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



THE SHARE OF EACH STATE. 



A summary of the results attained is shown in diagram 7 on page 
23, which gives the number of soldiers (not including officers) fur- 
nished by each State. The bars are proportionate in length to the 
total number of men furnished, whether by volunteering in the Eegu- 
lar Army, coming in through the National Guard, or being inducted 



through the draft. 



SUMMARY. 



1. The number of men serving in the armed forces of the Nation 
during the war was 4,800,000, of whom 4,000,000 served in the Army. 

2. In the War with Germany the United States raised twice as 
many men as did the Northern States in the Civil War, but only 
half as many in proportion to the population. 

3. The British sent more men to France in their first year of war 
than we did in our first year, but it took England three years to 




Diagram 6. — Sources of the commissioned personnel. 

reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France, and the United States 
accomplished it in one-half of that time. 

4. Of every 100 men who served, 10 were National Guardsmen, 13 
were Eegulars, and 77 were in the National Army (or would have 
been if the services had not been consolidated). 

5. Of the 54,000,000 males in the population, 26,000,000 were 
registered in the draft or were already in service. 

6. In the physical examinations the States of the Middle West 
made the best showing. Country boys did better than city boys; 
whites better than colored ; and native born better than foreign born. 

7. In this war twice as many men were recruited as in the Civil 
War and at one-twentieth of the recruiting cost. 

8. There were 200,000 Army officers. Of every six officers, one had 
previous military training with troops, three were graduates of 
officers' training camps, and two came directly from civil life. 



FOUK MILLION MEN. 23 



Men Per c en * 

New York 367,864 Mg" ^ EMME SMBMM 9.79 

Pennsylvania 297.891 ■"" B " Ba ^^^;^?*^J^!^y f,9 ° 

Illinois 251,074 — ^^— ^^^ ""P 6 ' 68 

Ohio 200,293 Mg^MM ff, 5 . 33 

Texas 161,065 

Michigan 135,485 

Massachusetts 132,610 

Missouri 128,544 

California 112,514 

Indiana 106,581 

Hew Jersey 105,207 

Minnesota 99,116 

Iowa 98,781 

Wisconsin 98,211 

Georgia 85 .506 

Oklahoma 80,169 

Tennessee 75,825 

Kentucky Z 5 »9£5 
Alabama 74,678 
Virginia 73,062 
N. Carolina 73,003 
Louisiana 6 §,988 
Kansas 63 ,428 

Arkansas 61,027 
fl. Virginia 55,777 
Mississippi 54,295 
S. Carolina 53,482 
Connecticut 50,069 
Nebraska 47,805 




Maryland 47,054 

Washington 45,154 

Montana 36,293 

Colorado 34,393 

Florida 33,331 

Oregon 30,116 

S. Dakota 29,686 

N. Dakota 25,803 

Maine £4,252 

Idaho }-!.2i 6 

Utah 17,361 

Rhode Island 16,861 

Porto Bico 16,538 

Dist. of Col. 15,930 

B. Hampshire 14,374 

Hew Mexico 12,439 

Wyoming Ht 39 ? 

Arizona 10,492 

Vermont 9,338 

Delaware 7,484 

Hawaii 

Nevada 

Alaska 

A.E.F. 

Not allocated 

Philippines 

Total 3,757,624 

Diagram 7.— Soldiers furnished toy each State. 



Chapter II. 
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 



THE AVERAGE MAN. 

The average American soldier who went to France received six 
months of training in this country before he sailed. After he landed 
overseas he had two months of training before entering the battle 
line. The part of the battle line that he entered was in a quiet 
sector and here he remained one month before going into an active 
sector and taking part in hard fighting. 

The experiences of thousands of soldiers differ widely from the 
typical figures just presented, but a careful study of the training 
data of nearly 1,400,000 men who actually fought in France gives 
the average results shown above. In summary they are that the 
average American soldier who fought in France had six months 
of training here, two months overseas before entering the line, and 
one month in a quiet sector before going into battle. 

THE DIVISIONS. 

The Infantry soldier was trained in the division, which was our 
typical combat unit. In the American Army it was composed of 
about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. Training and sorting organiza- 
tions of about 10,000 men, known as depot brigades, were also 
utilized, but as far as possible the new recruits were put almost im- 
mediately into the divisions which were the organizations in which 
they would go into action. 

Before the signing of the armistice there were trained and sent 
overseas 42 American divisions. The training of 12 more was well 
advanced, and there were 4 others that were being organized. The 
plans on which the Army was acting called for 80 divisions overseas 
before July, 1919, and 100 divisions by the end of that year. 

Table 2 lists the divisions that were organized and trained before 
the signing of the armistice. The different columns show the num- 
ber by which each division was designated, the camp where it was 
trained, and the States from which its members came at the time of 
organization. In many cases the original composition was after- 
wards greatly changed by bringing in replacements to make up for 

losses. 

25 



26 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

Table 2. — Place of organization of divisions and sources by States. 



Division. 


Cam p. 


States from which drawn. 


Regulars: 

1st 




Regulars. 
Regulars. 


2nd 




3rd 




4th 




Regulars. 
Regulars. 
Regulars. 
Regulars. 
Regulars. 


5th 




6th 


McClellan, Ala 


7th 




8th 


9th 




10th 




Regulars. 


11th 




12th 






13th 




Regulars. 


14th 




15th 




Regulars. 
Regulars. 


16th 




17th.. 




18th 




Regulars. 


19th 




20th . 


Sevier, S. C . 


Regulars. 


National Guard: 

26th 




27th 


Wadsworth, S. C 


New York. 






29th 




New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia 


30th 


Sevier, S. C 


Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina. 


31st... 




Georgia, Alabama, Florida. 


32nd 




Michigan, Wisconsin. 


33rd 




Illinois. 


34th 


Cody,N. Mex 


Nebraska, Iowa, S. Dakota, Minnesota, N. Dakota. 


35th 




36th 




Texas, Oklahoma. 


37th 


Sheridan, Ohio 


Ohio. 


38th 




Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia. 


39th 




Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana. 


40th 


Kearny, Calif 

Fremont, Calif 

Mills, N. Y 


California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico. 


41st 


Various States. 


42nd 


Various States. 


National Army : 

■ 76th 


Devens, Mass 


New England, New York. 


77th... 


Upton, N. Y 


New York City. 


78th.. 


Dix, N.J 


Western New York, New Jersey, Delaware. 


79th... 




Northeastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, District of Co- 


80th 


Lee, Va 


lumbia. 
Virginia, West Virginia, Western Pennsylvania. 


81st 




North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Porto Rico. 


82nd 




Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee. 


83rd 




Ohio, Western Pennsylvania. 


84th 


Zachary Taylor, Kv 


Kentucky, Indiana, Southern Illinois. 


85th 


Michigan, Eastern Wisconsin. 


86th. . . 


Grant, 111 


Chicago, Northern Illinois. 


87th 




Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Southern Alabama. 


88th. 




North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Western Illinois. 


89th 




Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska. 


90th 




Texas, Oklahoma. 


91st 


Lewis, Wash 


Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, 


92nd 




Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, Utah. 


93rd 


Stuart, Va 


Colored, various States. 







The divisions are in three groups. The Regular Army divisions, 
numbered from 1 to 20, were originally made up from Regular 
Army units plus voluntary enlistments and selective-service men. 
The National Guard divisions, numbered from 26 to 42, came in 
largely from the militia of the several States. The National Army 
divisions, numbered from 76 to 92, were made up almost wholly of 
men called in by the selective-service law. As an aid to memory 
it may be helpful to note that the Regular Army divisions were 



SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 



27 



numbered below 25, the National Guard divisions from 25 to 50, 
and the National Army divisions between 50 and 100. 

All the divisions shown in the table reached France except the 
12 Regular Army divisions numbered from 9 to 20. The divisions 
being organized at the time of the signing of the armistice were num- 
bered 95, 96, 97, and 100. 



ntCA 







O.fct 







22"* 





35™ 







42*d AVERAGE 

Diagram 8.— Composition of National Guard divisions. 

The sources of the National Guard divisions are shown in diagram 
8. The black portion of each circle shows the part of each division 
drawn from the National Guard; the shaded portion represents 
troops drawn from the National Army and other sources; and the 
unfilled gap in each circle represents the number of troops that the 
division was short of its authorized strength when it sailed. 



28 



THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 



Reference to the lower right-hand circle in the diagram shows that 
the average composition of these National Guard divisions was one 
made up of about two-thirds State troops and one-third other troops. 
This illustrates the noteworthy fact that one tendency of the methods 
of divisional organization was to produce composite divisions made 
up of men from most varied sources. 

The Forty-second Division, called because of its composite char- 
acter the " Rainbow Division," was made up of selected groups from 
over the entire country and sent to France early. The Forty-first, 
called the " Sunset Division," was a composite of troops from many 




Map 2 — Camps and cantonments. 

Western States. Four divisions were made up from one State each : 
the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, and Thirty- 
seventh. 

CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS. 



To carry forward the training program, shelter was constructed 
in a few months for 1,800,000 men. For the National Guard and 
National Army divisions, 16 camps and 16 cantonments were built. 
National Guard units being organized rapidly during the summer 
of 1917 were put under canvas in camps throughout the South; The 
cantonments were largely in the North for the National Army 
called in the fall of 1917. The location of these 32 training areas is 
shown in map^on this page. 



SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. * 29 

One National Guard division, the Eainbow, required no training 
field, for it was assembled directly at Camp Mills for early trans- 
portation to France. Two National Army divisions, the Ninety- 
second (colored) and the Ninety-third (colored), were trained in 
separate units at various camps. The headquarters of the Ninety- 
second were at Camp Funston and those of the Ninety-third at Camp 
Stuart. The remaining 16 National Guard and 16 National Army 
divisions began their training in the camps and cantonments in the 
summer and fall of 1917. 

The building of the cantonments was authorized in May, 1917 ; the 
last site was secured on July 6, and on September 4 accommodations 
were ready for 430,000 men. This capacity was shortly increased to 
770,000, an average capacity per cantonment of 48,000. Construction 
of the camps went forward at the same rapid pace. Although tents 
were provided for housing the soldiers, a considerable number of 
wooden buildings were necessary, as well as water supply, sewerage, 
electric light, and roadway construction. The capacity of the camps 
reached 684,000, giving a total camp and cantonment capacity of 
nearly a million and a half. 

The Regular Army divisions were trained in part at one or another 
of these 32 centers, in part as separate units at various Army posts. 

Troops had to be accommodated at many other points besides the 
32 camps and cantonments. There were schools for training men for 
special services, such as the Artillery, Aviation, Engineer Corps, 
Chemical Warfare, Tank Corps, Quartermaster Corps. There were 
proving grounds and testing fields. There were also large embarka- 
tion camps at New York and Newport News. For these purposes 
housing was constructed with a capacity for more than 300,000 men. 

INSTRUCTORS FOR TRAINING 4,000,000 MEN. 

In the American Army there is one officer for each 20 men. This 
means that 200,000 officers were required for the army of 4,000,000 
men. But when war was declared there were only 6,000 officers in 
the Regular Army. The National Guard divisions were fortunately 
able to furnish most of their own officers. After this source of sup- 
ply had been exhausted, however, it was still necessary to secure some 
180,000 officers elsewhere. 

The officers' training camp was the instrumentality that really 
solved the problem of securing the commissioned personnel of the 
American Army. The successful precedents of the Flattsburg camps 
were followed. Candidates for the camps were selected after rigid 
tests as to physical and mental qualifications, many Reserve Corps 
officers being included. Three months of inter. Q ive training put the 
prospective officers through all the tasks required of the enlisted man 



30 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

and the duties of the platoon and company commander. This type 
of training camp furnished the Army with nearly half its total 
number of officers and more than two-thirds of those for line service. 
Diagrams 9 and 10 show some details about the graduates of these 
training camps. 

Diagram 9 shows the ranks of the commissions granted. By far 
the largest number of graduates were given the grade of second lieu- 

Zfanber 
Rank commissioned Par cent 

Colonels 

Lieutenant Colonels 
Majors 

Captains 

First Lieutenants 12,397 L'^aiSaS 15.4 




Second Lieutenants 62,445 ■■■■■■^■■■■1 77.5 

Total 80,568 

Diagram 9. — Officers commissioned from training camps, by ranks. 

tenant, but exceptional ability, coupled with previous military train- 
ing, was singled out in the first series of camps for more advanced 
commissions. 

Diagram 10 shows the numbers of officers commissioned in each 
branch of the service. Infantry and Artillery absorbed seven-eighths 
of the graduates with the Infantry taking more than twice as many as 
the Artillery. The total of 80,568 is not the grand total of gradu- 

Branch TTumber 

of Service commissioned rer osn * 



Infantry 



48,968 ■Bgia^ l^^l 60.7 

Field Artillery 20,291 ■■■^^■125.2 

Quartermaster 3,067 H 3.8 

Coast Artillery 2,063 ■ 2.6 

Cavalry. 2,032 ■ 2.5 

Engineer 1,966 ■ 2.4 

Signal 1,262 I 1.6 

Ordnance 767 I 1.0 

Statistical 152 1.2 

Total 80,568 

Diagram 10.— Officers commissioned from training camps, by services. 

ates of officers' training schools but only of schools training officers 
for line duty. After the close of the second series of schools in 
November, 1917, it was found desirable for various staff corps and 
departments to conduct separate specialized schools for training their 
officers and many commissions were granted in these staff schools in 
addition to those shown in the diagram. The Quartermaster, Engi- 
neer, Signal, Ordnance, and Statistical officers shown in diagram 10 
were all graduated from the first two series of schools. 



SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 31 

FRENCH AND BRITISH INSTRUCTORS. 

Shortly after the first of the new camps were established France 
and England sent to the United States some of their ablest officers 
who had seen service on the western front to bring to our training 
approved methods developed in the war. These instructors were not 



Subject of Instruction 


Somber of 
instructors 






Per cent 


Artillery 

Liaison 


43 BMHI 




15.0 

rs. 




minor tactics 


3i HBBBHB 


■ 10.8 
110.1 
1 10.1 
1 10.1 

9.5 

9.5 

officei 




Fortifications 


29 mmaamm 




Automatic rifles 


29 ■■■■■ 




Hand grenades 


29 mmnmm 




Field and staff officers' course 27 l£E||33£B£Ji 
Miscellaneous 27 BHHBBBB 

Total 286 

Diagram 11. — French instruction 





numerous but the aid they rendered was of the first importance. 
Diagrams 11 and 12 show how the subjects of instruction were 
divided among them. 

Diagram 11 gives the information for the French officers, who 
were 286 in number. Their major specialties were Artillery and 
staff work. Corresponding details for the English officers are shown 

Somber of 
Subject of instruction instructors Per cent 

Gas 

Physical training and bayonet 

Machine gun 

Sniping 

Trench mortar 

Company commanders * course 

Miscellaneous 

Artillery 

Total 261 

Diagram 12. — British instrnction officers. 

in diagram 12. These military specialists were 261 in number and 
much of their effort was devoted to instruction in gas and physical 
training. 

In addition to the officers shown, the British also detailed 226 non- 
commissioned officers as instructors, who were assigned to different 
subjects in about the same ratio as the officers. These groups of 
foreign instructors attached to training schools, divisions, and other 
units, rendered service out of all proportion to their number. They 
were a significant contribution to our training program. 




32 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

LENGTH OF TRAINING. 

Of the 42 American divisions which reached France, 36 were organ- 
ized in the summer and early autumn of 1917. The other 6 were or- 
ganized as divisions by January, 1918, but had been in training as 
separate units months before that time. 

Although the average American soldier who fought in France had 
been under training only six months before sailing, the figure for the 
training of the divisions is greater than that. The main reason for 
the difference is that gaps in the divisions were filled by men who had 
received much less training than the original troops of the organiza- 
tion. 

The average division had been organized eight months before sail- 
ing for France and its period of training was further lengthened by 
a two months interim between the time the division landed in France 
and the time it entered the line. Diagram 13 shows these periods for 
each of the 42 divisions. Each division is represented by a horizontal 
bar. The hollow part shows the period from organization to arrival 
of headquarters in France; the lightly hatched part, the time in 
France before entering line; the heavily hatched part, the time be- 
tween entering the line for the first time and engaging in combat in 
an active sector; and the solid portion the length of service as an 
active battle organization. 

The First and Second Divisions left this country as separate units 
and were organized in France. The troops of which they were com- 
posed were mostly thoroughly trained men of the Regular Army. 
The Second Division also included two regiments of Marines. The 
next three, while their stay in this country as organized divisions 
was short, were composed of selected units of the National Guard, 
most of which had seen service on the Mexican border and could be 
counted as well-trained bodies of troops. All the other divisions 
show extended periods of training in this country. The Regular 
Army divisions show the shortest periods, but were made up of the 
most experienced soldiers. 

It is noticeable that all but two of the National Guard and Na- 
tional Army divisions were organized in August and September, 
1917. The two exceptions to the rule were the Twenty-ninth, whose 
records show that it started the process of reorganization a few days 
ahead of schedule, and the Ninety-second (colored) Division which 
for a number of months trained in separte units at a number of 
different camps. 

The conclusion to be drawn from the diagram would seem to be 
that the average American division entered battle only after 10 or 



SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 



33 



Divi 

eion 




Jan J Feb [Mar | Apr JMay |jtm |jul [Aug |sep |Oct g 



1917 



1918 



1 I Organization to arrival in Prance 
X7Z%\ Arrival in France to entering line 
H~3 Entering line to active battle service 
SB Service as active combat division 

Diagram 13.— Time from organization of divisions to entering line. 

132966°— 19 3 



34 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

11 months of thorough training. This is true of the skeletons of 
divisions, but it is not true of all the men who made up their strength. 
There are two reason for this. In the first place, some weeks or even 
months usually elapsed from the time a division was organized to the 
time when it reached full strength. In the second place, troops were 
frequently taken from one division to bring up to strength another 
which was sailing, or to be sent overseas to replace losses. The train- 
ing of individual enlisted men was therefore less than for the divi- 
sions as organizations. 

The length of training of the men can be got at in another way. 
By September, 1917, we had 500,000 men in this country training 
for overseas duty. We did not have 500,000 men in France until 
May, 1918, or eight months later. It is probable that the millionth 
man who went overseas began training in December, 1917. He did 
not reach France until July, 1918, after seven months of training. 
Evidence of this character goes to show that for our first million men 
the standard of seven months' training was consistently maintained 
as an average figure. 

In June with the German drives in full swing, the Allies called on 
us to continue the extraordinary transportation of troops begun in 
April. The early movement had been met by filling up the divisions 
that sailed with the best trained men wherever they could be found. 
Divisions embarked after July 1 had to meet shortages with men 
called to the colors in the spring. By November the average period 
of training in the United States had been shortened to close to four 
months, and the average for the period July 1 to November 11 was 
probably five months. 

Seven months may then be taken as the average training figure for 
the first million men, five months for the second million, an average 
of six months before reaching France. After reaching France an 
average of two months' training before going into front-line trenches 
was maintained, although the experience of divisions used as replace- 
ments in the last months was under this figure. 

There were of course many cases in which the training was under 
these averages. To make these cases as few as possible a number of 
safeguards were set up. In this country a careful system of reporting 
on training was arranged so that only the better trained divisions 
might be sent forward. At the replacement centers in France the 
men who had slipped through without sufficient training were singled 
out and put through a 10 days' course in handling the rifle. 

In the last months of the war, the induction of men was carried 
forward at top speed and every device was used for hastening train- 
ing. The result fully justified the effort. Into the great Meuse- 
Argonne offensive we were able to throw a force of 1,200,000 men 



SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 35 

while we had many thousands of troops engaged in other parts of 
the line. Our training-camp officers stood up to the test; our men, 
with their intensive drilling in open-order fighting, which has charac- 
terized American training, routed the best of the German divisions 
from the Argonne Forest and the valley of the Meuse. 

SUMMARY. 

1. The average American soldier who fought in France had six 
months of training here, two months overseas before entering the line, 
and one month in a quiet sector before going into battle. 

2. Most soldiers received their training in infantry divisions which 
are our typical combat units and consist of about 1,000 officers and 
27,000 men. 

3. Forty-two divisions were sent to France. 

4. More than two-thirds of our line officers were graduates of the 
officers' training camps. 

5. France and England sent to the United States nearly 800 spe- 
cially skilled officers and noncommissioned officers who rendered most 
important aid as instructors in our training camps. 



Chapter III. 
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 



SENDING THE TROOPS OVERSEAS. 

During the 19 months of our participation in the war more than 
2,000,000 American soldiers were carried to France. Half a million 
of them went over in the first 13 months and a million and a half 
in the last 6 months. Within a few weeks of our entrance into the 
war we began, at the earnest request of our cobelligerents, to ship 



To France 



n-ri 




MAY JUN JUL AUS SHTOCr MOV DEC JAtl FEB MARAPfi MAY JUM JUL AUS SOT OCT hOV DEC JAM FEB MAR APR HAY JUD 



1917 1918 1919 

Diagram 14.— Men sailing each month to France and home. 

troops overseas. At first the movement was not rapid. We had only 
a few American and British troop ships chartered directly ' from 
their owners. During the early winter, as the former German liners 
came into service, embarkations increased to a rate of nearly 50,000 
per month, and by the end of 1917 had reached a total of 194,000. 

The facts as to the transportation of troops to France and back to 
the United States are presented in diagram 14, in which the upright 
columns show the number carried each month. 

37 



38 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

Early in 1918 negotiations were entered into with the British Gov- 
ernment by which three of its big liners and four of its smaller troop 
ships were definitely assigned to the service of the Army. The results 
of this are shown in the increased troop movement for March. It 
was in this month that the great German spring drive took place in 
Picardy, with a success that threatened to result in German victory. 
Every ship that could be secured was pressed into service. The aid 
furnished by the British was greatly increased. It was in May and 
the four following months that the transport miracle took place. The 
number of men carried in May was more than twice as great as the 
number for April. The June record was greater than that of May, 
and before the 1st of July 1,000,000 men had been embarked. 

The record for July exceeded all previous monthly totals, the num- 
ber of troops carried being more than 306,000. Before the end of 
October the second million men had sailed from our shores. During 
many weeks in the summer the number carried was more than 10,000 
men a day, and in July the total landed averaged more than 10,000 
for every day of the month. 

No such troop movement as that of the last summer had ever been 
contemplated, and no movement of any such number of persons by 
water for such a distance and such a time had ever previously oc- 
curred. The record has been excelled only by the achievement in 
bringing the same men back to the shores of the United States. The 
monthly records of this return are shown by the black columns of the 
same diagram, which indicate the even more rapid increase of totals 
from month to month and the attainment of higher monthly accom- 
plishments. The total number of soldiers brought home in June was 
nearly 360,000. If we add to this the sailors and marines, the total is 
more than 364,000. 

GROWTH OF THE TRANSPORT FLEET. 

The necessity for creating a great transport fleet came just at the 
time when the world was experiencing its most acute shortage of ton- 
nage. The start was made by chartering a few American merchant 
steamers and by the 1st of July there were in service seven troop 
ships and six cargo ships with a total dead-weight capacity of 94,000 
tons. 

Diagram 15 shows how there was developed from these small be- 
ginnings a great transport fleet which aggregated by the end of 
1918 three and one-quarter million dead-weight tons of shipping. 
The size of the fleet each month is shown by the figures in the bars 
of the diagram. It will be noted that each bar is divided in two 
parts, the portion on the left showing the dead-weight tonnage of the 
troop ships and that on the right the tonnage of the cargo ships. 



TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 



39 



During these same months another great American transport fleet, 
of which little has been said in the public press, was created with 
an almost equally striking rapidity. This was our cross-Channel 
fleet, which carried cargo and men from England to France. Its 
growth is pictured in the bars of diagram 16, in which the figures 
also represent the number of dead-weight tons from month to month. 
Beginning with 7,000 tons in October, 1917, this fleet consisted of 
more than a third of a million tons by the end of 1918. About one- 
fourth of the vessels were Swedish or Norwegian, while the rest 
were American. This service utilized large numbers of small wood 



1917 Jul. 


1 1 


|94 


Aug. 


1 1 


■ 131 


Sep* 


1 I 


■ 177 


Oct. 


1 1 


(EH 268 


ROV. 


i i 


BHE3I - 


Dec. 


i 




1918 Jan. 


l 1 




Feb. 


l | 


%SUM£ 


Mar. 


l 1 


f^i*MM 


Apr* 


l 1 




May 


i 1 




June 1 1 




July 1 1 


EEMSM 


Aug. 


l 1 




Sep. 


l 1 




Oct. 


l I 




U07. 


i 1 


HHjB 


Deo. 


l 1 




1919 Jan. 


l 1 


■ELSH 


Feb. 


i 1 




liar. 


l 1 


■EH 


Apr. 


l 1 




May 


l 1 


EJMSJS& 



465 



1200 



2330 



2700 



2844 



2591 



2126 



1839 
Troop Cargo 

Diagram 15. — The trans-Atlantic fleet in thousands of deadweight tons. 

and steel vessels built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation at the 
yards of the Great Lakes and along the coast. 

WHERE THE SHIPS CAME EROM. 



In building up our trans- Atlantic and Channel fleets every possible 
source of tonnage had to be called on for every ship that could be se- 
cured. The first great increment was the seized German vessels, which 



40 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

came into service during the fall of 1917. The taking over of Dutch 
steamers in the spring of 1918 and the chartering of Scandinavian 
and Japanese tonnage accounted for great increases in the cargo fleet. 
Map 3, on page 41, shows the amounts of tonnage that were secured 
for our Army fleet from the different countries of the world. 

The most ample credit must be given to the Emergency Fleet Cor- 
poration, which turned over nearly a million tons of new ships, and 
to the Shipping Control Committee, which stripped bare of all suit- 
able vessels our import and export trades and turned over for Army 




130 

.taerican ' Swedish Norwegian 

Diagram 16. — The cross-Channel fleet, in thousands of deadweight tons. 

use nearly a million and a half tons of ships. The Army vessels also 
came from 12 other nations well scattered over the globe and shown 
in the figures of the map already referred to. 

EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION. 

Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York. 
Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in 
France. Most of those who landed in England went directly to 
Liverpool and most of those who landed in France went to Brest. 
While these statements are valid generalizations, they fall short in 
showing what happened in detail. The principal facts of the east- 
ward troop movement are shown in map 4, on page 42. 



TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 



41 



Troops left America from 10 ports, as shown in the little table in 
the left of the map. In this table the several ports of Hoboken, 
New York, and Brooklyn have all been included in one, and the 
same thing is true of the different ports at Hampton Roads, which 
have been shown under the heading of Newport News. 

While 10 American ports were used, including 4 in Canada, more 
than three-quarters of all the men went from New York. The ports 
of arrival are given in the tables on the right of the map, which 
show that the ports of debarkation in Europe were even more nu- 
merous than those of embarkation in America. 



HELP FROM THE ALLIES. 



Credit for the troop movement must be shared with the Allies, and 
with the British in particular, since approximately half of the 




Map 3. — Deadweight tons of American Army shipping secured from different 

countries. 

troops were carried in their ships. This is shown by the figures of 
diagram 17. 

Among every hundred men who went over, 49 went in British 
ships, 45 in American ships, 3 in those of Italy, 2 in French, and 1 in 
Russian shipping under English control. Part of the explanation 
for the large numbers of troops carried in American ships is to be 
found from the fact that under the pressure of the critical situation 
on the western front, ways were found to increase the loading of our 
own transports by as much as 50 per cent. In addition, our trans- 
ports exceeded those of the Allies in the speed of their turnarounds. 
The facts as to the average number of days taken by the ships 



42 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



oooo o o o o 

SO o o oo o o 
Oq o Oo o o 

CO 

0) 

£ O 

q ujo _jba£ 
i a. p o o < 

< > a: < J 3 



© o o o o o ]o 

o o o o o o lo 

O O O O o ofo 

to "H ,oj'-«*-"o -h'S 

ich en &> in io 




oo ooO°oo ooo 

OO OoO ooo OO £>^ M 

oooooooo oo of 
■<-t «*- rt io y) \o vo"> shcoo 

■H tO ^- IO f> 03 83 

v0 . 61 O 



TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 



43 



to go to Europe, discharge their cargo and troops, come back, take 
on another load, and start for France once more, are shown in 
Diagram 18. 

The cycle of operations is termed "a turnaround," and it is 
not complete until the vessel has taken its load over, discharged it, 
returned, reloaded, and actually started on another trip. When our 
ships began operations in the spring of 1917 the average turn- 
around for the troop ships was 52 days, and that for the cargo 
ships 66 days. These performances were improved during the 
summer months, but became very much longer during the excep- 
tionally cold winter of 1917. During the spring, summer, and fall 
of 1918 the performances of both cargo and troop ships became 

Russian (British control) - 20,000 - 1% 
French - 47,000 - 2$-\ \V 
Italian - 65,000 - 3%-^ \\_ 




Total - 2,086,000 
Diagram 17. — American troops carried by ships of each nation. 

standardized at about 70 days for cargo ships and 35 days for troop 
ships. 

In noting these facts, as presented in the figures of the diagram, 
it is to be borne in mind that the figures refer to the lengths of 
the turnarounds of all the ships sailing from American ports in 
one month. Thus the high figure of 109 days for the cargo ships 
means that 109 days was the average time required for all the 
cargo ships leaving American ports in November to complete their 
turnarounds and start on their next trips. These vessels made 
their trips in the exceptionally cold months of December, January, 
and February. 



44 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

The fastest ships have averaged under 30 days. During the spring 
and summer of 1918 the Leviathan, the former Vaterland, has aver- 
aged less than 27 days, as has the Mowrut Vernon, the former 
Kronprinzessen Cecelie. These turnarounds, made under the em- 
barrassment of convoy, are much quicker than anything attained 
in commercial operation. During the summer the Leviathan has 
transported troops at the rate of over 400 a day, and so has landed 




J J A S IT D JFMAMJJASOKD J F M 
1917 1918 1919 

Diagram IS. — Average turnarounds of troop and cargo transports in 

days. 

the equivalent of a German division in France each month. Two 
American ships, the Great Northern and Northern Pacific, have 
averaged 25 and 26 days, respectively, and have each made turn- 
arounds in 19 days. 

CARGO MOVEMENT. 

The first shipment of cargo to support the forces abroad was made 
in June, 1917, and amounted to 16,000 tons. After the first two 



TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 



45 



months the shipments grew rapidly and steadily until they were in 
excess of 800,000 tons in the last month of the war. These facts are 
shown in diagram 19. 

The shipment of cargo differs from that of troops in that it was 
done almost entirely by American ships. Less than 5 per cent of the 
cargo carried was transported in allied bottoms. The great bulk of 
the cargo was carried in the cargo ships shown in diagram 15 on 
page 39. Kelatively small amounts were carried in the troop ships. 



629 



536 



Figures in 
Thousands of Short Tons 



•450 





363 




Jim Jul 

Diagram 19.— Tons of Army cargo shipped to France each month. 



Sep Oct Mot Pec Jan Feb Bar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb liar Apr 
1917 1918 1919 



After the signing of the armistice every ship was withdrawn from 
the service as soon as it could be spared and put back into trades or 
the carrying of food for relief work in Europe. By April the total 
cargo fleet was only a third as large as it had been five months before. 
The cargo carried for the American Army consisted of thousands 
of different articles of the most varied sort. Something of this 
variety is revealed by diagram 20, which shows the number of short 
tons carried for each of the Army supply services and for the special 



46 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

agencies. Nearly one-half of all consisted of quartermaster material, 
largely composed of food and clothing. The next largest elements 
were engineering and ordnance supplies. All together, from our en- 
trance into the war through April, 1919, the Army shipped from 
this side of the Atlantic nearly seven and a half million tons of cargo. 
Included in the cargo shipment were 1,791 consolidation loco- 
motives of the 100-ton type. Of these, 650 were shipped set up on 
their own wheels, so that they could be unloaded on the tracks in 
France and run off in a few hours under their own steam. Ship- 
ment of set-up locomotives of this size had never been made before. 
Special ships with large hatches were withdrawn from the Cuban 
ore trade for the purpose and the hatches of other ships were spe- 

Short tons 

Quartermaster 3,606,000 

Engineer 1,506,000 

Ordnance 1,189,000 

Pood relief 285,000 

Motor Transport 214,000 

French material 208,000 

Signal Corps 121,000 | 1.62 

Medical 111,000 | 1,49 

Aviation 61,000 | .82 

Red Cross 60,000 | ,81 

Y.M.O.A. 45,000 |.60 

Miscellaneous 35,000 | ,47 

Chemical Warfare 11,000 | .15 




Total 7,452,000 

Diagram 20. — Tons of cargo shipped for each. Army supply service to 

April 30, 1919. 

cially lengthened, so that when the armistice was signed the Army 
was prepared to ship these set-up locomotives at the rate of 200 a 
month. 

The Army also shipped 26,994 standard-gauge freight cars, and 
at the termination of hostilities was preparing to ship flat cars set 
up and ready to run. Motor trucks to the number of 47,018 went 
forward, and when fighting ceased were being shipped at the rate 
of 10,000 a month. Eails and fittings for the reinforcing of French 
railways and for the construction of our own lines of communica- 
tions aggregated 423,000 tons. In addition to the tons of cargo men- 
tioned above the Army shipped 68,694 horses and mules, and at 
the cessation of hostilities was shipping them at the rate of 20,000 
a month. The increase in the shipment of cargo from the United 
States was consistently maintained from the start of the war, and at 
its cessation was undergoing marked acceleration. 



TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 47 

Aside from the cargo shipped across the Atlantic, Gen. Pershing 
imported large amounts from European sources, the chief item being 
coal from England. In October he brought into France by means 
of his cross-Channel fleet a total of 275,000 tons of coal and other 
commodities. 

LOSSES AT SEA. 

During the whole period of active hostilities the Army lost at sea 
only 200,000 deadweight tons of transports. Of this total 142,000 
tons were sunk by torpedoes. No American troop transport was 




1918 1919 



Diagram 21.— Average days required to convert cargo ships to troop 

transports. 

lost on its eastward voyage. For this splendid record the Navy, 
which armed, manned, and convoyed the troop transports, deserves 
the highest commendation. . 

RETURN OF TROOPS. 

In diagram 14, on page 37, figures are presented showing the num- 
ber of troops brought back to the United States from France each 
month since the signing of the armistice. The figures mount even 
more rapidly and reach higher totals than those of the eastward 
journeys. 

As soon as the armistice was signed preparations were made for 
returning the troops to the United States in the shortest possible time. 
This was rendered difficult by the fact that for the eastward move- 



48 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

ment we had relied largely on the British, who carried approximately 
half of all the troops. After the signing of the armistice the British 
needed these ships for the return of their own colonial troops, to 
Canada, Australia, and South Africa. 

This situation was met by the Army Transport Service, which 
immediately began the conversion of our large cargo ships into troop- 
carrying vessels. Diagram 21 shows the number of days that were 
required to convert cargo ships into troop-carrying transports. The 
upright columns of the diagram are proportional to the number of 
days required. The ships upon which work was begun in December 
were not ready for the first trips as troop carriers until 55 days later. 
During the following months the work went forward more and more 
rapidly, as is shown by the shortening lengths of the columns in the 
diagram. By April the time required for converting cargo ships to 
troop carriers had been almost cut in two and was approximately one 
month. By means of these converted cargo ships, by the assignment 
of German liners, and also by the great aid rendered by the Navy, 
which put at the Army's disposal cruisers and battleships, the Army 
is being brought back home even more rapidly than it was taken to 
France. 

SUMMARY. 

1. During our 19 months of war more than 2,000,000 American 
soldiers were carried to France. Half a million of these went over 
in the first 13 months and a million and a half in the last 6 months. 

2. The highest troop-carrying records are those of July, 1918, when 
306,000 soldiers were carried to Europe, and June, 1919, when 364,000 
were brought home to America. 

3. Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York. 
Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in France. 

4. Among every 100 Americans who went over 49 went in British 
ships, 45 in American ships, 3 in Italian, 2 in French, and 1 in 
Russian shipping under English control. 

5. Our cargo ships averaged one complete trip every TO days and 
our troop ships one complete trip every 35 days. 

6. The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It reached 
the size of 2,700,000 deadweight tons and carried to Europe about 
7,500,000 ions of cargo. 

7. The greatest troop-carrier among all the ships has been the 
Leviathan, which landed 12,000 men, or the equivalent of a German 
division, in France every month. 

8. The fastest transports have been the Great Northern and the 
Northern Pacific, which have made complete turnarounds, taken on 
new troops, and started back again in 19 days, 



Chapter IV. 
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 



THE PROBLEM OF PURCHASE. 

In the spring of 1917 there were in the United States some 4,000,- 
000 young men who were about to become soldiers, although they 
little suspected the fact. Before they entered the Army, as well as 
after they were in it, these men consumed such ordinary necessities 
of life as food, coats, trousers, socks, shoes, and blankets. 

These simple facts lead directly to the mistaken conclusion that the 
problem of supplying the necessities of life for the soldiers in the 
Army was the comparatively simple one of diverting into the camps 
substantially the same amounts of food and clothing as these young 
men would have used in their homes if there had been no war. 

These men constituted about one twenty-fifth of the population 
of the country and undoubtedly consumed before the war more than 
one twenty-fifth of the food and clothing used in the United States. 
But after every possible allowance has been made for the require- 
ments of youth and the wastefulness of war, the figures of Army 
purchases still present surprising contrasts with those of civilian 
use in normal times. 

Some of these contrasts are shown in diagram 22, which compares 
total American production of blankets, wool gloves, wool socks, and 
men's shoes in 1914, as given in the census of manufactures, with 
Army purchases of the same articles in 1918. 

The first two columns of the diagram relate to blankets. They 
show that the Army purchases in 1918 were two and one-quarter 
times as great as the entire American production in 1914. To put it 
another way, the figures mean that the blankets bought in one year 
for the use of 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 soldiers would have been sufficient 
to make good the actual normal consumption of blankets by 100,000,- 
000 American civilians for two and a quarter years. From the data 
of the other columns of the same diagram similar, if not equally sur- 
prising, comparisons may be made. 

The reasons for the enormous figures of Army purchases are not far 
to seek. In the first place, men who went to camp received complete 
equipment of new articles, whereas ordinary production in peace time 

132966°— 19 4 49 



50 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



goes mainly to replace articles that have been worn out. In the sec- 
ond place, the supplies required for an army increase in proportion 
to the distance that separates the army from its home base. In the 
third place, the consumption in action is three or four times the peace 
rate. 

The stream of supplies going forward to an army may be likened 
to the water delivered against a fire by an old-fashioned bucket bri- 
gade. For every pailful thrown on the fire there must be many that 
have been taken from the source of supply and are on the way. As 



total ] 

'MADE 

y 1914 ; 

9/ 



Figures in millions 



8 




18 


TOTAL'. 

;made- 

J. 1914/ 






13 



19 



Blankets 



Wool gloves 



Wool socles 



Shoes 



Diagram 22.— Total American production of four articles compared 
with Army purchases. 

the distance from the source increases this supply in transit con- 
stantly grows. When an army is 3,000 or 4,000 miles from its sources 
of supply the amounts of supplies in reserve and in transit are enor- 
mous as compared with the quantities actually consumed each month. 
The rule generally followed for clothing was that there should be 
for each man at the front a three months' reserve in France, another 
two or three months' reserve in the United States, and a third three 
months' supply continuously in transit. Wool coats, for example, 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 



51 



last about three months in active service. Hence for every coat on a 
man's back at the front there had to be a coat in reserve in France, 
a coat in transit, and a coat in reserve in the United States. For 
every man at the front four coats were needed, and needed as soon as 
he went overseas. Two million men overseas required something 
like 8,000,000' coats, and required them immediately. 

The same thing was true for other supplies and munitions. The 
need for reserves and the time required for transportation called for 
the supply of enormous quantities and called for it at once. The im- 
mediate needs for each man sent forward were in fact far in excess 
of the later requirements. For munitions difficult to manufacture, 
such as artillery and ammunition, the problem presented by this 
necessity for reserves and large amounts in transit, in addition to 
the actual equipment of troops, was almost insuperable. The 
initial need is so great in a situation of this character that it can 
only be met in one of two ways; either by having the initial equip- 
ment available at the outbreak of war, or by immediately securing 
such an enormous productive capacity that it is larger than is 
required for maintaining the establishment later. 

In supplying food and clothing and other articles which are mat- 
ters of common commercial production, the problem was not as 
difficult as with ordnance, but the large needs for initial equipment 
did put an enormous strain upon the industries concerned. A list 
of the total deliveries during the war of some of the common articles 
of clothing shows the size of the task. They are given in Table 3. 
The cost of the articles listed was more than $1,000,000,000. 



Table 3.- — Clothing 


delivered to the . 


Arm if April 6, 1917, 


to May 31, 1918. 


Articles. 


Total 
delivered. 


Articles. 


Total 
delivered. 






131, 800, 000 
85,000,000 
83,600,000 
30,700,000 
26, 500, 000 














13'900'000 
8,300,000 




.pairs.. 













All these garments could be made in ordinary commercial fac- 
tories, but their quantity was so enormous that at a number of times 
during the war it was feared that the demand would run ahead 
of the supply. When the troop movement was speeded up in the 
spring of 1918 the margin on woolen clothing was dangerously 
narrow. To secure these and other articles in sufficient quantity 
it was found necessary in many cases for the Army to take control 
of all stages of the manufacturing process, from assembling the 
raw material to inspecting the finished product. For many months 



52 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

preceding the armistice the War Department was owner of all the 
wool in the country. From September, 1918, to June, 1919, if the 
troop movement had continued, Army needs were estimated at 
246,000,000 pounds of clean wool, while the amount allotted to 
civilian needs was only 15,000,000 pounds. The British Army had 
in a similar way some years before taken control of the English 
wool supply in order to meet army and navy needs. Their require- 
ments were, however, less than ours, to the extent that they did not 
need such a large reserve in France and practically none in transit. 
Their requirements per man for equipment were for this reason 
about two-thirds as great as ours. 

Something the same story might be told for about 30,000 kinds 
of commercial articles which the Army purchased. Purchases 
included food, forage, hardware, coal, furniture, wagons, motor 
trucks, lumber, locomotives, cars, machinery, medical instruments, 
hand tools, machine tools. In one way or another the Army at 
war drew upon almost every one of the 344 industries recognized 
by the United States Census. In some cases readjustments of 
machinery for a slightly modified product were necessary. In many 
an improved product was demanded. In practically all an enor- 
mous production was required. In the cases of some articles all 
the difficulties of quantity production were combined with the prob- 
lems of making something not before manufactured. Typical in- 
stances are the 5,400,000 gas masks and the 2,728,000 steel helmets 
produced before the end of November, 1918. 

MACHINERY OF DISTRIBUTION. 

For those supplies that were to a certain degree articles of com- 
mercial manufacture, the problem of distribution was fully as diffi- 
cult as procurement. For production, machinery already in existence 
could be utilized ; for distribution, a new organization was necessary. 
In this country the problem was not hard for there were ample rail- 
way facilities; an abundance of motor transportation could be 
requisitioned if necessary ; and the troops were near the sources. In 
France, a complete new organization was necessary whose main duty 
it was to distribute munitions and supplies. It was called the 
Services of Supply, the S. O. S., and had its headquarters at Tours. 
It was an army behind the Army. On the day the armistice was 
signed, there were reporting to the commanding general of the 
Services of Supply, 386,000 soldiers besides 31,000 German prisoners, 
and thousands of civilian laborers furnished by the Allies. At the 
same time there were in the zone of the armies 160,000 noncombatant 
troops, the majority of whom were keeping in operation the lines of 
distribution of supplies to the troops at the front, The proportion 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 



53 



of noncombatants in the American Army never fell below 28 per 
cent. In the British Army it often ran higher. Even when there 
was the greatest pressure for men at the front, the work back of the 
lines took roughly one man out of every three. 

Distributing supplies to the American forces in France was in the 
first place a problem of ports, second a problem of railroads, third 




A PORTS 

• GENERAL STORAGE DEPOTS 

PRINCIPAL RAILWAYS USED BY A.E.f 



Map 5. — Seaports, storage points, and supply lines of the American Army 

in Franee. 

a problem of motor and norse-drawn transportaion, and fourth a 
problem of storage. 

The ports and railroads of France were crowded with war traffic 
and fallen into disrepair. It was not necessary to build new ports, 
but American engineers added 17 new berths, together with ware- 
houses and dock equipment. It was not necessary to build new rail- 
roads, for France already had a railway net denser per square mile 
than that of the United States, but it was desirable to increase the 
carrying capacity by nearly 1,000 miles of new trackage, and by 
switching facilities at crucial points, by new repair shops and round- 



54 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

houses, and by new rolling stock. These things were done by the 
Engineers. The problems were not wholly solved. There were never 
enough docks to prevent some loss of time by vessels waiting to dock, 
but the capacity for handling American cargo was tripled from 
10,000 tons per day in the spring of 1918 to 30,000 tons by November 
11 and the waiting time of ships was shorter than in commercial prac- 
tice. There were never wholly adequate railway facilities, but with 
the help of locomotives and freight cars shipped from this side 
freight was carried inland about as fast as it was landed. Map 5 
shows the main railway lines used by the overseas forces. They con- 
nect the principal ports at which the Army fleet docked with the 
headquarters of the Services of Supply at Tours and with the Toul- 
Verclun sector, where the American armies operated. The dots rep- 
resent the principal storage depots of the transportation service. 

NARROW-GAUGE RAILWAYS AND MOTOR TRUCKS. 

Railroads carried American supplies from the ports in France to 
intermediate or advance depots. As map 5 shows, railroad lines 
roughly paralleled the front. Spurs led up to the front, but beyond 
a certain distance the standard-gauge railroad did not go. Where 
the danger of shelling began or where the needs changed rapidly 
as the battle activity shifted from this front to that, the place of the 
heavy railway was taken by other means of distributing supplies. 
First came the narrow-gauge railroad, with rails about 2 feet apart, 
much narrower than the usual narrow-gauge road in this country. 
American engineers built 125 miles of these roads, for which 406 
narrow-gauge locomotives and 2,385 narrow-gauge cars were shipped 
from this country, in addition to the standard-gauge equipment. 

Beyond the range of the narrow-gauge railway came the motor 
truck. The truck could go over roads that were under shell fire. It 
could retire with the Army or push forward with advancing troops. 
Trucks were used on a larger scale in this war than was ever before 
thought possible. The American Infantry division on the march 
with the trucks, wagons, and ambulances of its supply, ammunition, 
and sanitary trains stretches for a distance of 30 miles along the road. 
The 650 trucks which the tables of organization of the division pro- 
vide are a large factor in this train. The need for trucks increased 
moreover during the latter months of the war as trench warfare gave 
place to a war of movement. As the forces moved forward on the 
offensive away from their railway bases, more and more trucks were 
demanded. 

The Army overseas never had all the trucks it needed during the 
period of hostilities. Diagram 23 shows how the supply, month by 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 



55 



month, measured up to the numbers called for in the tables of organi- 
zation. The dash line shows the truck tonnage needed and the heavy 
line the amount available. 

The supply was least adequate during the last four months of the 
war, when the shipment of trucks fell behind the accelerated troop 
movement. The difficulty was almost entirely a shortage of ships. 
At practically all times there were quantities of trucks at the ports 
of embarkation, but trucks take enormous amounts of cargo space 
on ships. It is slow and difficult work to load them, and time after 
time embarkation officials were forced to leave the trucks standing 



Tons 



75000 



50000 



25000 




1918 1919 

Diagram 23.— Motor-track tonnage needed and available in the Amer- 
ican Expeditionary Forces. 

at the ports and load their ships rapidly with supplies needed still 
more urgently overseas. In October and November more ships were 
pulled out of the trades and the trucks were shipped even at the 
expense of other essential supplies. The shipment kept pace with 
the troop movement, but the initial shortage could not be overcome 
until February. The number of trucks sent overseas prior to the 
armistice was 40,000 and of these 33,000 had been received in France. 
The trucks ranged in size from three-quarters of a ton to 5 tons. 



56 



THE WAB WITH GERMANY. 



Beyond the range of the motor truck the horse and wagon were 
the means of supply distribution. Here again the American armies 
made an inadequate equipment do the work that was required. The 
shipment of animals overseas was discontinued early in 1918 on the 
information that horses could be purchased overseas. Then in the 
fall when every ton of shipping was precious, the supply of foreign 
horses proved inadequate and 23 of the best of the Army's cargo 



JO LIVERPOOL 




LEASED FROM ALLIES OR TAKEN {^ 

OVER FROM GERMANS *V, 

U.S WIRES — . "N*»..< 



Map 6.' 



■American telephone and telegraph lines in France, England, and 

Germany. 



vessels had to be converted to animal transports. About 500 horses 
and mules were embarked in September and 17,000 in October. The 
shipments could not, however, be started soon enough to prevent a 
shortage. A horse uses as much ship space as 10 tons of cargo, but 
in the latter months the need for animals was so great that this 
sacrifice was made. 

In general, it may be said that the Army overseas never had 
enough means of transportation. It may also be said that they 
had very large quantities and that they produced remarkable results 
with the supply they had. 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 
4 7,000 TELEGRAMS A DAY. 



57 



In order to operate the transportation of supplies in France, a new 
system of communication had to be set up; so the Signal Corps 
strung its wires over nearly every part of France. This is shown 
in map 6. 

The heavy lines indicate telephone and telegraph lines wholly con- 
structed by Americans or wires strung on French poles. The light 
lines are wires leased from the French or taken over from the Ger- 
mans. Trunk lines led from all the principal ports to Paris, to 
Tours, and to general headquarters (G. H. Q.) back of the Ameri- 
can battle areas. The lines running to Coblenz for the army of 




Map 7. — Construction projects of the Army in the United States. 

occupation were taken over from the Germans. At the time of the 
signing of the armistice the Signal Corps was operating 282 tele- 
phone exchanges and 133 complete telegraph stations. The tele- 
phone lines numbered 14,956, reaching 8,959 stations. More than 
100,000 miles of wire had been strung. The peak load of operation 
reached was 47,555 telegrams a day, averaging 60 words each. 

CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES. 

To build factories and storage warehouses for supplies, as well as 
housing for troops, 200,000 workmen in the United States were 
kept continuously occupied for the period of the war. The force of 
workers on this single activity was larger than the total strength of 



58 THE WAE WITH GEKMANY. 

both southern and northern armies in the Battle of Gettysburg. The 
types of construction included cement piers and warehouses, equip- 
ment for proving grounds, plants for making powder and explo- 
sives, repair shops, power plants, roads, and housing for troops. 
Building was required in every State of the Union, as shown in 
map 7. Each dot represents a construction project. 

The region of greatest activity was the Northeast, at once the most 
densely populated section and the center of munitions production. 

Housing constructed had a capacity of 1,800,000 men, or more 
than the entire population of Philadelphia. The operations of the 

Millions Por cent 

of dollars of total 

National Amy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
cantonments 199 B SHHBbB SZSSaB&SS&BBSEaSB&ttM 24 

Ordnance Dept. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™ 

projects 163 iiGBEBHJSBBBaHnBHBHH 20 

Miscel. camps and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™ ■ 

cantonments 139 I IBbhEBT . 5H* Bfl 17 

Quartermaster Corps ^_^_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ 
projects 137 IHbBBBH \: _ H 16 

Rational Guard 

camps 74 

Hospitals 23 | JJ 

Regular Amy ^m^m 

posts 22 HBB 

Coast artillery ^— 

posts 13 HB 2 



Aviation & Signal 
Corps projects 



8 ■ 1 



Other construction - 40 

v 

Total 818 



Diagram 24 Costs of construction projects in the United States. 

Construction Division constituted what was probably the largest con- 
tracting business ever handled in one office. 

The total expenditures in this enterprise to November 11, 1918, 
were, in round numbers, $800,000,000, or about twice the cost of the 
Panama Canal. The per cent of the total which was allotted to 
various purposes is shown in diagram 24. The largest single item 
is the cost of National Army cantonments which was nearly one- 
quarter of the total. Ordnance Department projects, including the 
building of enormous powder, high-explosive, and loading plants, 
come second. 

The costs of construction were probably higher than they would 
have been for slower work. The outstanding feature of the accom- 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 59 

plishment was its rapidity. Each of the cantonments was completed 
in substantially 90 days. It was this speed that made it possible to 
get the draft army under training before the winter of 1917 set 
in and made it available just in time for the critical action of the 
summer of 1918. 

CONSTRUCTION IN THE A. E. F. 

The conduct of the war in France necessitated a construction pro- 
gram comparable in magnitude and number of projects with that in 
the United States. Less new building was required for shelter and 

















\ & *-> 










} Va 










^ t& 










y~ ,n 










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CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS OF 


THE A.E.F. 





Map 8. — Construction projects of the Army in Prance. 

for the manufacture of munitions, but more for the development of 
port and railroad facilities and for the repair and operation of the 
complicated equipment of a modern army. 

The storage space constructed in France was more than nine- 
tenths as large as the amount built at home. Hospital capacity con- 
structed in France was twice the new capacity at home. 

All construction work in France was performed by the Corps of 
Engineers under the Services of Supply. The labor force consisted 
largely of American soldiers and German prisoners, although French 



60 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



and English civilians and Chinese coolies were used wherever avail- 
able. To economize tonnage materials were obtained in Europe as 
far as possible, sometimes at high prices. The Engineer Corps ran 
its own quarries and its own logging camps and sawmills. Only such 
materials as could not be obtained abroad — chiefly machinery and 
steel products — were purchased in the United States. 

Up to the signing of the armistice construction projects had been 
undertaken by the Corps of Engineers to the number of 831. Their 



45 DAYS SUPPLY 



23 


S3 




Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jim Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 



1916 

Diagram 25.— Days supply of Army rations on hand in the American 
Expeditionary Forces eaeh month. 

distribution over France is shown in map 8, in which every dot 
represents a place at which one or sometimes several projects were 
undertaken. The A. E. F. left its trail in the shape of more or less- 
permanent improvements over the greater part of France. The proj- 
ects cluster most thickly around the ports used by American forces 
and the American area on the southern end of the battle line. 



FOOD AND CLOTHING AT THE FRONT. 

The real test of the efficiency of the supply service comes when an 
army engages in battle. Measured by that test the work of feeding, 
clothing, and equipping the American Army was well done for, in 



FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 61 

the main, the expeditionary forces received what they needed. 
Within the limits of this report no account can be given in detail 
of how fully the supplies received overseas met the needs of the 
troops. A few typical and fundamentally important items only can 
be selected. Food and clothing are the most essential. 

At no time was there a shortage of food in the expeditionary forces. 
Soldiers sometimes went hungry in this as in all other wars, but the 
condition was local and temporary. It occurred because of trans- 
portation difficulties during periods of active righting or rapid move- 
ment when the units outran their rolling kitchens. The stocks of 
food on hand in depots in France were always adequate. This is 
illustrated in diagram 25. The columns show the stocks of food in 
depots on the first of each month in terms of how many days they 
would last the American forces then in France. 

During the winter and spring of 1918 the amounts on hand rose 
steadily. On May 1, about the time when American troops were en- 
tering active fighting for the first time, they were well over the 45- 
day line, which was considered the required reserve during the latter 
months of the war. For a time efforts were made to build up a 90- 
day supply in order that the overseas forces might continue to oper- 
ate for some months, even if the lines of supply across the ocean were 
cut. As the menace of the submarine becomes less acute, and as the 
need of ship tonnage for other supplies became more pressing, the 
required reserve was cut to 45 days. It will be seen from the dia- 
gram that at no time during the period of active operations did the 
reserve fall below this line. 

In the matter of clothing also, the supply services rose to the emer- 
gency of combat. 

There were periods in the history of many individual units when 
needed supplies could not be immediately obtained but, as in the 
case of food, the difficulty was one of local transportation. 

The records of the Quartermaster show that during the six months 
of hard fighting, from June to November, the enlisted man in the 
A. E. F. received on the average : 

Slicker and overcoat, every 5 months. 

Blanket, flannel shirt, and breeches, every 2 months. 

Coat, every 79 days. 

Shoes and puttees, every 51 days. 

Drawers and undershirt, every 34 days. 

Woolen socks, every 23 days. 

SUMMARY. 

1. The problems of feeding and clothing the Army were difficult 
because of the immense quantities involved rather than because of 
the difficulty of manufacturing the articles needed. 



62 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

2. Requirements for some kinds of clothing for the Army were 
more than twice as great as the prewar total American production 
of the same articles. 

3. To secure the articles needed for the Army the Government 
had to commandeer all the wool and some other staple articles in 
the United States and control production through all its stages. 

4. The distribution of supplies in the expeditionary forces re- 
quired the creation of an organization called the Services of Supply, 
to which one-fourth of all the troops who went overseas were as- 
signed. 

5. American Engineers built in France 17 new ship berths, 1,000 
miles of standard-gauge track, and 125 miles of narrow-gauge track. 

6. The Signal Corps strung in France 100,000 miles of telephone 
and telegraph wire. 

7. Prior to the armistice 40,000 trucks were shipped to the forces 
in France. 

8. Construction projects in the United States cost twice as much 
as the Panama Canal, and construction overseas was on nearly as 
large a scale. 

9. The Army in France always had enough food and clothing. 



Chapter V. 
SPRINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 



RIFLES. 



During the years immediately preceding our entrance into the war 
there was much discussion within the War Department, as well as in 
the country at large, of the need for increased military preparedness. 
Reference to the department reports for 1914, 1915, and 1916 shows 
that what was then considered as the best military and civilian 
opinion was agreed that the army that would have to be called into 
the field in any large emergency was one of 500,000 men. 

In these reports attention was called to the fact that while our 
available resources in trained men, in airplanes, and in machine guns 
were entirely inadequate, our reserve stocks of rifles and small-arms 
ammunition were sufficient for even a larger Army than the half 
million suggested. 

On the outbreak of hostilities there were on hand nearly 600,000 
Springfield rifles of the model of 1903. This arm is probably the 
best Infantry rifle in use in any army, and the number on hand was 
sufficient for the initial equipment of an army of about 1,000,000 men. 
What no one foresaw was that we should be called upon to equip 
an army of nearly 4,000,000 men in addition to furnishing rifles 
for the use of the Navy. 

The emergency was met in several different ways. The available 
Springfields were used to equip the Regular Army and National 
Guard divisions that were first organized. In addition to these rifles 
we also had in stock some 200,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles that had 
been stored for an emergency and were in sufficiently good condition 
to be used for training purposes. In addition, efforts were made to 
speed up the manufacture of new Springfields. 

It was soon found, however, that manufacturing difficulties would 
make it impossible to increase the output of Springfields to much be- 
yond 1,000 per day, which was clearly insufficient. At this juncture 
decision was reached to undertake the manufacture of an entirely 
new rifle to meet the deficiency. 

Fortunately, there were in this country several plants which were 
just completing large orders for the Enfield rifle for the British 
Government. A new rifle — the model 1917 — was accordingly de- 

63 



64 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



signed. This rifle resembled the British Enfield sufficiently so that 
the plants equipped for Enfield production could be rapidly con- 
verted to its manufacture, but it was chambered to use the same am- 
munition as is used in the Springfield and in the machine guns and 
automatic rifles of American manufacture. 

Diagram 26 shows the number of Springfields and Enfields ac- 
cepted to the end of each month from the beginning of the war up 



3490 



3524 *»? 3550 




PRE ^AUSSCFTOCT MOV DEC JAM FEB MAR APR MAY JUH JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAM FEB MAH APR. 
R 1917 1918 1919 

Diagram 26 — Thousands of Springfields and Enfields accepted to the 

end of each month. 

to the end of April, 1919. The figures include the prewar stock of 
Springfields. 

Beginning with slightly less than 600,000 Springfields at the out- 
break of the war, the total at the end of the war had increased to 
nearly 900,000. The Enfields first came into production in August, 

1917. After their manufacture had actually begun the output in- 
creased rapidly until it totaled at the end of the war, in November, 

1918, nearly 2,300,000, 



SPKINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 65 

During the entire period the production of spare parts for the 
Springfield rifles was continued at an increased rate. The first di- 
visions sent to France were equipped with this rifle. It is a fact that 
about half the rifle ammunition used against the enemy by United 
States troops was shot from Springfield rifles. The test of battle 
use has upheld the high reputation of the Springfield, and has dem- 
onstrated that the American Enfield is also a weapon of superior 
quality. The American troops were armed with rifles that were 
superior in accuracy and rapidity of fire to those used by either 
their enemies or the Allies. 

MACHINE GUNS. 

The use of machine guns on a large scale is a development of the 
European war. This is demonstrated by the records of every army. 
In the case of the American forces the figures are particularly im- 
pressive. In 1912 Congress sanctioned the allowance of the War De- 
partment of four machine guns per regiment. In 1919, as a result of 
the experience of the war, the new Army plans provide for an equip- 
ment of 336 machine guns per regiment. The second allowance is 84 
times as great as the one made seven years earlier. 

In the annual report of the Secretary of War for 1916, transmitted 
in the fall of that year, attention was called to the efforts then being 
made to place our Army on a satisfactory footing with respect to 
machine guns. The report says : 

Perhaps no invention has more profoundly modified the art of war than the 
machine gun. In the European War this arm has been brought into very great 
prominence. * * * When the Congress at the last session appropriated $12,- 
000,000 for the procurement of machine guns, it seemed important, for obvious 
reasons, to free the air of the various controversies and to set at rest in as final 
a fashion as possible the conflicting claims of makers and inventors. A board 
was therefore created. * * * A preliminary report has been made by this 
board, selecting the Vickers-Maxim type for heavy machine guns, recommending 
the purchase of a large supply of them, and fixing a date in May at which time 
exhaustive tests to determine the relative excellence of various types of light 
machine guns are to be made. 

In accordance with these recommendations, 4,000 Vickers machine 
guns were ordered in December, 1916. By the end of the next year 
2,031 of them had been delivered. In further accord with the recom- 
mendations of the board, careful tests were held in May, 1917, of 
various types of heavy machine guns, and also of light machine guns, 
which have come to be known as automatic rifles. Rapidity of fire, 
freedom from stoppage and breakage, accuracy, weight, ease of manu- 
facture, and other factors were all carefully examined. 

The Vickers gun justified the good opinion previously formed of it, 
but it was clear that it could not be put on a quantity-pro^ction 

132966°-^L9 5 ;,,1 i ! u!'Ut ! < 'i&OlXi 



66 THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 

basis because of technical difficulties in manufacture. Fortunately, 
a new gun well adapted to quantity production was presented for 
trial. This gun, the heavy Browning, performed satisfactorily in all 
respects and was adopted as the ultimate standard heavy machine 
gun. The light Browning, designed by the same expert, was easily 
in the lead as an automatic rifle, weighing only 15 pounds. The 
Lewis gun, too heavy for satisfactory use as an automatic rifle and not 
capable of the long-sustained fire necessary in a heavy gun, was very 
well suited, with slight modification, for use as a so-called flexible gun 
on aircraft. A small number (2,500) of these guns were ordered for 
training purposes for ground use, but the bulk of the possible produc- 
tion of this gun was assigned to aircraft purposes. In addition to 
the flexible type, airplanes require also a synchronized gun; that is, 
a gun whose time of firing is so adjusted that the shots pass between 
the propeller blades. The Vickers gun had been used successfully for 
this purpose in Europe and the call was insistent for their diversion 
to this use, both for our own planes and for those of the French. 
After many trials and adjustments, however, the Marlin gun, a de- 
velopment of the old Colt, was adapted to this purpose, releasing 
part of the early production of Vickers guns for ground use. A sub- 
sequent development was the design of a modified form of the heavy 
Browning for aircraft use as a synchronized gun. 

Production of all the types mentioned was pressed and the advan- 
tages of preparedness illustrated. The placing of the order for 4,000 
Vickers in 1916 enabled 12 of our early divisions to receive that 
weapon as their heavy machine gun. The thorough trial given in 
May, much earlier than would have been possible except for previous 
plans, made possible a selection of suitable types for every purpose 
and the completion of the first light Brownings in February, 1918, 
and the first heavy Brownings in April of the same year. 

The remarkable rise in the rate of production is shown by months 
in diagram 27. The rise was broken only in September, the month of 
the influenza epidemic. 

The earliest needs of our troops in France were met by French 
Hotchkiss machine guns and Chauchat automatic rifles. A little 
later, divisions going over were provided with Vickers heavy guns 
and Chauchat automatic rifles. After July 1, divisions embarking 
were equipped with light and heavy Brownings. Both Browning 
guns met with immediate success and with the approval of foreign 
officers as well as with that of our own. 

Although the light and the heavy Browning guns were brought 
into production in February and April of 1918, they were not used 
in battle until September. This was not because of any shortage of 
supply in the later summer months but because of a deliberate and 
most significant judgment on the part of Gen. Pershing. After 



SPRINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 



67 



careful tests of the new weapons had been made in Europe the 
American commander in chief decided that the two new Brownings 
were so greatly superior to any machine guns in use by any of the 
armies on either side that the wisest course would be to wait until 
several divisions could be equipped with them and a plentiful future 
supply assured before using them in battle at all. 

What he feared was that if the first of the guns to reach the expe- 
ditionary forces were used in battle there would always be some 



227 



201 



178 



TOTAL ACCEPTED 227,000 

I^J Accepted to date (whole column) 
ff§f| Accepted during month 
FIGCBBS 15 THOUSABDS 



143 



121 



86 



61 



4a 



35 



26 



O 



13 



□ 



19 , , 



1 1 



1 1 



HI 



Jtm Jul Aug Sep Oct Hot Bee 



To Jan Feb Vsr Apr 1 

Dec 31 ' 

1917 1918 

Diagram 27.— Thousands of American machine guns produced to the 

end of each month. 

chance that one might be captured by the Germans. If this should 
happen it was possible that with their quick recognition of the im- 
portance of any military improvement and the demonstrated German 
industrial capacity for quantity production, they might begin the 
immediate manufacture of German Brownings. In this event the 
advantage of the possession of large numbers of greatly improved 
types of machine guns and automatic rifles would be partly lost to 
the American forces. 



68 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



For these reasons the Brownings were not used in combat until 
they were used in large numbers in the Meuse-Argonne battle. There 
they amply justified the faith of the American commander and the 
Ordnance Department in their superior qualities. 

The total number of machine guns of American manufacture pro- 
duced to the end of 1918 is shown in Table 4. In addition there were 
secured from the French and British 5,300 heavy machine guns, of 
which nearly all 'were French Hotchkiss guns, and 34,000 French 
Chauchat automatic rifles. 

Tabxe 4. — Machine guns produced to the end of 1918. 

Heavy Browning field 56,612 

Vickers field 12,125 

Other field 6,366 

Lewis aircraft 39,200 

Browning aircraft 580 

Marlin aircraft 38,000 

Vickers aircraft 3, 714 

Light Browning 69,960 

Total 226,557 

i 

RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS USED IN FRANCE. 

When troops embarked for France they carried with them their 
rifles, and sometimes their machine guns and automatic rifles. If 
appropriate allowance is made for such troop property in addition 
to what was shipped in bulk for replacement and reserves, it is 
found that about 1,775,000 rifles, 29,000 light Brownings, and 27,000 
heavy Brownings, and 1,500,000,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun 
ammunition were shipped to France from this country before No- 
vember 1. These supplies were supplemented by smaller amounts re- 
ceived from the French 'and British, as already mentioned. The 
actual use of American-made machine guns and automatic rifles in 
France is summarized in Table 5. 

Table 5. — Use of American-made automatic arms in France. 



Total, 
including 
training. 



Light Browning 

Heavy Browning . . . 
Vickers ground gun 

Lewis aircraft 

Marlin aircraft 

Vickers aircraft — 




SPEINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 69 

PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS. 

From the beginning of the war the call for pistols was insistent. 
In this case the American Army was fortunate in having in the 
Browning-Colt a weapon already in production and more effective 
than the corresponding weapon used by any other army. But while 
there never was any question as to the quality of the pistol, there was 
much trouble in securing them in numbers adequate to meet the de- 
mands. To help meet the situation a revolver was designed using 
the same ammunition, and placed in production in October, 1917. As 
a result the troops in France who were likely to require them for 
close combat were supplied with one or the other of these weapons 
so far as possible, but full equipment was never secured. 

SMALL-ARMS AMMUNITION. 

A sufficient supply of small-arms ammunition has always been 
available to provide for troops in service. The complication due to 
the use of machine guns and automatic rifles of French caliber has 
been successfully met. To meet the special needs of the Air Service 
and of antiaircraft defense, new types of ammunition have been de- 
signed and produced, the purposes of which are indicated by their 
names — armor piercing, tracer, and incendiary. Before the end of 
the war American production of small arms ammunition amounted to 
approximately 3,500,000,000 rounds, of which 1,800,000,000 were ship- 
ped overseas. In addition, 200,000,000 rounds were secured from the 
French and British. 

ARMS AND THE MEN. 

Diagram 28 is an attempt to answer in graphic form the question 
"To what degree did the different elements of our troop program 
and our small-arms program move forward in company front?" 
The upper heavy black line represents the number of men in the 
American Army from month to month. The lower black line repre- 
sents similarly the strength of the Army in France. 

On the same scale are drawn four other lines indicating widely 
fluctuating quantities for the different months. The lowest of these 
represents the size of army that could have been equipped, accord- 
ing to the tables of organization, with the number of pistols and 
revolvers actually on hand each month. The diagram shows that we 
never had nearly enough of these weapons to equip fully our entire 
Army, and only during part of the months of the war were there 
enough for the full equipment of the troops in France even if all 
the pistols and revolvers had been there and issued. 



10 



THE WAR wl?H GEEMAtf¥. 



The line for automatic rifles shows an adequate supply for all 
troops only in the last two months of the war. That for machine 
guns shows inadequate supplies up to July and then so enormous a 



MILLIONS 
OF MEN 



N 

"7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2, 
1 
















































































































































AftM"^^ 




































WaXjS^lm 





sjmsssw^ -- 





APR MAY JUN JUL AU6 SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG- SEP OCT NOV 
1917 1918 

Diagram 28. — Small arms available each month. 

production as to be sufficient before the end of the war for an army 
of nearly 8,000,000 men. The line for rifles shows relatively close 
agreement during the entire period. There was an initial surplus, 
then a deficit for six months, and after that a consistent surplus. 

In the cases of automatic rifles, machine guns, and rifles there was 
always a supply on hand in excess of what would have been required 
for the equipment of the expeditionary forces alone. 



SPRINGFIELDS, ENEIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 71 

In making the computations for all these comparisons an appro- 
priate allowance has been made in every case for reserves, wastage, 
and time lost in transit. The curves represent as nearly as it has 
been possible to make them the actual balance each month between 
the number of men and the total equipment available. They can not, 
of course, take into account any shortages that may have resulted in 
specific localities through failures in distribution. 

Only the Springfield and Enfield rifles are included in the compu- 
tation of available rifles, although hundreds of thousands of Krag- 
Jorgensen and Russian rifles and some Canadian Ross rifles were 
used for training purposes. 

The rapid rise of the lines representing the men that could have 
been equipped with machine guns and automatic rifles in the later 
months is due to the heavy production of Brownings. In fact, this 
production was one of the striking features of our war effort. It 
would have resulted, if the fighting had been prolonged, in a greatly 
increased volume of fire on the part of the American troops. 

PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1919. 

At this point it is appropriate to comment on the fact that there 
are many articles of munitions in which American production reached 
great amounts by the fall of 1918 but which were not used in large 
quantities at the front because the armistice was signed before big 
supplies of them reached France. In the main, these munitions are 
articles of ordnance and aviation equipment, involving such tech- 
nical difficulties of manufacture that their production could not be 
improvised or even greatly abbreviated in time. 

As the production figures are scrutinized in retrospect, and it is 
realized that many millions of dollars were spent on army equip- 
ment that was never used at the front, it seems fair to question 
whether prudent foresight could not have avoided some of this 
expense. 

Perhaps the best answer to the question is to be found in the record 
of a conference that took place in the little French town of Trois 
Fontaines on October 4, 1918, between Marshal Foch and the Ameri- 
can Secretary of War. 

In that conference the allied commander in chief made final ar- 
rangements with the American Secretary as to the shipment of 
American troops and munitions in great numbers during the fall and 
winter preparatory for the campaign of 1919. 

This was one day before the first German peace note and 38 days 
before the end of the war, but Marshal Foch was then calling upon 
America to make her great shipments of munitions and her supreme 
contribution of man power for the campaign of the following year. 



72 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

SUMMARY. 

1. When war was declared the Army had on hand nearly 600,000 
Springfield rifles. Their manufacture was continued, and the Ameri- 
can Enfield rifle designed and put into production. 

2. The total production of Springfield and Enfield rifles up to 
the signing of the armistice was over 2,500,000. 

3. The use of machine guns on a large scale is a development of the 
European war. In the American Army the allowance in 1912 was 
four machine guns per regiment. In 1919 the new Army plans provide 
for an equipment of 336 guns per regiment, or eighty- four times as 
many. 

4. The entire number of American machine guns produced to the 
end of 1918 was 227,000. 

5. During the war the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning 
machine gun were developed, put into quantity production, and used 
in large numbers in the final battles in France. 

6. The Browning machine guns are believed to be more effective 
than the corresponding weapons used in any other army. 

7. American production of small arms ammunition amounted to 
approximately 3,500,000,000 rounds, of which 1,800,000,000 were 
shipped overseas. 

8. Attention is directed to diagram 28, on page 70, comparing 
numbers of men under arms each month with numbers for which 
equipment of pistols, rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns were 
available. 



Chapter VI. 
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 



ARTILLERY. 



It was true of light artillery as it was of rifles, that the United 
States had, when war was declared, a supply on hand sufficient to 
equip the Army of 500,000 men that proponents of preparedness 
had agreed might have to take the field in the event of a large emer- 
gency. There were 900 pieces of field artillery then available. The 
gun on hand in largest quantities was the 3-inch fieldpiece, of which 
we had 544. As 50 of these are required for 1 division, this was a 
sufficient number to equip 11 divisions. When the emergency ar- 
rived, however, it was far larger than had been foreseen even by 
those who had been arguing that we needed an army several times 
as large as the one we then had. The initial plans called for the 
formation of 42 divisions, which would require 2,100 3-inch field- 
pieces almost at once. In addition, these divisions would require 
for active operations in France a repair shop reserve, a replacement 
reserve, and a stream of guns in transit which would increase their 
initial requirements to about 3,200. To keep this army going would 
only require a production of about 100 guns per month, but to get 
it going within a reasonable length of time would have required a 
productive capacity of 300 or 400 guns per month, depending on 
how soon it was imperative for the army to be in action. The great 
difference between the manufacturing output necessary to get an 
army going quickly and that required to keep it going after it has 
been equipped, explains the enormous industrial disadvantage suf- 
fered by a nation which enters a war without its stocks of military 
supplies for initial equipment already on hand. 

To meet the situation the decision was made in June, 1917, to 
allot our own guns to training purposes and to equip our forces 
in France with artillery conforming to the French and British 
standard calibers. The arrangement was that we should purchase 
from the French and British the artillery needed for our first divi- 
sions and ship to them in return equivalent amounts of steel, copper, 
and other raw materials so that they could either manufacture guns 
for us in their own factories or give us guns out of their stocks and 
proceed to replace them by new ones made from our materials. 

73 



*74 the war With germane. 

The plans then formulated further provided that, with our initial 
requirements taken care of in this way, we should at once prepare 
to manufacture in our own plants artillery of these same cali- 
bers for the equipment of later divisions. In general, it may be 
truly said that these plans were carried through successfully along 
the lines originally laid down. With no serious exceptions, the 
guns from British and French sources were secured as needed, but 
our own plants were slower in producing complete units ready for 
use than had been hoped and planned. 

In our factories the 3-inch guns of improved model which had 
been ordered in September, 1916, were changed in caliber to use 
standard French ammunition, and became known as 75 mm. guns, 
model 1916. The British 18-pounder then being produced in this 
country was similarly redesigned, and became known as the 75 mm. 
gun, model 1917. Work was immediately begun also on the plans 
for the French 75 mm. gun so as to make it possible to produce it 
in American factories. For this gun, however, it was necessary to 
develop new manufacturing capacity. 

In the case of other calibers of artillery, the same means in gen- 
eral were taken to secure a supply. Material previously on order 
was adapted to meet the new conditions ; capacity actually engaged 
on production for the French and British was utilized to as great 
an extent as possible, and foreign plans were adapted to American 
practice and new plants erected to push production. It was neces- 
sary, of course, in all this work not to interfere with American pro- 
duction for the Allies. Of the enormous amount of equipment made 
necessary by the expansion of the Army from its first strength to 
the contemplated force of 5,000,000 men, the artillery and artillery 
ammunition could be improvised with the least facility, for the 
necessary processes of its manufacture involved irreducible periods 
of time. In spite of all these handicaps, the record of actual pro- 
duction on United States Army orders only, is 1,642 complete units 
of artillery before the armistice was signed. The total production 
of complete units of artillery in American plants is shown by the 
figures of diagram 29. The data are exclusive of production for 
the Navy and for the Allies. 

In point of fact the figures showing the number of complete units 
produced are somewhat unfair to the American record. The diffi- 
cult problem of planning the production of the different component 
parts was not satisfactorily solved until about the end of the war. 
The result was that by the production of a single component, after 
the armistice was signed, hundreds of units were completed, and the 
totals for the months after the armistice are as large as those before 
October, although the work actually done in those months was very 



TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE PIKING LINE. 



T5 



much less. These facts are revealed by the monthly and total figures 
of the diagram. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of com- 
plete artillery units produced in American plants was more than 
3,000, or equal to all those purchased abroad from the French and 
British up to the signing of the armistice. 



3077 




Diagram 29.— Complete units of artillery made in America. 



ARTILLERY AMMUNITION. 

In the magnitude of the quantities involved the Artillery ammuni- 
tion program was the biggest of all. Copper, steel, high explosives, 
and smokeless powder were all required by the hundreds of millions 
of pounds. As no firms were prepared to manufacture complete 
rounds, it was necessary for the Ordnance Department to make con- 
tracts for each component and to assume the burden of directing the 
distribution of these components between manufacturers. For the 
shrapnel it was possible to use the design substantially as had previ- 



76 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



ously been used in this country, but the high explosive and gas shell 
proved more troublesome. A large supply of American shell was 
produced, however, before the signing of the armistice, and shipment 
to Europe in quantity had begun. The ammunition actually used 
against the enemy at the front was nearly all of French manufacture, 



20326 



18294 



15702 



12630 



TOTAL ACCEPTED 20,326,000 

£■■ Accepted to date (whole column) 
"■'>' Accepted during month 

FIGUBES EJ THOUSAHDS 



10072 



7981 



6896 



S55S 



4361 



3231 



2389 



1427 



1803 



UUhHIH 




To Jan. Feb. liar. Apr. Hay June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Hot. Dec. 



Dec. 31 



i 191? 1918 

Diagram 30.— Thousands of complete rounds of American artillery am- 
munition produced. 

but the approaching supply from America made possible a more free 
use of the French and British reserves. As shown in diagram 30, 
our monthly production of artillery ammunition rose to over 
2.000,000 complete rounds in August and over 3,000,000 rounds in 
October if we include United States calibers. By the end of 1918 
the number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition produced 
in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared with 
10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British. 



TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 77 

BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARTILLERY PRODUCTION. 

One mode of measuring our accomplishments in the way of artil- 
lery production is to compare what we succeeded in producing in our 
own plants in the first 20 months after the declaration of war with 
what Great Britain produced in the first 20 months after her entry 
into the war. This comparison is made in diagram 31, which com- 
pares for that period of time American and British production of 
complete units of light and heavy artillery and rounds of light and 
heavy shells. Antiaircraft artillery (a small item) is not included 

Light artillery 

British | 3.599 I 

American 

Heavy artillery 



British 1 


379_J 














Light artillery shells 








British Q 




23.328.0001 












American SMHRSHflHHi 






2B,?74,Q0Q | 



Heary artillery shells 

British H. 153.0001 
American hHHHhBI 



Diagram 31.— British and American production of artillery and am- 
munition in the first 20 months of war. 

in either class. Canadian production of machined shell for Great 
Britain and the United States is included in each case. 

In each of the comparisons of diagram 31 the bar in outline repre- 
sents British production over the first 20 months, and the one in 
solid black the American output over the first 20 months. The fig- 
ures show that the British did better than we did in the production 
of light artillery, but that we excelled their record in heavy artillery 
and in both sorts of shell production. 

SMOKELESS POWDER AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES. 

One of the striking contributions of the United States to the cause 
of the Allies was the enormous quantity of smokeless powder and 



78 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

high explosives produced. From April 1, 1917, to November 11, 1918, 
the production of smokeless powder in the United States was 632,- 
000,000 pounds, which was almost exactly equal to the combined pro- 
duction of France and Great Britain. This was not all for our own 
use. About half the British supply in 1917 was drawn from this 
country, and in 1918 over a third of the French supply was Ameri- 
can made. This large supply was made possible in part by plants 
erected for the British in this country, but the American Ordnance 
Department also added new plants. As a result, the established rate 
of production in this country by the close of the war was 45 per 
cent greater than the combined French and British rate. 

The American production of high explosives — T. N. T., ammonium 
nitrate, picric acid, and others — was not established, when we de- 
clared war, on so large a scale as that of smokeless powder. It was 
necessary therefore to erect new plants. This need, by the way, was 
the main reason for the restrictions on the sale of platinum, which 
is necessary at one point in the process of manufacture. As a result 
of the efforts that were made, our established rate of production of 
high explosives at the close of the war was over 40 per cent larger 
than Great Britain's, and nearly double that of France. The aver- 
ages for August, September, and October for the three countries 
were : 

Pounds. 

Great Britain 30, 957, 000 

France ._ 22, 802, 000 

United States 43, 888, 000 

The result of the high rate of production of both smokeless powder 
and high explosives was that the artillery ammunition program was 
never held up for lack of either the powder which hurls the bullet 
or shell from the gun or the high explosive which makes the shell 
effective when it reaches its destination. 

.. TOXIC GASES. 

When the clouds of chlorine suddenly enveloped the British and 
French lines in the Ypres salient, early in 1915, a new weapon was 
introduced into the war. That it was a powerful weapon is evidenced 
by the fact that during the year 1918 from 20 to 30 per cent of all 
Our battle casualties were due to gas. 

' At the time we entered the war we had had practically no experi- 
ence in manufacturing toxic gases, and no existing facilities which 
could be readily converted to such use. At the signing of the armis- 
tice, we were equipped to produce gas at a more rapid rate than 
France, England, or Germany. 



TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 



79 



In the early days of our participation in the war it was hoped that 
concerns engaged in chemical manufacture could be put into this new 
field. There were many valid objections, however, to such a plan. 
Many of these concerns were already crowded with war work. En- 
tirely new equipment would have to be installed, which, in all likeli- 
hood, would be practically worthless at the close of the war. Ex- 
haustive investigation and experimentation would mean delay in 
securing quantity production. The element of danger would mean 



10817 



9907 



TOTAL ACCEPTED 10,817 



BBH Accepted to date (v*.ole column) 
iS&i Accepted during month 



FIGURES IK SHOES TOKS 




10 ?! 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nor 

1918 
Diagram 32. — Tons of toxic gases manufactured each month. 

difficulty in securing and retaining adequate labor forces. For these 
reasons the Government found it necessary to build its own chemical 
plants and to finance certain private firms. The majority of these 
producing plants, together with plants for filling shells with gas, 
were built on a tract of land in the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 
which came to be known as the Edgewood Arsenal. The auxiliary 
plants were also known as Edgewood Arsenal. The columns of dia- 
gram 32 show the number of short tons of toxic gases produced in 
American plants each month, The increase in production was rapid 



80 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

and steady during 1918 and, before the armistice, more than 10,000 
tons had been manufactured. 

Production of gas and the capacity for filling were at all times well 
ahead of the supply of shell containers to be filled. In June, 1918, 
considerable quantities of mustard gas, chlorpicrin, and phosgene 
were shipped overseas for filling gas shells produced by the French. 
By the end of July no more French shells were available for this pur- 
pose and the surplus gas was sold to the French and British. 

TRACTORS AND TANKS. 

An innovation in this war, development of which in the future 
promises to be even more important, was the increased use of motor 
transportation. As applied to the artillery, this meant the use of 
caterpillar tractors to haul the big guns, especially over rough ground. 
When we entered the war no suitable designs existed for caterpillar 
tractors of size appropriate for the medium heavy artillery. But 
new 5-ton and 10-ton types were perfected in this country, put into 
production, and 1,100 shipped overseas before November 1. About 
300 larger tractors were also shipped and 350 more secured from the 
French and British. 

The tank was an even more important application of the caterpillar 
tractor to war uses. In the case of the small 6-ton tanks, the efforts 
of this country were largely concentrated on improvement of design 
and on development of large scale production for the 1919 campaign. 
Up to the time of the armistice 64 had been produced in this country, 
and the rate at which production was getting under way is shown by 
the fact that in spite of the armistice the total completed to March 31, 
1919, was 799. The burden of active service in France was borne by 
227 of these tanks received from the French. 

The efforts of this country in the case of heavy 30-ton tanks were 
concentrated on a cooperative plan, by which this country was to fur- 
nish Liberty motors and the rest of the driving mechanism, and the 
British the armor plate for 1,500 tanks for the 1919 campaign. It 
has been estimated that about one-half the work on the American 
components for this project had been completed before November 11, 
and the work of assembly of the initial units was well under way. 
For immediate use in France, this country received 64 heavy tanks 
from the British. 

OUR ARTILLERY IN FRANCE. 

The most important single fact about our artillery in France is 
that we always had a sufficient supply of light artillery for the 
combat divisions that were ready for front-line service. This does 
not mean that when the divisions went into the battle line they 



TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 81 

always had their artillery with them, for in a number of cases they 
did not. 

The statement does mean, however, that when divisions went into 
line without their artillery this was not because of lack of guns but 
rather because it takes much longer to train artillery troops than it 
does infantry and so, under the pressure of battle needs in the sum- 
mer and fall of 1918, American divisions were put into line a num- 
ber of times supported by French and British artillery or without 
artillery. 

When the armistice came in November the American forces not 
only had a sufficient number of 75's for the 29 combat divisions, but 
in addition enough more for 12 other divisions. 

A careful study of the battle records of all the divisions shows 
that if all the days in the line of all the combat divisions are added 
together, the total is 2,234. The records further show the number 
of days that each division was in line with its own artillery, with 
British artillery, with French, or without any. 

The result of the compilation is to show that in every 100 days 
that our combat divisions were in line they were supported by their 
own artillery for 75 days, by British artillery for 5 days, by French 
for IJdays, and were without artillery for 18^ days out of the 100. 
Of these 18^ days, however, 18 days were in quiet sectors and only 
one-half of one day in active sectors. There are only three records of 
American divisions being in an active sector without artillery sup- 
port. The total of these three cases amounts to one-half of 1 per 
cent, or about 14 hours out of the typical 100 days just analyzed. 

The most significant facts about our artillery in France are pre- 
sented in summary in table 6, which takes into account only light and 
heavy field artillery and does not include either the small 37-mm. 
guns or the trench mortars. 

Table 6. — American artillery in France — Summary. 

Total pieces of artillery received to Nov. 11 3,499 

Number of American manufacture 477 

American-made pieces used in battle 130 

Artillery on firing line 2,251 

Rounds of artillery ammunition expended 8, 850, 000 

Rounds of ammunition of American manufacture expended 208, 327 

Rounds of American-made ammunition expended in battle 8, 400 

The facts of the table can be summarized in round numbers with 
approximate accuracy by saying that we had in France 3,500 pieces 
of artillery, of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used 
on the firing line 2,250 pieces, of which over 100 were made in 
America. 

132966°— 19 6 



82 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 
GUNS NEEDED V. GUNS AVAILABIiE. 



Diagram 33 shows the degree of balance which existed each month 
throughout the war between the men under arms and the artillery 
that was available for them. The number of men in the entire Ameri- 
can Army is shown by the upper black line and the number of these 
who were in France is shown by the lower black line. 

The upper hollow line shows the size of army that could have been 
fully equipped each month with the pieces of light artillery, con- 




APR MAY JUN JUL AU& SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR (W JUN JUL AU& SEP OCT NOV 
1917 1918 

Diagram 33.— Artillery available each month. 

sisting of 75 mm. and 3-inch field guns, that were then actually avail- 
able. If the supply had been fully ample this line would run some- 
what above the upper black line, to allow for an adequate reserve 
and for the retirement of the less satisfactory types of guns. Ac- 
tually the hollow line runs below the black one from September, 1917, 
to September, 1918, and indicates a slight deficiency in training equip- 
ment, which was relieved in the fall of 1918 by large deliveries of 
the 1917 model. 

In a similar way the lower black line shows for each month the 
size of army that could have been equipped with the proper number 
of pieces of heavy artillery of calibers greater than 3 inches. The 



TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 83 

measure of full equipment is based on the tables of organization 
adopted early in the war. These tables call for more heavy artillery 
for a given number of men than the French, British, or Germans 
actually used, and much more than had ever been thought advisable 
before this war. 

If all our heavy field artillery had been of types suitable for use 
in France, we should have had enough, even on this high standard, 
to meet the needs of the expeditonary forces. However, as we had 
some types that were considered suitable only for training the short- 
age indicated by the diagram was a real one. The rapid rise in the 
latter months of the war shows that the great difficulties of manu- 
facture of this type of material were being overcome toward the end 
of the war. In considering the facts presented by this diagram it 
is to be borne in mind that all suitable pieces of artillery are taken 
into account from the date they were produced or secured whether 
they were then located in America or in France. The comparison is 
between the men that we had and the guns that we had each month. 

SUMMARY. 

1. When war was declared the United States had sufficient light 
artillery to equip an army of 500,000 men, and shortly found itself 
confronted with the problem of preparing to equip 5,000,000 men. 

2. To meet the situation it was decided in June, 1917, to allot our 
guns to training purposes and to equip our forces in France with 
artillery conforming to the French and British standard calibers. 

3. It was arranged that we should purchase from the French and 
British the artillery needed for our first divisions and ship them in 
return equivalent amounts of steel, copper, and other raw materials 
so that they could either manufacture guns for us in their own fac- 
tories or give us guns out of their stocks and replace them by new 
ones made from our materials. 

4. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery 
units produced in American plants was more than 3,000, or equal to 
all those purchased from the French and British during the war. 

5. The number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition pro- 
duced in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared 
with 10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British. 

" 6. In the first 20 months after the declaration of war by each 
country the British did better than we did in the production of light 
artillery, and we excelled them in producing heavy artillery and both 
light and heavy shells. 

7. So far as the Allies were concerned, the European war was in 
large measure fought with American powder and high explosives. 



84 THE WAE WITH GEKMANY. 

8. At the end of the war American production of smokeless pow- 
der was 45 per cent greater than the French and British production 
combined. 

9. At the end of the war the American production of high explo- 
sives was 40 per cent greater than Great Britain's and nearly double 
that of France. 

10. During the war America produced 10,000 tons of gas, much 
of which was sold to the French and British. 

11. Out of every hundred days that our combat divisions were in 
line in France they were supported by their own artillery for 75 
days, by British artillery for 5 days, and by French for 1^ days. 
Of the remaining 18-J clays that they were in line without artillery, 18 
days were in quiet sectors, and only one-half of 1 one day in each hun- 
dred was in active sectors. 

12. In round numbers, we had in France 3,500 pieces of artillery, 
of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used on the 
firing line 2,250 pieces, of which over 100 were made in America. 






Chapter VII. 
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 



PREWAR EQUIPMENT. 

When war was declared, in April, 1917, the United States had two 
aviation fields and 55 serviceable airplanes. The National Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics, which had been conducting a scientific 
study of the problems of flight, advised that 51 of these airplanes 
were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent. 

This judgment was based on the operations in Mexico, which had 
demonstrated serious defects in the designs of American planes used 
there. It was well known that improved types had been developed in 
the European conflict, but the details of their design were carefully 
guarded and withheld from neutrals. 

Immediately following the declaration of war, the Allied Gov- 
ernments, particularly the French, urged the necessity of sending 
5,000 American aviators to France during the first year, if supe- 
riority in the air were to be insured. This request emphasized the 
need of speed. The European instructors who came over later to 
assist in the training work made no pretense that the 5,000 schedule 
was practicable. The problem was to approximate it as nearly as 
possible. Public expectation was greatly exaggerated, due to the 
general ignorance, shared by even the best informed American 
authorities on aviation, as to the requirements, other than simple 
flying ability, which this service exacts. 

There were three primary requisites for bringing into existence an 
elementary aviation service. These were training planes, aviators, 
and service planes. All of them had to be created. 

TRAINING. 

For the task of training, as well as that of securing the necessary 
planes and motors, there existed in our Army no adequate organiza- 
tion of qualified personnel. Before the war our air service had been 
small, struggling, and unpopular. Aviation was restricted to un- 
married officers under 30 years of age, and offered no assured future 
as a reward for success. It had made its greatest appeal to the 
younger and more daring types of line officers, and was not an or- 
ganization on which a great industrial expansion could be built, 

85 



86 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

or from which any large numbers of qualified instructors could be 
drawn. 

Training for aviation divides itself into three stages — elementary, 
advanced, and final. Elementary training, given to all candidates 
alike, includes physical training, hygiene, various practical and 
theoretical military subjects, the study of the structure and mecha- 
nism of airplanes and engines, signaling, observation, ground gun- 



11425 




A.E.7. 



U.S.A* 



■EEEM 

Apr UayJutt Jul lug Sep Oct Nov Deo JanFepHar Apr Bay Jon Jul Aug Sep Oct New 
1917 1918 

Diagram 34. — Plying officers in the Army each nionth. 

nery, and elementary flying to the point of doing simple flying 
alone. 

Advanced training consisted in the specialized work necessary to 
qualify the student as a well-prepared all-around pilot or observer, as 
the case might be, ready to take up and master quickly any type of 
machine or any kind of observation or bombing duty which the exi- 
gencies of the service might necessitate. 

Final training, given in Europe, was a short intensive specializa- 
tion on the particular type of machine, or the particular military 
problem to which the pilot or observer was finally assigned. 



AIRPLANES,, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 87 

The initial shortage of instructors and the opening of new fields 
made it necessary to retain a considerable proportion of the early- 
graduating classes as instructors. At the date of the armistice there 
were 27 fields in operation, with 1,063 instructors; 8,602 men had 
been graduated from elementary training, and 4,028 from advanced 
training. There were then actually in training 6,528 men, of whom 
59 per cent were in elementary, and 41 per cent in advanced train- 
ing schools. 

There had been sent to the expeditionary forces more than 5,000 
pilots and observers of whom, at the date of armistice, 2,226 were 
still in training, and 1,238 were on flying duty at the front. 

Diagram 34 shows the number of flying officers in the Army from 
month to month. 

The columns show the whole number in service each month and 
the upper portions the numbers of those who were in service over- 
seas. The total personnel of our Air Service, including flying and 
nonflying officers, students, and enlisted men, increased from about 
1,200 at the outbreak of the war to nearly 200,000 at the close. 

TRAINING PLANES AND ENGINES. 

With 5,000 aviators demanded and only 55 training planes on 
hand, the production of training planes was the problem of greatest 
immediate concern. A few planes provided for in the 1917 fiscal 
appropriation were on order. Other orders were rapidly placed. 
Deliveries of primary training planes were begun in June, 1917. 
To the date of the armistice over 5,300 had been produced, including 
1,600 of a type which was abandoned on account of unsatisfactory 
engines. 

Advanced training planes reached quantity production early in 
1918; up to the armistice about 2,500 were delivered. Approxi- 
mately the same number were purchased overseas for training the 
units with the expeditionary force. Diagram 35 shows the pro- 
duction of training planes and engines by months. 

European experience had demonstrated that the maintenance of a 
squadron, whether, in training or in service, requires more engines 
than planes for replacements. Pending the results of American ex- 
perience, British figures, requiring an average production of two 
engines per plane, were adopted as standard for American computa- 
tions. Extensive orders were placed for two types of elementary 
and three types of advanced training engines. 

The upper line in the diagram shows that quantity production of 
training engines was reached in 1917, and that by the end of Novem- 
ber, 1918, a total of nearly 18,000 training engines and more than 9,500 
training planes had been delivered. Of the engines, all but 1,346 



88 



THE WAK WITH GEEMANY. 



were built in the United States; and of the 9,500 training planes, 
more than 8,000 were of American manufacture. 



SERVICE PLANES. 



As soon as war was declared it became possible for American offi- 
cers and engineers to learn the secrets of the great improvements that 
had been developed during the war in the design of airplanes used 
in battle service. A commission was immediately sent abroad to 



2,000 



1,600 



1,200 



eoo 



400 





































































6 
<* 

V 


f 


































4 


/ 




































# 




































A< 


7 




































y/ 






1 


^: 


j> 
































































V 




j£ 


& 


**y 






























> 


'P 





















































17,673 



9,503'! 



May Jtm Jv£L Aug Sep Oct Nor Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jra Jul Aug Sep Oct Hot 
1917 ~~ 1918 

Diagram 35. — Production of training planes and engines to the end of 

each month. 

select types of foreign service planes for production in the United 
States. 

A controlling factor in their selections was the necessity of rede- 
signing the models so as to take American-made motors, as foreign 
engine production was insufficient to meet even the needs of the Allies. 

Because of this and because of the rapidity with which the designs 
of the smaller planes were changing, the best allied authorities urged 
the concentration of American production on the more stable obser- 
vation and bombing machines, leaving the production of pursuit 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 



89 



planes to the European factories, which were in closer contact with 
the front. In the case of any plane selected only an estimate could 
be made as to its probable adaptability to a new type of motor, this 
engineering risk being less in the more conservative types of design. 
This consideration, together with the imperative need for quick large- 
scale production, led to the selection of four types for this experi- 
ment: The De Havilland-4 (British) observation and day-bombing 

7889 




Fran 

foreign 

sources 



258 ^fe6 3(H 
Sep Oct Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jnn Jnl Aug Sep Oct Hot 



1917 1918 

Diagram 36.— Production of service planes to the end of each month. 

machine, the Handley-Page (British) night bomber, the Caproni 
(Italian) night bomber, and the Bristol (British) two-seater fighter. 
This selection was approved by the French and British authorities. 

The redesigned De Havilland-4 proved to be a good, all-round 
plane of rather poor visibility, with a tank design which increased 
the danger in case of a crash, but with these defects more than com- 
pensated by unusually good maneuver ability, and great speed. The 
De Havillands were acknowledged to be the fastest observation and 
bombing planes on the western front. At the time of the armistice 
this plane was being produced at a rate of over 1,100 per month. A 



90 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

total of 3,227 had been completed, 1,885 had been shipped to France, 
and 667 to the zone of the advance. The Handley-Page was rede- 
signed to take two high-powered American motors, passed its tests, 
and on the date of the armistice, parts for 100 had been shipped abroad 
for assembly. 

Delay in the receipt of plans for the Caproni greatly retarded the 
redesign of this machine. Successful tests of the new model were, 
however, completed previous to the armistice. The Bristol fighter 
was a failure. The changes necessary to accommodate the American 
engine so increased the total weight as to render the machine unsafe. 

Diagram 36 shows the production of service planes from American 
and foreign sources. The total at the end of November, 1918, was 
nearly 7,900, of which nearly 4,100 were of American manufacture, 
and remaining 3,800 were of foreign manufacture. In other words, 
of every 100 battle planes which we received up to the end of Novem- 
ber, 1918, 52 were of American manufacture and 48 were made in 
foreign factories. 

Two new models — the Le Pere two-seater fighter, and the Martin 
bomber — were designed around the standard American motor, and 
in tests prior to the armistice each showed a performance superior 
to that of any known machine of its class. Neither, however, was 
completed in time for use in actual service. 

SERVICE ENGINES. 

The rapid development of the heavier types of airplane, together 
with the pressing need for large scale production, made necessary the 
development of a high-powered motor adaptable to American 
methods of standardized quantity production. This need was met 
in the Liberty 12-cylinder motor which was America's chief contribu- 
tion to aviation. After this standardized motor had passed the ex- 
perimental stage production increased with rapidity, the October 
output being over 3,850'. The total production of Liberty engines to 
the date of the armistice was 13,574. Of this production 4,435 were 
shipped overseas to the expeditionary forces and 1,025 were delivered 
to the British, French, and Italian air services. It is noteworthy 
that at the present time the British are requesting the delivery of 
Liberty motors to them in accordance with arrangements made dur- 
ing the war. 

Other types of service engines, including the Hispano-Suiza 300 
horsepower, the Bugatti, and the Liberty eight-cylinder, were under 
development when hostilities ceased. The Hispano-Suiza 180 horse- 
power had reached quantity production ; 469 of this type were pro- 
duced, of which about one-half were shipped overseas for use in for- 
eign-built pursuit planes. 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOON'S. 



91 



The columns of diagram 37 indicate the total number of service 
engines produced for the Army to the end of each month, and show 
how many of them came from American factories and how many 
from foreign ones. 

Up to the end of November, 1918, the total number of service en- 
gines secured was in excess of 22,000. Of this number more than 
16,000, or 73 per cent, were from American sources and less than 
6,000 from foreign sources. 



2Z104 



36o 405 483 



670 




Prom 
foreign. 

sources 



g 75 gaai EEMBiBlEEMl 
Sep Oct. Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nor 
1917 1918 

Diagram 37.— Production of service engines to the end of each month. 

RAW MATERIALS. 



The American and allied airplane programs called for quantities 
of certain raw materials, which threatened to exhaust the supply. 
This was true of spruce and fir, lubricating oils, linen, dopes, and 
mahogany. 

In order to meet the spruce and fir shortage labor battalions were 
organized and placed in the forests of the west coast, loyal organiza- 
tions of civilian labor were fostered, new kiln processes were devel- 
oped which seasoned the lumber rapidly, without loss of strength and 



92 THE WAS WITH GERMANY. 

resiliency. These methods solved the problem. Approximately 
174,000,000 feet of spruce and fir were delivered, of which more than 
two-thirds went to the Allies. 

Castor oil was at first the only satisfactory lubricant for airplane 
motors. The limited supply was far short of the prospective demand, 
but the situation was met by planting a large acreage of castor beans 
and the development of a mineral oil substitute. 

To meet an acute shortage of linen for the wings of planes a 
fabric of long fiber cotton was developed which proved superior to 
linen. 

The standard " dope " used by the Allies to cover the wings of their 
planes, making them air and water tight, was limited in supply and 
highly inflammable. A substitute dope, far less inflammable and of 
more plentiful basic materials, was produced. 

Mahogany for propellers was partially replaced by walnut, oak, 
cherry, and ash, and by improved seasoning processes excellent results 
were secured. 

ACCESSORIES. 

Few facilities and little experience existed at the beginning of the 
war for the development of many of the delicate instruments and 
intricate mechanisms required in the equipment of service planes. 
Intensive research brought some notable results, of which several de- 
serve especial mention. These are: 

The oxygen mask, equipped with telephone connections which en- 
abled the flyer to endure the rarified air at any altitude which his 
plane could reach without losing speaking contact with his com- 
panions. 

The military parachute, which was developed to unprecedented 
safety. This was used principally for escape from burning balloons, 
and was improved so that it would bring down safely the entire 
balloon basket with its load. During the entire war there was not an 
American casualty due to parachute failure. 

The electric-heated clothing for aviators on high altitude work. 
The electric suit, developed in the latter months of the war and used 
at the front, was lined with insulated coils through which current was 
driven by means of a small dynamo actuated by a miniature propeller 
driven by the rush of the plane through the air. 

Long-focus, light-filtration cameras by which good photographs 
could be taken through haze from altitudes of 3 miles or more. Pri- 
mary credit for this belongs to Europe, but America improved the 
mechanism and standardized the design for quantity production. 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 



93 



The wireless telephone, by which the aviator is enabled to converse 
easily with other planes and with ground stations. This development 
came too late to be of any substantial use at the front, but its value 
for peace as well as for any future war is obvious. 



BALLOONS. 



Diagram 38 shows the total number of observation balloons manu- 
factured and the number that were shipped overseas. 



800 



600 



400 



200 























642 






































<& 


X 




369 














^ 






SR- 


• 
• 














4 


°/ 








































• 




































































• 






















• 






















• 



















Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jan Jnl Aug Sep Oct Nov 

1918 
Diagram 38.— Observation balloons produced and shipped overseas 

each month. 

In no field did American manufacturing capacity achieve a greater 
relative success. Before the armistice we had produced 642 observa- 
tion balloons and had received 20 from the French. Forty-three of 
our balloons had been destroyed and 35 given to the French and 
British. 

This left us with 574 balloons at the end of the war. On the same 
date the Belgian Army had 6, the British 43, the French 72, and the 
Germans 170 on the western front. These figures mean that at the 
end of the war we had nearly twice as many observation balloons as 
the enemy and the Allies combined had at the front, 



94 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

FORTY-FIVE SQUADRONS AT THE FRONT.) 

The American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille were transferred 
from the French to the American service December 26, 1917, flying as 
civilians until formally commissioned in late January, 1918. They 
were then attached to and served with the French Fourth Army, 
operating over Rheims. 

In addition to the purely American operations, two full squadrons 
were attached to the British Royal Air Force in March and June 
respectively, of 1918, remaining with the British throughout the 
war, and participated in the following engagements: The Picardy 
drive, Ypres, Noyon-Montdidier, Viellers, Bray-Rosieres-Roye, Ar- 
ras, Bapaume, Canal du Nord, and Cambrai. 

The strictly American aviation operations started in the middle 
of March, 1918, with the patrolling of the front from Villeneuve- 
les-Vertus by an American pursuit squadron using planes of the 
French-built Nieuport-28 type. These operations were in the nature 
of a tryout of the American trained aviators, and their complete 
success was followed by an immediate increase of the aerial forces at 
the front, with enlargement of their duties and field of action. By the 
middle of May squadrons of all types — pursuit, observation, and 
bombing — as well as balloon companies were in operation over a 
wide front. These squadrons were equipped with the best available 
types of British and French-built service planes. 

The rapid increase in American air forces is shown in diagram 39. 
The height of the columns shows the number of squadrons in action 
each month. The squadrons were of four types : Observation squad- 
rons, whose business it is to make observations, take photographs, 
and direct artillery fire; pursuit squadrons, using light fighting 
planes to protect the observation planes at their work, to drive the 
enemy from the air, or to " strafe " marching columns by machine- 
gun fire; the day bombers, whose work was the dropping of bombs 
on railways or roads ; and the night bombers, carrying heavier bomb 
loads for the destruction of strategic enemy works. 

In April the American forces just going into active sectors had 
three squadrons, two for observation and one for pursuit. Their 
strength totaled 35 planes. In May, as the diagram shows, the squad- 
rons were increased to nine. The most rapid growth occurred after 
July, when American De Havilland planes were becoming available 
in quantity for observation and day bombing service, and by Novem- 
ber the number of squadrons increased to 45, with a total of 740 
planes in action. 

The equipment of American squadrons was in the early months 
entirely of French and British manufacture. American De Hav- 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 



95 



illand-4 planes were first used at the front on August 7, and the 
number in service increased rapidly from that time on. 

The total number of service planes that had been sent to the zone of 
advance by the end of each month for the use of American airmen 
with our armies is shown in diagram 40. The upper portion of the 
columns represents planes of American make, and the lower portion 
planes of foreign make. Of the total 2,698 planes sent to the zone 
of advance, 667, or one-quarter, were of American make and the pro- 
portion was rapidly increasing at the time of the signing of the 
armistice. 



-NI6HT B0MBIH6 
-DAY BOMBING 




Apr May Jan. Jul Aug Sep Oct Hoy 

1918 
Diagram 39.— American air squadrons in action each month. 

Of the 2,031 planes from foreign sources sent forward about nine- 
tenths were French. The planes sent to the zone of advance are ap- 
proximately one-half of the service planes received by the A. E. F., 
the other half being in back areas. 

The rapid rate of destruction of planes at the front is illustrated by 
the fact that out of the 2,698 planes dispatched to the zone of advance 
about 1,100 remained at the time of the signing of the armistice. 



96 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 
IMPORTANT OPERATIONS. 



Three major operations, marking the critical points in American 
participation in the war, also furnish a comparison indicating the 
growth of American air forces in action. These are: The Second 
Battle of the Marne, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. 



CHATEAU-THIERRY JULY. 



On the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons front the Germans had at the 
start a pronounced superiority in the air. The American Air Serv- 



2698 




Pot Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jtm Jul Aug Sep Oct Har 

lil7 1918 

Diagram 40. — Service planes sent to zone of advance by end of each 

month. 

ice succeeded, however, in establishing the lines of contact with enemy 
airmen from 3 to 10 miles within the enemy's lines, photographed the 
entire front and the terrain deep behind the lines, and played an 
important part in putting German air forces on the defensive. The 
German concentration for the attack of July 15 was reported in 
detail and the location of the German reserves established, while the 
secrecy of the allied mobilization for the counterattack was main- 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 97 

tained and the Germans surprised. The American force employed 
consisted of four pursuit squadrons, three observation squadrons and 
three balloon companies. 

ST. MIHIEL SEPTEMBER. 

In capturing the St. Mihiel salient the American first army was 
aided and protected by the largest concentration of air force ever 
made, of which approximately one-third were American and the 
other two-thirds were French, British, and Italian squadrons oper- 
ating under American command. Throughout this operation the 
German back areas were kept under bombardment day and night; 
their reserves and ammunition dumps were located for the American 
long-range artillery; propaganda designed to disaffect enemy per- 
sonnel was dropped ; record was made by photograph of every move- 
ment of the enemy's lines and reserves, such information being fre- 
quently delivered to headquarters in finished photographs within 
half an hour of its occurrence ; and fast pursuit planes armed with 
machine guns flew low over the German lines, firing directly into his 
infantry. 

Day bombers and corps and artillery observers were forced to fly 
low on account of the fog which hampered all the day operations, 
greatly reduced the visibility, and made infantry liaison especially 
difficult. This accounts for the fact that some trouble was experi- 
enced by the Infantry with German " strafing " planes. 

The American air force employed consisted of 12 pursuit squad- 
rons, 11 observation squadrons, 3 bombing squadrons, and 14 balloon 
companies. This large force performed an amount of flying ap- 
proximately three times as great as was done during the Chateau- 
Thierry operations. Diagram 41 shows the number of hours spent 
in the air each week by American service planes at the front. Dur- 
ing the last two weeks of July the flying time was more than 1,000 
hours per week. The week of the St. Mihiel offensive it rose to 
nearly 4,000 hours. 

MEUSE-ARGONNE SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER. 

Because the Meuse-Argonne engagement covered a wider front and 
a more extended period of time, against an enemy who had improved 
his distribution of air force along the entire southern section of the 
front, no such heavy instantaneous concentration of planes as was 
made at St. Mihiel was possible. In this operation, moreover, less 
assistance was rendered by French and British flyers. The American 
force used during the engagement was considerably larger than at 
St. Mihiel. 

132966°— 19 7 



98 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



During the six weeks' struggle, the losses were heavy, but re- 
placements were brought forward so rapidly that at the last stage 
of the action the available American strength was greater than at the 
start. As shown by diagram 41, American air activities continued 
during the Argonne fighting on the same scale as during the St. 
Mihiel offensive. 



Hoars 
















5T 

MiHin 


1 1 
MtUSE 


ii i 

AREOflflf 


t; 

r 
a 
< 










































































2,000 


c 


HATEAIH 


HIER 


RY 






































1 

24 


8 B»29 


S 1219 26 


1 10 


rata 


' M 


la 


. U1B2 


rrr 


SBSoe 


1320 




1 11 


IS 2! 


1 


5 1 


Z2 


35 


11 


J 




i i 





APR MAY 



jun jul 



AUS 5EPT OCT 



nov DEC JAM 



FEB MAR APR 



1918 1919 

Diagram 41.— Hours spent in the air eacb week by American service 

planes at the front. 



STRENGTH AT ARMISTICE. 

At the signing of the armistice, there were on the front 20 pursuit 
squadrons, 18 observation squadrons, and 7 squadrons of bombers; 
with 1,238 flying officers and 740 service planes. There were also 23 
balloon companies. 

THE TEST OF BATTLE. 

The final test of the American Air Service is the test of battle. 
The final record is the record of the results of combat. Casualty 



AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 



99 



figures are an important part of the record. American aviators 
brought down in the course of their few months of active service 755 
enemy planes. Our losses in combat were 357 planes. This is illus- 
trated in diagram 42. The record of our balloon companies shows 
a somewhat less favorable comparison between our own and enemy 

AIRPLANES 

755 



357 





Enemy l>y American Enemy by American 

Am erican lfy enemy American "by enemy 

Diagram 42.— Airplanes and balloons brought down in action. 

losses, the figures being 43 American and 71 German balloons de- 
stroyed. 

SUMMARY. 

1. On the declaration of war the United States had 55 training 
airplanes, of which 51 were classified as obsolete and the other 4 as 
obsolescent. 



100 THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 

2. When we entered the war the Allies made the designs of their 
planes available to us and before the end of hostilities furnished us 
from their own manufacture 3,800 service planes. 

3. Aviation training schools in the United States graduated 8,602 
men from elementary courses and 4,028 from advanced courses. 
More than 5,000 pilots and observers were sent overseas. 

4. The total personnel of the Air Service, officers, students, and 
enlisted men, increased from 1,200 at the outbreak of the war to 
nearly 200,000 at its close. 

5. There were produced in the United States to November 30, 
1918, more than 8,000 training planes and more than 16,000 training 
engines. 

6. The De Havilland-4 observation and day bombing plane was 
the only plane the United States put into quantity production. Be- 
fore the signing of the armistice 3,227 had been completed and 1,885 
shipped overseas. The plane was successfully used at the front for 
three months. 

7. The production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine was America's 
chief contribution to aviation. Before the armistice 13,574 had been 
completed, 4,435 shipped to the expeditionary forces, and 1,025 de- 
livered to the Allies. 

8. The first flyers in action wearing the American uniform were 
members of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were transferred to the 
American service in December, 1917. 

9. The American air force at the front grew .from 3 squad- 
rons in April to 45 in November, 1918. On November 11 the 45 
squadrons had an equipment of 740 planes. 

10. Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of the advance for American 
aviators 667, or nearly one-fourth, were of American manufacture. 

11. American air squadrons played important roles in the battles 
of Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. They 
brought down in combat 755 enemy planes, while their own losses 
of planes numbered only 357. 



Chapter VIII. 
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 



TWO OUT OF THEEE. 

Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France 
took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000, 
and of these 1,390,000 saw active service in the front line. 

American combat forces were organized into divisions, which, as 
has been noted, consisted of some 28,000 officers and men. These 
divisions were the largest on the western front, since the British 
division numbered about 15,000 and those of the French and Ger- 
mans about 12,000 each. There were sent overseas 42 American 
divisions and several hundred thousand supplementary artillery and 
service of supply troops. Diagram 43 shows the numerical designa- 
tions of the American divisions that were in France each month. 
The numbers in the columns are the numbers of the divisions in 
France each month, and in every case the numbers of those arriving 
during the month are placed at the top of the column, while those 
designating the divisions already there are shown below. 

Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active 
combat service, while the others were used for replacements or were 
just arriving during the last month of hostilities. The battle record 
of the United States Army in this war is largely the history of these 
29 combat divisions. Seven of them were Eegular Army divisions, 
11 were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up 
of National Army troops. 

American combat divisions were in battle for 200 days, from the 
25th of April, 1918, when the first Regular division after long train- 
ing in quiet sectors, entered an active sector on the Picardy front, 
until the signing of the armistice. During these 200 days they were 
engaged in 13 major operations, of which 11 were joint enterprises 
with the French, British, and Italians, and 2 were distinctively 
American. 

At the time of their greatest activity in the second week of October 
all 29 American divisions were in action. They then held 101 miles 
of front, or 23 per cent of the entire allied battle line. From the 
middle of August until the end of the war they held, during the 

101 



102 THE WAR WITH GEKMANY. 

greater part of the time, a front longer than that held by the British. 
Their strength tipped the balance, of man power in favor of the 
Allies, so that from the middle of June, 1918, to the end of the war 
the allied forces were superior in number to those of the enemy. 

8 

38 

31 

34 34 

86 86 
84 84 

87 87 
40 40 40 
39 39 39 
88 88 88 
81 81 81 

7 7 7 

85 85 85 

36 36 36 36 

91 91 91 91 

79 79 79 79 

76 76 76 76 

29 29 29 29 29 

37 37 37 37 37 

90 90 90 90 90 

92 92 92 92 92 

89 89 89 69 89 

83 83 83 83 83 

78 78 78 78 78 

80 80 80 80 80 80 

30 30 30 30 30 30 

33 33 33 33 33 33 

6 6 6 6 6 6 

27 27 27 27 27 27 
4 4 4 4 4 4 

28 28 28 28 28 28 
35 35 35 35 35 35 
82 82 82 82 82 82 

77 77 77 77 77 77 77 

33333333 

55555555 

32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 

41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 

42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 

26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 

222222222222222 

1111 1-1111 111 -11111 

Jim Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Deo | Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct 
1917 1918 

Diagram 43. — Numerical designations of American divisions in France 

each month. 

The total battle advances of all the American divisions amount to 
782 kilometers, or 485 miles, an average advance for each division of 
17 miles, nearly all of it against desperate enemy resistance. They 
captured 63,000 prisoners, 1,378 pieces of artillery, 708 trench mor- 
tars, and 9,650 machine guns. In June and July they helped to 
shatter the enemy advance toward Paris and to turn retreat into a 
triumphant offensive. At St. Mihiel they pinched off in a day an 




TWO HUNDRED DAYS OP BATTLE. 



103 



enemy salient which had been a constant menace to the French line 
for four years. In the Argonne and on the Meuse they carried lines 
which the enemy was determined to hold at any cost, and cut the 
enemy lines of communication and supply for half the western 
battle front. 

The maps and diagrams in this chapter show in more detail the 
part American troops played in the allied endeavor, something of 



654 854 




Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
31 28 21 10 10 10 

Diagram 44.— Kilometers of front line held by armies of each, nation. 



July 
10 



Sept. Oct. 
10 10 



Hot. 
11 



the scale and character of their operations, and several comparative 
records of the 29 combat divisions. 



TIPPING THE BALANCE OF POWER. 

The place American troops took in the allied undertaking is 
illustrated in diagram 44, which shows in kilometers the length of 
front line held by the armies of each nation on the allied side 
during the year 1918. In January American troops were holding 
10 kilometers, or 6£ miles, of front in quiet sectors. In April their 
line had lengthened to 50 kilometers. In July this figure was 



104 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



doubled and in September tripled. The high point was reached 
in October, with 29 divisions in line, extending over a front of 162 
kilometers, or 101 miles, nearly one-quarter of the entire western 
front. These changes are shown on the diagram in the upper 
portions of the columns in solid black. 

The length of front shown as occupied by the French includes 
the lines held by the Italian Second Army Corps. On November 11, 
1918, the Italians held 11 kilometers, or 2^ per cent, of the western 
front. 

The fluctuations in the heights of the columns show how the 
allied lines gradually lengthened as the five German offensives bel- 



2,000,000 


GERMAN. 


J.600000. _ ,_ 


UiS.OOO 


t^E6,000 


1.672.000 


1,684,000 »u_ 


ED 

1.694,000 






1,500,000 


ALLIED 

1.846,000 


1,343,000 


^496,000 "*X 


^412,000 


1,395,000 


1239,000 
GERMAN >• 


1,223,000 
\ 


1,000,000 














\ 


500,000 


















866,000 



Apr.l 
Diagram 



May 1 June 1 July 1 Aug.l Sept.l Oot.l Not.1 

45.— Rifle strength of allied and German armies on the 
western front. 



lowed them out in big salients and rapidly shortened as the German 
retreats began. 

Another measure of American participation is the effect caused by 
the rapid arrivals of American troops on the rifle strength of the 
allied armies. One of the best indexes of effective man power is 
the number of riflemen ready for front-line service. For example, 
there are 12,250 rifles in an American division and smaller num- 
bers in those of other armies. 

Diagram 45 shows the rifle strength of the allied and German 
armies on the western front from April 1 to November 1, 1918. 

The dotted line shows the German rifle strength at the beginning 
of each month and the solid line the allied strength. On the 1st of 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 105 

April the Germans had an actual superiority of 324,000 riflemen 
on the western front. Their strength increased during the next two 
months but began to drop during June. At the same time the 
allied strength, with the constantly growing American forces, was 
showing a steady increase, so that the two lines crossed during June. 
From that time on allied strength was always in the ascendency 
and since the French and British forces were weaker in October and 
November than they were in April and May, this growing ascendency 
of the Allies was due entirely to the Americans. By November 1 the 
allied rifle strength had a superiority over the German of more than 
600,000 rifles. 

THIRTEEN BATTLES. 

American troops saw service on practically every stretch of the 
western front from British lines in Belgium to inactive sectors in the 
Vosges. On October 21, 1917, Americans entered the line in the quiet 
Toul sector. From that date to the armistice American units were 
somewhere in line almost continuously. 

It is difficult to cut up the year and 22 days which intervened into 
well-defined battles, for in a sense the entire war on the western front 
was a single battle. It is possible, however, to distinguish certain 
major operations or phases of the greater struggle. Thirteen such 
operations have been recognized in which American units were en- 
gaged, of which 12 took place on the western front and 1 in Italy. 
Battle clasps will be awarded to the officers and men who participated 
in these engagements. These battles are named and the number of 
Americans engaged is shown in table 7, on this page. 

Table 7. — Thirteen major operations in which Americans participated. 



Operation. 



Approximate 
number of 
Americans 



West front — Campaign of 1917: 

Cambrai, Nov. 20 to Dec. 4 

West front — Campaign of 1918: 

German offensives, Mar. 21 to July 18 — 

Somme, Mar. 21 to Apr. 6 

Lys, Apr. 9 to 27 

Aisne, May 27 to June 5 

Noyon-Montdidier, June 9 to 15 

Champagne-Marne, July 15 to 18 — 
Allied offensives, July 18 to Nov. 11 — 

Aisne-Marne, July 18 to Aug. 6 

Somme, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11 

Oise-Aisne, Aug. 18 to Nov. 11 

Ypres-Lys, Aug. 19 to Nov. 11 

St. Mihiel, Sept. 12 to 16 

Meuse-Argonne, Sept. 20 to Nov. 11. 
Italian front— Campaign of 1918: 

Vittorio-Veneto, Oct. 24 to Nov. 4 



2,500 



2,200 
500 
27, 500 
27,000 
85,000 

270, 000 
54, 000 
85,000 
103,000 
550, 000 
1,200,000 

1,200 



106 



THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 



The first major operation in which American troops were en- 
gaged was the Cambrai battle at the end of the campaign of 1917. 
Scattering medical and engineering detachments, serving with the 
British, were present during the action but sustained no serious 
casualties. 



GERMAN OFFENSIVES. 



The campaign of 1918 opened with the Germans in possession of 
the offensive. In a series of five drives of unprecedented violence the 




Map 9. — The five great German offensives of 1918. 

imperial Great General Staff sought to break the allied line and end 
the war. These five drives took place in five successive months, begin- 
ning in March. Each drive was so timed as to take advantage of 
the light of the moon for that month. Map 9, on this page, shows 
the ground won by the Germans in each of the offensives. The arrows 
indicate the points at which American troops went into the battle, 
and the small numbers are the numerical designations of the Ameri- 
can divisions taking part. 

The first drive opened on March 21, on a 50-mile front across the 
old battle field of the Somme. In 17 days of fighting the Germans 
advanced their lines beyond Noyon and Montdidier and were within 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OP BATTLE. 107 

12 miles of the important railroad center of Amiens with its great 
stores of British supplies. In this battle, also known as the Picardy 
offensive, approximately 2,200 American troops, serving with the 
British and French, were engaged. 

The attack upon Amiens had been but partially checked when the 
enemy struck again to the north in the Armentieres sector and ad- 
vanced for 17 miles up the valley of the Lys. A small number of 
Americans, serving with the British, participated in the Lys de- 
fensive. 

For their next attack (May 27) the Germans selected the French 
front along the Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne. The line 
from Rheims to a little east of Noyon was forced back. Soissons 
fell, and on May 31 the enemy had reached the Marne Valley, down 
which he was advancing in the direction of Paris. At this critical 
moment our Second Division, together with elements of the Third 
and Twenty-eighth Divisions were thrown into the line. By block- 
ing the German advance at -Chateau-Thierry, they rendered great 
assistance in stopping perhaps the most dangerous of the German 
drives. The Second Division not only halted the enemy on its front 
but also recaptured from him the strong tactical positions of Bou- 
resches, Belleau Wood, and Vaux. 

The enemy had by his offensives established two salients threaten- 
ing Paris. He now sought to convert them into one by a fourth 
terrific blow delivered on a front of 22 miles between Montdidier 
and Noyon. The reinforced French Army resisted firmly and the 
attack was halted after an initial advance of about 6 miles. Through- 
out this operation (June 9-15) the extreme left line of the salient 
was defended by our (First Division. Even before the drive began 
the division had demonstrated the fighting qualities of our troops by 
capturing and holding the town of Cantigny (May 28). 

There followed a month of comparative quiet, during which the 
enemy reassembled his forces for his fifth onslaught. On July 15 
he attacked simultaneously on both sides of Rheims, the eastern 
corner of the salient he had created in the Aisne drive. To the 
east of the city he gained little. On the west he crossed the Marne, 
but made slight progress. His path was everywhere blocked. In 
this battle 85,000 American troops were engaged — the Forty-second 
division to the extreme east in Champagne, and the Third and 
Twenty-eighth to the west, near Chateau-Thierry, 

ALLIED OFFENSIVES. 

The turning point of the war had come. The great German of- 
fensives had been stopped. The initiative now passed from Luden- 
dorff to Marshal Foch, and a series of allied offensives began, des- 



108 



THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 



tined to roll back the German armies beyond the French frontier. 
In this continuous allied offensive there may be distinguished six 
phases or major operations in which the American Expeditionary 
Forces took part. 

These six operations are shown on map 10, on this page, in which 
the solid arrows indicate points where American divisions entered 
the line, and the broken arrows the distances over which they drove 
forward. In four of the six operations the American troops en- 
gaged were acting in support of allied divisions and under the com- 
mand of the generals of the Allies. 




Map 10.— American participation in the allied offensives of 1918. 

The moment chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first 
counteroffensive was July 18, when it was clear that the German 
Champagne-Marne drive had spent its force. The place chosen was 
the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to 
the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty- 
eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second American Divisions, to- 
gether with selected French troops, were employed. When the oper- 
ation was completed (August 6) the salient had been flattened out 
and the allied line ran from Soissons to Rheims along the Vesle. 

Two days later the British struck at the Somme salient, initiating 
an offensive which, with occasional breathing spells, lasted to the 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 109 

date of the armistice. American participation in this operation was 
intermittent. From August 8 to 20 elements of the Thirty-third 
Division, which had been brigaded for training with the Austra- 
lians, were in the line and took part in the capture of Chipilly Eidge. 
Later the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, who served 
throughout with the British, were brought over from the Ypres 
sector and used in company with Australian troops to break the 
Hindenburg line at the tunnel of the St. Quentin Canal (Sept. 20- 
Oct. 20). 

In the meantime simultaneous assaults were in progress at other 
points on the front. On August 18 Gen. Mangin began the Oise- 
Aisne phase of the great allied offensive. Starting from the Soissons- 
Rheims line, along which they had come to rest August 6, the French 
armies advanced by successive stages to the Aisne, to Laon, and on 
November 11 were close to the frontier. In the first stages of this 
advance they were assisted by the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and 
Seventh-seventh American Divisions, but by September 15 all of 
these were withdrawn for the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive of the 
American Army. 

The day after the opening of the Oise- Aisne offensive the British 
launched the first of a series of attacks in the Ypres sector which 
continued with some interruptions to the time of the armistice and 
may be termed the " Ypres-Lys offensive." Four American divisions 
at different times participated in this operation. The Twenty- 
seventh and Thirtieth were engaged in the recapture of Mount Kem- 
mel August 31 to September 2. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first 
were withdrawn from the Meuse-Argonne battle and dispatched to 
Belgium, where they took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys 
offensive (Oct. 31 to Nov. 11). 

With the organization of the American First Army on August 10, 
under the personal command of Gen. Pershing, the history of the 
American Expeditionary Forces entered upon a new stage. The 
St, Mihiel (Sept. 12-16) and Meuse-Argonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11) 
offensives were major operation planned and executed by American 
generals and American troops. The ground won in each is shown by 
the shaded areas in map 10. 

In addition to the 12 operations above mentioned, American troops 
participated in the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto (Oct. 24 to Nov. 4), 
which ended in the rout of the Austrian Army. 

THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL. 

The first distinctly American offensive was the reduction of the St. 
Mihiel salient carried through from September 12 to September 15, 
largely by American troops and wholly under the orders of the Amer- 



110 



THE WAR, WITH GERMANY. 



ican commander in chief. The positions of the various American 
divisions at the beginning of the offensive and on each succeeding 
day are shown on map 11 on this page. The arrows indicate the ad- 
vance of each division. In the attack the American troops were 
aided by French colonial troops, who held the portion of the front 
line shown in dashes on the left of the map. The Americans were 
also aided by French and British air squadrons. 

The attack began at 5 a. m., after four hours of artillery prepara- 
tion of great severity, and met with immediate success. Before noon 
about half the distance between the bases of the salient had been 



FORTIFIED 
AREA OF ME.TZ 




Map 11 The Battle of St. Mihiel. 

covered and the next morning troops of the First and Twenty-sixth 
Divisions met at Vigneulles, cutting off the salient within 24 hours 
from the beginning of the movement. 

Two comparisons between this operation and the Battle of Gettys- 
burg emphasize the magnitude of the action. About 550,000 Ameri- 
cans were engaged at St. Mihiel; the Union forces at Gettysburg 
numbered approximately 100,000. St. Mihiel set a record for con- 
centration of artillery fire by a four-hour artillery preparation, con- 
suming more than 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. In three days 
at Gettysburg Union artillery fired 33,000 rounds. 

The St. Mihiel offensive cost only about 7,000 casualties, less than 
one-third the Union losses at Gettysburg. There were captured 
16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. A dangerous enemy salient was re- 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. Ill 

duced, and American commanders and troops demonstrated their 
ability to plan and execute a big American operation. 

THE BATTLE OF THE MEUSE- ARGON NE. 

The object of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, said Gen. Pershing in 
his report of November 20, 1918, was " to draw the best German divi- 
sions to our front and to consume them." This sentence expresses 
better than any long description not only the object but also the out- 
come of the battle. Every available American division was thrown 
against the enemy. Every available German division was thrown 
in to meet them. At the end of 47 days of continuous battle our 
divisions had consumed the German divisions. 

The goal of the American attack was the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, 
the main line of supply for the German forces on the major part of 
the western front. If this line were cut, a retirement on the whole 
front would be forced. This retirement would include, moreover, 
evacuation of the Briey iron fields, which the Germans had been 
using to great advantage to supplement their iron supply. The de- 
fense of the positions threatened was therefore of such importance as 
to warrant the most desperate measures for resistance. When the 
engagement was evidently impending the commander of the German 
Fifth Army sent word to his forces, calling on them for unyielding 
resistance and pointing out that defeat in this engagement might 
mean disaster for the fatherland. 

Map 12 shows the progress of the American action, giving the lines 
held by divisions on different days. On the first day, the 26th of 
September, and the next day or two after that, the lines were con- 
siderably advanced. Then the resistance became more stubborn. 
Each side threw in more and more of its man power until there were 
no more reserves. Many German divisions went into action twice, 
and not a few three times, until, through losses, they were far under 
strength. All through the month of October the attrition went on. 
Foot by foot American troops pushed back the best of the German 
divisions. On November 1 the last stage of the offensive began. The 
enemy power began to break. American troops forced their way to 
the east bank of the Meuse. Toward the north they made even more 
rapid progress, and in seven days reached the outskirts of Sedan and 
cut the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, making the German line untenable. 

In the meantime (Oct. 2 to 28) our Second and Thirty-sixth Divi- 
sions had been sent west to assist the French who were advancing in 
Champagne beside our drive in the Argonne. The liaison detachment 
between the two armies was for a time furnished by the Ninety- 
second Division. 



112 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



In some ways the Meuse-Argonne offers an interesting resemblance 
to the Battle of the Wilderness, fought from May 5 to 12, 1864, in 
the Civil War. Both were fought over a terrain covered with tangled 
woods and underbrush. The Wilderness was regarded as a long bat- 
tle, marked by slow progress, against obstinate resistance, with very 
heavy casualties. Here the similarity ends. The Meuse-Argonne 




Map 12.— The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. 

lasted six times as long as the Battle of the Wilderness. Twelve 
times as many American troops were engaged as were on the Union 
side. They used in the action ten times as many guns and fired 
about one hundred times as many rounds of artillery ammunition. 
The actual weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used 
by the Union forces during the entire Civil War. Casualties were 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 113 

perhaps four times as heavy as among the Northern troops in the 
Battle of the Wilderness. 

The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne was beyond compare the greatest 
ever fought by American troops, and there have been few, if any, 
greater battles in the history of the world. Some of the more im- 
portant statistics of the engagement are presented in Table 8. 

Table 8. — American data for the Meuse-Argonne Battle. 

Days of battle 47 

American troops engaged 1, 200, 000 

Guns employed in attack 2, 417 

Rounds of artillery ammunition fired 4,214,000 

Airplanes used 840 

Tons of explosives dropped by planes on enemy lines 100 

Tanks used 324 

Miles of penetration of enemy line, maximum 34 

Square kilometers of territory taken 1, 550 

Villages and towns liberated 150 

Prisoners captured 16, 059 

Artillery pieces captured 468 

Machine guns captured 2, 864 

Trench mortars captured 177 

American casualties 120, 000 

RECORD OF 29 COMBAT DIVISIONS. 

Twenty-nine combat divisions achieved the successes and bore the 
losses of active operations. The story of their achievements can not 
be told within the limits of this account. There are, however, certain 
fundamental records which give us a picture of the accomplishments 
of these divisions. They tell us how long each division served in the 
front line; how far each advanced against the enemy; how many 
prisoners each captured ; and how heavily each suffered. 

The length of service of each division in quiet and in active sectors 
of the line is shown in diagram 46. The First Division was the first 
in line and the first to enter an active sector. It reached France in 
June, 1917, went into line in October and into an active sector in 
April, 1918. The next three divisions in order of length of service 
all reached France in 1917. 

Three of the 29 divisions were still serving their apprenticeship 
and had not seen much severe battle service at the time of the signing 
of the armistice. They were the Sixth, the Eighty-first, and the 
Eighty-eighth. It is interesting that of the total of 2,234 days which 
American divisions spent in line, four-tenths were in active sectors. 

Diagram 47 pictures the accomplishments of different divisions by 
showing the number of kilometers each advanced against the enemy, 
132966°— 19 8 



114 



THE WAR WITH GEKMATTY. 



and in graphic form the percentage of the total kilometers advanced 
which was carried through by each division. The length of the ad- 
vance depends in each case on the length of service of the division, 
the duty assigned to it (whether offensive or defensive), the nature 
of the terrain to be covered, the strength and effectiveness of oppos- 
ing enemy forces, artillery support, etc. Hence, conclusions as to the 
relative efficiency of divisions can not be drawn from these figures 
alone. 



Divl- 






sion 


Quiet 


Active 


1st 


127 


93 


26th 


148 


45 


42nd 


125 


39 


2nd 


71 


66 


77th 


47 


66 


5th 


71 


32 


82nd 


70 


27 


35th 


92 


5 


32nd 


60 


35 


3rd 





86 


89th 


55 


28 


29th 


59 


23 


28th 


31 


49 


90th 


42 


26 


37th 


50 


11 


33rd 


32 


27 


27th 





57 


30th 





56 


92nd 


51 


2 


79th 


28 


17 


4th 


7 


38 


6th 


40 





78th 


17 


21 


7th 


31 


2 


81st 


31 





91st 


15 


14 


88th 


28 





36th 





23 


80th 


1 


17 


Total 


1,329 


905 



Quiet 



Active 



220 



J 164 



193 



J 137 




113 



103 



186 




Diagram 46.— Days spent by each, division in quiet and active sectors. 

The Seventy-seventh National Army Division, composed largely 
of troops from New York City, made the greatest advance — a total 
of 71J kilometers, or nearly 45 miles. This was more than 9 per 
cent of the ground gained by the divisions. If the advances are 
turned into miles the total advance is 485 miles, and the average gain 
for each division IT miles. 

Diagram 48 on the number of German prisoners captured is sub- 
ject to the same qualifications as the preceding diagram. The figures 
for number of prisoners taken are from the official records of the 
different divisions. The total is somewhat higher than the rolls of 
American prisoner stockades have shown, but the difference is prob- 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 



115 



ably in prisoners turned over to the French or British. The total 
number of Americans taken prisoner by Germans was 4,480. 

The price paid for these achievements was 256,000 battle casualties; 
a heavy price when counted in terms of the individuals who gave 
their lives or suffered from wounds; a small price when compared 
with the enormous price paid by the nations at whose sides we fought. 
Diagram 49 gives the roll of honor of the divisions for battle casual- 
ties. 



Divi- 


Kilo- 




Per 


sion 

77th 
2nd 

42nd 
1st 

89th 


meter* 

7li 
60 
55 
51 

48 


l 


cent 


3rd 
80th 
26th 
32nd 
33rd 
9llt 
37th 


41 
38 
37 
36 
36 
34 
30 


^BBHBEBB 3.83 




30th 


29£ 


MBWMHWWTIilffglffff! 3.77 




5th 


29 


BMtu "" WB lTW* gl,Ba 3.vi 




90th 


28§- 
24§ 


MiLmammaaaaimmm 3.&4 




4th 


BS^l iS&H 3.13 




78th 


21 


■ ^ ^ - -■■ 2.68 




36th 


21 


■kfiAiJ^-^.JBl 2.68 




79th 


19£ 


am:.BSBB8SH 2.49 




82nd 


17 


HttHHEHHS 2.17 




35th 


l*k 


UUMBM) 1.60 




27th 


11 


BBBBi i.4i 




28th 


10 


■BBS 1.28 




92nd 


8 


ESS 1.02 




29th 


7 


SBB .89 




81st 


5k 


nso .70 




7th 


1 


1 .13 




6th 









88th 










Total 782§- 
Diagram 47. — Kilometers advanced against the enemy by each, division. 

The figures given were corrected to June 3 and constitute the final 
record of the office of the adjutant general of the expeditionary forces. 
Battle deaths include both killed in action and died of wounds. Under 
wounded are included many slightly injured. Artillery brigade losses 
are included in the figures of the divisions to which they were origi- 
nally assigned. 

Under "others" are grouped the casualties of several different 
kinds of units. These are the following. 



116 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



Others. 



Troops not in divisions 

Ninety -third Division 

Replacement and depot divisions 
Divisional deaths not distributed 

Total 



Killed. 



1,019 
584 
690 
782 



Wounded. 



3,496 
2,582 
1,556 



Total. 



4,515 
3,166 
2,246 

782 



3,075 



7,634 



10,709 



The troops not in divisions were largely artillery, headquarters, 
train, and other special services attached to groups of divisions 
operating together in corps and armies. 



Divi 

sion 




Per cent, 
19.0? 



Total 63,079 

Diagram 48.— German prisoners eaptured by each division* 

The Ninety-third Division is worthy of special comment. It has 
not been listed among the combat divisions because it was always 
incomplete as a division. It was without its artillery and some 
other units, and was brigaded with the French from the time of 
its arrival in France in the spring of 1918 until the signing of the 
armistice. Its service in the line was fully as long as that of many 
of the so-called combat divisions. This is indicated by a compari- 



TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 



117 



son of its casualties with those in the other divisions. The division 
was made up of colored soldiers from National Guard units of 
various States. 

Casualties in replacement and depot divisions are partly accounted 
for in two ways. In the first place the artillery of a number of 
these divisions went into action separately. Secondly, some re- 
placement units joining combat divisions suffered casualties before 



Divi- 
sion 


Battle 
deaths 


Wounded 


.Killed 


Total casualties 

Wounded 






4,478 

4,411 

3,177 

2,551 

2,644 

2,135 

2,915 

2,511 

1,992 

1,785 

1,629 

1,976 

1,298 

1,433 

1,067 

1,392 

989 

1,384 

1,419 

1,132 

1,414 

977 

951 

600 

296 

176 

251 

93 

29 


17-752 

17,201 

12,940 

11,429 

11,275 

11,325 

10,477 

9,893 

8,505 

7,201 

7,325 

6,864 

6,248 

5,858 

6,216 

5,685 

6,266 

5,861 

5,331 

5,000 

4,364 

4,266 

4,268 

1,928 

1,397 

1,466 

973 

453 

89 




2nd 
1st 




"H 22,230 
J 21,612 


3rd 


■HH 


"1 16,117 




28 th 


■BH 


1 13,980 




42nd 
26th 


zS= 


1 ±8,919 
113.460 




32nd 


ami 


113.392 




4th 


nan 


1 12.b04 




77 th 


kna 


' 1 10,497 




27 th 


H3i 


— 1 8,986 




30th 
5th 


Sm 


ZD 8,954 
I 8,840 




82nd 
89 th 
35th 


■== 


17, 546 

17,291 

17,283 




90th 
33rd 
78 th 


H 


17,277 

17,255 

17,245 




79 th 
80th 


g 


16,750 
1 6,132 
15,778 

1 5,243 

1 5,219 

!8 




91st 


■i 




37 th 


■ 




29th 


■ 




36th 
7 th 

92nd 

61st 
6th 

88th 


MZZI2,5J 
01,693 
□1,642 
□ 1,224 

546 
0118 




Total 
Others 


47,205 
3,075 


198,056 
7,634 




Grand total 


50,280 


205,690 





Diagram 49.— Casualties suffered by each division. 

the papers involved in their transfer had been completed. Hence 
they were reported in their original organizations. 

Among the 10,709 " other " casualties there is one most interest- 
ing and not inconsiderable group, some of the members of which 
-are included in " troops not in divisions," and the rest among the 
casualties of replacement and depot divisions. These are the men 
who deserted to the front. They went A. W. O. L. (absent without 
leave) from their organizations in the zone of supplies or in the 
training areas, and found their way up to the battle line, where many 
of them took part in the fighting and some of them were killed or 



118 THE WAE WITH GEEMANY. 

wounded. These cases were so numerous that Gen. Pershing made 
special arrangements by which trained men who had rendered good 
service behind the lines could, as a reward, secure opportunity to go 
to the front and take part in the fighting. 

In the next chapter a more careful analysis is made of American 
casualties, and the battle and disease deaths in this war are com- 
pared with the records of the United States and other nations in 
previous wars. 

SUMMARY. 

1. Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France 
took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000, 
and of these 1,390,000 saw active service at the front. 

2. Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active 
combat service. Seven of them were Regular Army divisions, 11 
were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up of 
National Army troops. 

3. American divisions were in battle for 200 days and engaged in 
13 major operations. 

4. From the middle of August until the end of the war the Ameri- 
can divisions held during the greater part of the time a front longer 
than that held by the British. 

5. In October the American divisions held 101 miles of line, or 
23 per cent of the entire western front. 

6. On the 1st of April the Germans had a superiority of 324,000 in 
rifle strength. Due to American arrivals the allied strength exceeded 
that of the Germans in June and was more than 600,000 above 
it in November. 

7. In the Battle of St. Mihiel 550,000 Americans were engaged, as 
compared with about 100,000 on the Northern side in the Battle of 
Gettysburg. The artillery fired more than 1,000,000 shells in four 
hours, which is the most intense concentration of artillery fire re- 
corded in history. 

8. The Meuse-Argonne Battle lasted for 47 days, during which 
1,200,000 American troops were engaged. 

9. The American battle losses of the war were 50,000 killed and 
206,000 wounded. They are heavy when counted in terms of lives 
and suffering, but light compared with the enormous price paid by 
the nations at whose sides we fought. 



Chapter IX. 
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 



THE DEADLIEST WAR. 

Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors who took part in the 
war with Germany, 2 were killed or died of disease during the 
period of hostilities. In the Northern Army during the Civil War 
the number was about 10. Among the other great nations in this 
war, between 20 and 25 in each 100 called to the colors were killed 
or died. To carry the comparison still further, American losses 
in this war were relatively one-fifth as large as during the Civil 
War and less than one-tenth as large as in the ranks of the enemy 
or among the nations associated with us. 

The war was undoubtedly the bloodiest which has ever been 
fought. One possible competitor might be the Crimean War, in 
which the casualty rate per 100 men was equally heavy. The Brit- 
ish forces in the Crimean War lost 22 of every 100 men, the 
French 31, the Turkish 27, and the Russian 43. More than four- 
fifths of the losses were, however, deaths from disease, while in the 
recent war with Germany disease deaths were inconsiderable as 
compared with battle deaths. The forces engaged in the Crimean 
War were, moreover, much smaller. 

Table 9. — Battle deaths in armies engaged in present war, 1914-1918. 

Russia 1. 700 ' °°° 

Germany *■ 600 ' 00 ° 

France *> 385 ' 300 

Great Britain 900 ' °°° 

Austria — 800 ' 00 ° 

Italy . 364 ' 000 

m , 250, 000 

Turkey ' 

Serbia and Montenegro 125 > ° 00 

Belgium - 102 >^ 

Roumania _— 100 > ° 00 

Bulgaria 100 > j™ 

United States _—,——— 50 ' 3 ^ 

Greece ___ L-L — _ ' 

r> 4. i 2,000 

Portugal . ' 

7,485,600 
Total , 

119 



120 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



The total battle deaths in the recent war were greater than all 
the deaths in all wars for more than 100 years previous. From 
1793 to 1914 total deaths in war may safely be estimated at some- 
thing under 6,000,000. Battle deaths alone from 1914 to 1918 totaled 
about 7.500,000. An estimate of the losses of the principal nations 
engaged is shown in Table 9. As the final records are not yet wholly 
complete, these figures are approximate in some cases. Only deaths 

meuse-argomne 



CHATEAU-THIERRY 



CANTIGMY 




JAM 



FEB MAR APR hW JUH JUL AUG SEPT OCT MOV DEC 



1918 



Diagram 50.— Battle deaths each week. 



resulting directly from action are included. The total deaths from 
all causes is very much larger, as some of the armies lost more 
heavily from diseases and privation than from battle. 

The table shows that Kussia had the heaviest losses, in spite of the 
fact that she withdrew from the war after the fall of 1917. Amer- 
ican losses are third from the bottom of the list. German losses 
were thirty-two times as great as the losses of the United States, 
the French twenty-eight times, and the British eighteen times as 
large. 



HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 121 

That American losses were not more severe is due to the fact that 
our armies were only in heavy fighting for 200 days. Diagram 50 
shows the number of battle deaths occurring each week through 1918. 
The first rise in the columns, the last part of May, reflects the battle 
of Cantigny. The second rise, in July, indicates the heavy losses 
which took place when American divisions were thrown in along 
the Marne salient at the beginning of the allied offensive. The 
heaviest losses were in the Meuse-Argonne drive from the last week 
of September until November 11. The weekly deaths during a part 
of that period were around the 6,000 mark. 

Infantry & Maoh.Gun O*" 09 ™ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^S 



Air Service 



Officers VSM//////////J7777A 33.3 



lien I .6 

Engineer Corps 



Officers 
Uen 


W7777K 11.5 


Officers 
Uen 


V/////A 11.5 


Officers 
Uen 


y77m e.i 

BB 5*6 


Officers 
Uen 


£23.8 


Officers 

Uen 


1.7 
■ 1.9 


Officers 
Uen 


1.7 

1 .3 


Officers 

Uen 


a 

11.4 


Officers 
Uen 



1 .1 



Tank Corps 
Artillery 
Signal Corps 
Medical Department 
Quartermaster 
Cavalry 

Ordnance 

Diagram 51.— Battle deaths among each thousand officers and men who 

reached France. 

BATTLE DEATHS BY SERVICES. 

The chances of death are much heavier in the Infantry than in 
any other branch of the service. Diagram 51 compares the various 
services in respect to the chances of death in each. The bars show 
how many battle deaths there were among each 1,000 men in the 
various services who reached France. Of each 1,000 enlisted men in 
the Infantry 52 were killed in action or died of wounds. The officers 
show a higher rate. The most striking difference between the death 
rates of officers and men appears in the Air Service. Here the 
casualties among officers are much higher than among men because 
in our service all aviators are officers. 



122 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



WOUNDED, PRISONERS, AND MISSING. 

For every man who was killled in battle, six others were wounded, 
taken prisoner, or reported missing. The total battle casualties in the 
expeditionary forces are shown in Table 10. The number who died 
of wounds was only 7 per cent as large as the number who were 
wounded. The hospital records show that about 85 per cent of the 
men sent to hospitals on account of injuries have been returned to 
duty. About half the wounded were reported as slightly wounded 
and many of them would not have been recorded as casualties in pre- 
vious wars. Except for 373 who died, all the prisoners shown in 
the table have now been returned. 

Table 10. — Battle casualties in the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Killed in action 35, 560 

Died of wounds 14, 720 

Total dead 50, 280 

Wounded severely 90, 830 

Wounded slightly 80,480 

Wounded, degree undetermined 34, 380 

Total wounded 205, 690 

Missing in action (Aug. 1, 1919) 46 

Taken prisoner + 4, 480 

Grand total 260, 496 

The number of men reported as missing has been steadily reduced 
from a total of 78,000 to the figure 46 shown in the table. This reduc- 
tion has gone on without clearing any case as dead except on evidence 
establishing the fact of death. The total number of cases cleared as 
presumed dead will be about 1,550. The results of clearing up the 
records of more than 21,000 cases, exclusive of prisoners, which were 
reported in the casualty cables to this country, are shown in diagram 
52. The largest number have been found in hospitals, while a con- 
siderable number have returned to duty after being lost from their 
units. 

The work -of the Central Kecords Office of the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces in clearing up the cases of men listed as missing has 
been more successful than that done in any of the other armies or in 
any previous great war. The missing lists of the other nations still 
run into the hundreds of thousands. The most recent figures for 
France and Great Britain are 264,000 and 121,000, respectively. 



HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 
BATTLE AND DISEASE LOSSES. 



123 



The total number of lives lost in both Army and Navy from the 
declaration of war to July 1, 1919, is 125,500. Deaths in the Army, 
including marines attached to it, were 115,660. About two-thirds 




Diagram 52.— Final disposition of cases of men reported missing In 
6 action. 

of these deaths occurred overseas. Diagram £3 shows the propor- 
tion which occurred in the United States and overseas, and also the 
proportion which disease deaths bore to battle deaths. Under 




TOTAL 115,660 



TOTAL 115,660 



Diagram 53.— Total deaths. 

" Other " are included deaths from accident. There were 768 lost 
at sea, of whom 381 are included under battle deaths, since their 
loss was the direct result of submarine activity. Almost exactly 
half the losses were from disease. If the comparison between dis- 



124 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



ease and battle losses is limited to the expeditionary forces, battle 
losses appear more than twice as large as deaths from disease. 

This is the first war in which the United States has been engaged 
that showed a lower death rate from disease than from battle. In 
previous wars insanitary conditions at camps and the ravages of 
epidemic diseases have resulted in disease deaths far in excess of 
the number killed on the battle field. The facts are shown in dia- 
gram 54. In order to make a fair comparison the figures used are 
the numbers of deaths each year among each 1,000 troops. Since 

disease: 



DISEASE 



BATTLE 



BATTLE 



BATTLE 



15 



33 



Mexican War 

1846-48 



Civil War 
(North) 
1661-65 



DISEASE 



BATTLE 

m 

Spanish War 
1898 



DISEASE 

I 



53 



PBESSHT WAS 

to Hot 11 

1918 



Diagram 54. — Disease and battle deaths. 

the time of the Mexican War a steady improvement has been made 
in the health of troops in war operations. The death rate from dis- 
ease in the Mexican War was 110 per year in each 1,000 men; in 
the Civil War this was reduced to 65 ; and in the Spanish War to 
26 ; while the rate in the expeditionary forces in this war was 19. 
The battle rate of 53 for the overseas forces is higher than in any 
previous war. It is higher than in the Civil War because all of the 
fighting was concentrated in one year, while in the Civil War it 
stretched over four years. The rates in this war for the total forces 



HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 125 

under arms both in the United States and France from the beginning 
of the war to May 1, 1919, were 13 for battle and 15 for disease. 

THE CONTROL OF DISEASE. 

Some of the outstanding causes of the remarkably low disease 
death rate in the war against Germany are: (1) A highly trained 
medical personnel, (2) compulsory vaccination of the entire Army 
against typhoid fever, (3) thorough camp sanitation and control of 
drinking water, and (4) adequate provision of hospital facilities. 

There were at the beginning of the war 2,089 commissioned medi- 
cal officers, including the Reserves. During the war 31,251 physicians 
from civil life were commissioned in the Medical Corps. This num- 
ber included leaders of medical science who have not only made pos- 
sible the application of the most recent advances of medicine in the 
prevention and cure of disease, but have themselves made new dis- 
coveries during the course of the war, resulting in great saving of life 
in our own and other armies. 

The intestinal diseases such as dysentery, the typhoids, bubonic 
plague, cholera, and typhus, have ravaged and even obliterated 
armies in the past. During the Spanish- American War typhoid 
fever alone caused 85 per cent of the total number of deaths. In the 
War with Germany these diseases have been practically eliminated 
as causes of death. Diagram 55 shows the relative proportion of 
deaths caused by principal diseases. During the entire war up to 
May 1, 1919, a total of only 2,328 cases of typhoid fever have been 
reported and only 227 deaths from this cause. The result is due to 
the compulsory vaccination of every man who entered the Army 
and to excellent sanitary conditions. The other intestinal diseases 
are similarly of little effect as causes of death or have not occurred 
at all. 

It was to be expected that with careful control exercised, epi- 
demics of these diseases would be avoided in the United States ; but 
in the Expeditionary Forces, where troops were quartered in tem- 
porary camps, billeted with civilians, or actively engaged in pro- 
longed battle, the reduction of these diseases is a notable achievement 
in sanitary control. 

It is evident from the diagram that pneumonia has been the great- 
est cause of death. More than 40,000 died of the disease. Of these, 
probably 25,000 resulted from the influenza-pneumonia pandemic 
which swept through every camp and cantonment in this country 
and caused thousands of deaths in the expeditionary forces. Up to 
September 14, 1918, only 9,840 deaths from disease had occurred in 
the Army, and the death rate for the period of the war up to that 
time was only 5 per year for each 1,000 men. During the eight weeks 



126 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



from September 14 to the 8th of November 316,089 cases of influenza 
and 53,449 of pneumonia were reported among troops in this country. 
The explosive character of the epidemic is shown in diagram 56. 
The curve in the diagram shows the weekly death rate for each 1,000 
troops in this country during the year 1918. The curve starts to rise 
sharply during the third week in September. It reached its high 
point the second week in October, when 4 out of each 1,000 troops 
under arms in this country died. The rate subsided at the end of 
October, but during the succeeding months remained somewhat higher 
than it had been previous to the epidemic. 

-Z% 
—.3% 



MEA5LE5 

SCARLET FEVER - 



ORGANIC HEART DISEA5EV4% 

APPEMDICITI5 A% 

PERITONITIS .5 

TYPHOID .5% 

BRJGHT*5 DISEASE 

5EPTCEMIA- 

EMPYEMIA 




Diagram 55.— Deaths by principal diseases. 

Two other diseases which offered difficult problems for the medical 
force were measles and spinal meningitis. Measles was prevalent 
during the first year of the war and was particularly dangerous as 
the predecessor of pneumonia. After vigorous efforts to control it, 
the number of cases was greatly reduced. Meningitis has caused 
nearly 2,000 deaths, ranking next to pneumonia as shown in diagram 
55. Both of these contagious diseases were largely the result of 
bringing numbers of men together in the confinement of camps and 
cantonments where the control of contagion is difficult. In the case 
of measles, men from rural communities who had not been im- 
munized by previous exposure were particularly susceptible. 



HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 
VENEREAL DISEASE. 



127 



Great, success has also been experienced in the control of the 
venereal diseases. A comprehensive program of education, to- 
gether with medical prophylaxis, has produced unusual results. 
While these diseases have continued to be the most frequent cause 
of admissions to the sick report, and the greatest source of nonef- 




JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR 



1918 1919 

Diagram 56.— Deaths per 1,000 soldiers each week in the United States, 
showing effect of influenza epidemic. 

fectiveness in the Army, a large proportion of the cases were con- 
tracted before entering the Army. A special study of all new cases 
of venereal diseases reported at five large cantonments, Lee, Va. ; 
Dix, N. J. ; Upton, N. Y. ; Meade, Md. ; and Pike, Ark., during the 
year ended May 21, 1919, shows that of 48,167 cases treated, 96 per 
cent were contracted before entering the Army and only i per cent 
after. 



128 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



The record for the forces overseas has been particularly note- 
worthy. There, few fresh recruits entered the Army from civil 
life, and hence the conditions more accurately show the effects of 
the Army control exercised. 

Up to September, 1918, there was steady reduction of noneffective- 
ness from venereal diseases in the Army overseas. At the begin- 
ning of that month there was less than one venereal patient in hos- 
pitals among each 1,000 men. Diagram 57 shows the number of 

90 



75 



60 



45 



30 



15 



Boy Deo Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jim Jul Aag Sep Oct Mot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Mag 
1917 1918 1919 

Diagram 57.— Venereal cases in hospitals among each. 10,000 men in the 
American Expeditionary Forces. 

venereal patients in hospitals at the beginning of each month per 
10,000 troops in the expeditionary forces. While the relative num- 
ber of patients has increased since hostilities stopped, the record is 
still excellent. Eegular weekly inspections, covering about 85 per 
cent of the total number of troops overseas, have disclosed during 
six months since the armistice less than one new case in each thousand 
men examined weekly. The actual average was one new case each 
week among each 2,630 men examined. 

HOSPITALIZATION. 

At the beginning of the war what was then considered an extrava- 
gant program of hospital construction was entered upon, with the 

MAJOR E. B. MILLER 

U. S. MARINES 

FT. LEAVENWORTH, KANS. 



I 7 * 










































































i55 




































33 




,30 


























40 


_ 39 








24^ 




21 


^0 


16 












16^« 


"^ 


2Bj 


























!?*■ 


J3 


2*^* 


ii 


13 










I 



HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 



129 



intent that in no case should the Army lack facilities for the care of 
its sick. Table 11 summarizes the hospital construction in the United 
States. 

Table 11. — Army hospital construction in the United States. 



New hospitals - 

Leased buildings and converted Army posts 
Post hospitals remodeled 

Total 



149 



Normal 
bed 

capacity. 



88,468 
29,383 
6,056 



123,907 



The figures are exclusive of very numerous small hospitals already 
in Army use. In addition more than 200 hospitals were put in oper- 



BedB /"^-L 


250,000 f 


200,000 y j;^ t^ 


150,000 -J Jf SSjC- S_ 


100,000 j *- /■ -J V 


60,000 -?r 



1918 1913 

Diagram 58.— Beds available and occupied in the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces. 

ation overseas. On December 1, 1918, there were available in Army 
hospitals 399,510 beds, or 1 bed to every 9 men in the Army. Of 
these, 287,290 were overseas and 112,220 were in this country. 

Diagram 58 shows the number of patients at the end of each week 
in the American Expeditionary Forces compared with the beds avail- 
able. The hospital capacity was exceeded in this country only dur- 
132966°— 19 9 



130 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

ing the influenza epidemic, when it became necessary to take over 
barracks for hospital purposes. The overseas record was even bet- 
ter. Except during two weeks in October, at the height of the at- 
tack on the Hindenburg line, the number of patients did not exceed 
the normal bed capacity of the hospitals, and at that time there were 
approximately 60,000 unused emergency beds. 

Over 130,000 patients have been evacuated from the expeditionary 
forces to hospitals in this country. They have been distributed to 
hospitals in this country in accordance with a twofold plan permit- 
ting the specialization of hospitals for the most efficient treatment 
of the various kinds of cases and placing the convalescents near their 
homes. 

SUMMARY. 

1. Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors, who served in the 
war with Germany, two were killed or died of disease during the 
period of hositilties. 

2. The total battle deaths of all nations in this war were greater* 
than all the deaths in all the wars in the previous 100 years. 

3. Russian battle deaths were 34 times as heavy as those of the 
United States, those of Germany 32 times as great, the French 28 
times, and the British 18 times as large. 

4. The number of American lives lost was 125,500, of which about 
10,000 were in the Navy, and the rest in the Army and the marines 
attached to it. 

5. In the American Army the casualty rate in the Infantry was 
higher than in any other service, and that for officers was higher 
than for men. 

6. For every man killed in battle six were wounded. 

7. Five out of every six men sent to hospitals on account of 
wounds were cured and returned to duty. 

8. In the expeditionary forces battle losses were twice as large as 
deaths from disease. 

9. In this war the death rate from disease was lower, and the death 
rate from battle was higher than in any other previous American war. 

10. Inoculation, clean camps, and safe drinking water, practically 
eliminated typhoid fever among our troops in this war. 

11. Pneumonia killed more soldiers than were killed in battle. 
Meningitis was the next most serious disease. 

12. Of each 100 cases of venereal disease recorded in the United 
States, 96 were contracted before entering the Army and only 4 
afterwards. 

13. During the entire war available hospital facilities in the Amer- 
ican Expeditionary Forces have been in excess of the needs. 



Chapter X. 
A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR. 

TOTAL WAR EXPENDITURES. 

For a period of 25 months, from April, 1917, through April, 1919, 
the war cost the United States considerably more than $1,000,000 an 
hour. Treasury disbursements during the period reached a total of 
$23,500,000,000, of which $1,650,000,000 may be charged to the normal 
expenses which would have occurred in time of peace. The balance 
may be counted as the direct money cost of the war to the end of 
April, 1919, a sum of $21,850,000,000. The figure is 20 times the 
prewar national debt. It is nearly large enough -to pay the entire 
costs of our Government from 1791 up to the outbreak of the Euro- 
pean war. Our expenditure in this war was sufficient to have carried 
on the Eevolutionary War continuously for more than a thousand 
years at the rate of expenditure which that war actually involved. 

In addition to this huge expenditure loans were advanced to the 
Allies at the rate of nearly half a million dollars an hour. Congress 
authorized for this purpose $10,000,000,000, and there was actually 
paid to various Governments the sum of $8,850,000,000. 

Of the United States Government war costs, the Army was respon- 
sible for the expenditure of 64 per cent, or just short of two-thirds of 
the entire amount. Through April 30, 1919, there had been with- 
drawn from the Treasury on the Army account $14,244,061,000. If 
there is deducted from this figure what would be the normal expedi- 
ture for a peace-time Army for a similar period there remains a total 
of $13,930,000,000 directly chargeable to the war. 

The rate of expenditure for the Army and for the entire Govern- 
ment increased rapidly as the war progressed. This is illustrated 
in diagram 59, which compares the daily rates of expenditure for 
the first three months of the war, the fiscal year entirely included 
in the war, and the first 10 months of the current fiscal year. The 
total height of the columns shows the daily rate of expenditure for 
the whole Government and the solid portion of the column the rate 
for the Army. 

During the first three months war expenditures were at the rate 
of $2,000,000 per day. During the next year they averaged more 
than $22,000,000 a day. For the final 10 months of the period the 

131 



132 



THE WAK WITH GERMANY. 



daily total reached the enormous sum of over $44,000,000. The 
very high daily average in the last period, most of which is in the 
months after the termination of hostilities, is surprising until we 
consider that the building of ships for the Emergency Fleet Cor- 
poration, the construction and operation of naval vessels, the food, 



$44,700,000 




#22,500,000 



2,000,000 



ARMY 




April 6,1917 July 1,1917 July 1,1918 

to to to 

June 30,1917 June 30,1918 Apr 30,1919 

Diagram 59.— Cost per day of the Government and of the Army. 

clothing, pay, and land and ocean transportation of the Army have 
had to go forward at about the same rate as during the war. The 
great flow of munitions and supplies for the Army and Navy could 
not, out of regard for the industrial balance of the country, be 
stopped with too great abruptness. A considerable number of war- 
time activities and purchases had still to be paid for as well. 



A MILLION" DOLLARS AN" HOUR. 



133 



ARMY EXPENDITURES. 

Table 12 shows the amounts expended by each important Army 
bureau. The Quartermaster Corps, which paid the soldiers and 
furnished them with food, clothing, equipment, and miscellaneous 
supplies, spent the most. The Ordnance Department was next in 
order, with over $4,000,000,000 for munitions, more than half of its 
expenditure being for artillery ammunition. 

Table 12. — Expenditures by Army bureaus. 



Quartermaster Corps: 

Pay of the Army, etc 

Other Quartermaster Corps appropriations . 

Ordnance Department 

Air Service 

Engineer Corps 

Medical Department 

Signal Corps 

Chemical Warfare Service 

Provost Marshal General 

Secretary's office and miscellaneous 



Expended to 
Apr. 30, 1919. 



$1,831, 

6, 242, 

4,087, 

859, 

638, 

314, 

128, 

83, 

124, 

133, 



273,000 
745,000 
347,000 
291,000 
974,000 
544,000 
920,000 
299,000 
301,000 
367, 000 



Total i 14,244,061,000 



Per cent. 



12.9 

43.8 

28.7 

6.0 

4.5 

2.2 

.9 

.6 

.17 

.23 



100.00 



1 Figures are for Dec. 31, 1918. Expenditures since that date for these purposes have been small compared 
with other items in table. y 




Diagram 60 — "Where the Army dollar went. 

The total of our Army expenditures shown in Table 12 about 
equals the value of all the gold produced in the whole world from 
the discovery of America up to the outbreak of the European war. 
The single item of pay for the Army is larger than the combined 
salaries of all the public-school principals and teachers in the United 
States for the five years from 1912 to 1916. 



134 THE WAR WITH GERMANS. 

WHERE THE DOLLAR WENT. 

Diagram 60 shows the relative amount of the Army expenditures 
spent for different purposes. It does this by dividing the typical 
dollar into sectors, showing the number of cents of each dollar that 
went for each purpose. 

PERMANENT ASSETS. 

As a result of the war efforts large quantities of munitions, sup- 
plies, and equipment have been secured which will be of value for 
many years to come. The Army now owns some of the finest docks 
in the world. The 16 National Army cantonments and 3 of the 
National Guard camps will be retained permanently as training 
camps. A number of first-class aviation fields and depots and bal- 
loon schools will be a permanent asset. We have stocks of most 
articles of clothing sufficient to last our Army for a number of years. 
There is a large supply of standardized trucks. 

As to rifles and machine guns and their ammunition, light and 
heavy artillery and ammunition, tanks and tractors, of these we have 
a supply more than sufficient to equip fully an army of a million 
men and maintain them in active combat for six months. These 
munitions are of the best quality and latest design — Springfield and 
Enfield rifles; Browning machine guns and automatic rifles; field 
guns and howitzers of tried French design. Articles of miscellaneous 
equipment are available in like quantity and quality. 

Thousands of Liberty motors and service planes are immediately 
available for any emergency. Engineer, signal, and medical equip- 
ment is on hand to the value of millions of dollars. 

All these are lasting assets which we have as a result of war ex- 
penditures. They give us a most valuable equipment for prepared- 
ness in the Military Establishment. 

WAR EXPENDITURES OF ALL NATIONS. 

Table 13 gives the figures showing the war expenditures of all 
nations up to May, 1919. It is as yet too soon to present figures that 
are entirely accurate, but these data have been carefully compiled 
and are believed to be substantially reliable. 



A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR. 135 

^able 13. — Estimated total war expenditures of principal nations to Apr. 30, 

1919. 

[All figures in billions of dollars and excluding normal expenses and loans to allies.] 



Country. 



Great Britain and Dominions 

France 

United States 

Russia 

Italy 

Belgium, Roumania, Portugal, Jugo-Slavia. 
Japan and Greece 

Total allies and United States 

Germany 

Austria-Hungary 

Turkey and Bulgaria 

Total Teutonic allies 

Grand total 



Billions of 
dollars. 



123 



63 



The total direct war costs amount to about $186,000,000,000, and 
of this sum the enemy countries spent about one-third and those on 
the allied side about two-thirds. Germany spent more than any 
other nation, and was closely followed by Great Britain, whose ex- 
penditures include those of her colonies. The figure for France is 
$12,000,000,000 less than that for Great Britain, and our own figure 
is below that for France. The Austrian expenditure was almost 
equal to that of the United States. It is noteworthy that the United 
States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of the war and 
something less than one-fifth of the expenditures on the allied side. 

SUMMARY. 

1. The war cost the United States considerably more than $1,000,000 
an hour for over two years. 

2. The direct cost was about $22,000,000,000, or nearly enough to 
pay the entire cost of running the United States Government from 
1791 up to the outbreak of the European war. 

3. Our expenditures in this war were sufficient to have carried on 
the Revolutionary War continuously for more than 1,000 years at the 
rate of expenditure which that war actually involved. 

4. In addition to this huge expenditure nearly $10,000,000,000 have 
been loaned by the United States to the Allies. 

5. The Army expenditures have been over $14,000,000,000, or nearly 
two-thirds of our total war costs. 

6. During the first three months our war expenditures were at the 
rate of $2,000,000 per day. During the next year they averaged more 



136 THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 

than $22,000,000 a day. For the final 10 months of the period, from 
April, 1917, to April, 1919, the daily average was over $44,000,000. 

7. Although the Army expenditures are less than two-thirds of 
our total war costs, they are nearly equal to the value of all the gold 
produced in the whole world from the discovery of America up to the 
outbreak of the European war. 

8. The pay of the Army during the war cost more than the com- 
bined salaries of all the public-school principals and teachers in the 
United States for the five years from 1912 to 1916. 

9. The total war costs of all nations were about $186,000,000,000, 
of which the Allies and the United States spent two-thirds and the 
enemy one-third. 

10. The three nations spending the greatest amounts were Ger- 
many, Great Britain, and France, in that order. After them come 
the United States and Austria-Hungary, with substantially equal ex- 
penditures. 

11. The United States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of 
the war, and something less than one-fifth of the expenditures of the 
allied side. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 



Table 14. — Duration of the war. 



Allied and associated nations. 



Serbia 

Russia 1 

France 

Belgium 

Great Britain. 
Montenegro... 

Japan 

Portugal 

Italy. 



San Marino 

Roumanian Aug. 29,1916 

Greece. 



War declared 

by Central 

Powers. 



July 28,1914 
Aug. 1,1914 
Aug. 3,1914 
Aug. 4,1914 
Nov. 23, 1914 
Aug. 9,1914 
Aug. 27,1914 
Mar. 9, 1916 



United States. 

Panama 

Cuba 

Siam 

Liberia 

China 

Brazil 

Guatemala . . . 

Nicaragua 

Haiti 

Honduras 



"War declared 
against Cen- 
tral Powers. 



Aug. 
Nov. 
Aug. 
Apr. 
Aug. 
Aug. 
Aug. 
Nov. 
May 
June 
Aug. 
Nov. 
Apr. 
Apr. 
Apr. 
July 
Aug. 
Aug. 
Oct. 
Apr. 
May 
July 
July 



9, 1914 
3, 1914 
3, 1914 
7,1917 
4, 1914 

6. 1914 
23, 1914 

23. 1914 

23. 1915 

6. 1915 

27. 1916 

23. 1916 
6, 1917 
7, 1917 
7, 1917 

22. 1917 

4. 1917 
14, 1917 

26. 1917 

21. 1918 

6. 1918 
12, 1918 
19, 1918 



Duration of war. 



Years. Months. Days 



14 
3 
8 
7 
7 
5 
19 
19 
19 
4 
10 
18 
5 
4 
4 
20 



i Treaty Mar. 3, 1918. 



2 Treaty Mar. 6, 1918. 



137 



138 



the War With germane. 



38 



26 



8/LUOA/S OrDOLMfiS SP£A/T 




18 



M 







<jpA 



/ / 



^ 






/277^Z £XP£A/D/rffl£S 4/86,000,000,000 

Diagram 61.— Billions of dollars spent by each nation for direct war 
expenses to the spring of 1919. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 



130 



iroo 




'X 



f/G(//?£S 

//v r/foas/iA/os 



/ 



* 



or* 



*/// * 



b 



y/// 






mam v •> •» 



/M77Z5 /X/IT/tS OF/)/?M/£S £A/6/IG£0 M P/?£S£A/r MR 7*485,000 
Diagram 62.-Tnousands of men killed in action and died of wounds. 



140 



the War with Germany. 



BFLGIAN 



Jen. 


31 


Feb. 


28 


liar. 


21 


liar. 


30 


Apr. 


10 


Apr. 


20 


Apr. 


30 


May 


10 


May 


20 


May 


30 


Jane 


10 


June 


20 


June 


30 


July 


10 


July 


20 


July 


30 


Aug. 


10 


Aug. 


20 


Aug. 


30 


Sept. 


10 


Sept. 


20 


Sept. 


30 


Oot. 


10 


Oct. 


20 


Oct. 


30 


Nov. 


11 



FBEhCH 



yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyAyy^ e9 yy/yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy* 



BRITISH AMCRlCATf 



s V?///////////////;^ VV//SS////S/S//S/S///S/A 



t^a^aa!^^ 



yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy,™ yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA ^W 



*yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy/,nvyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA g 



vyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy,.ri'yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy^ w 






5 \yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy, ™ yy//yy/Wyyy//////////A Z3L 



5 yyyy/yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy>.n y///yyyyyyyyyyyy/yyyyyyyA g 



5 yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy/A-t* yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy/yyyyym v 



^yyyyyyyyyyyyyyy^yyyyyyyyy^yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy I 



* yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA.nyysyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy/z^ 
a wyyysyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyys&vyyyyyyyyyyyyyy * 

AWyyyyyyZy^^^^^ j| 



4^^^%^gr ; ^^^^^ 



1 yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyn yyy/y/yy//yyyyyyyyyyyy\ 



s yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy^ yyyyyyyyyyyjyyyyyA 



5 wyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyysi yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA 



s yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyn yyyyyyyyyyyyzzzx 



*yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA^y/yy///y/////y^ 



s \yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA& yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA 



vyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy^yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyA 



^55 



« yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.™ yyyyyyyyyyyzzzx 



» yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy,& yyy/y/yyyyyyyyyyyyyA 

6 ^^^..55 WMMs/M 






3 



Si 



21 

ID 




Diagram 63.— Per cent of Western front held toy each army during 1918. The 
Italian troops are included with the French and the Portuguese with the 
British. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 



141 



6.427 f 100 



AMERICAN 
1950,100 



BWTI5H 

AND 
PORTUGUESE 

i.yiB,ooo 



3,562,180 



BELGIAN AMD' 
ITALIAN 
200,000 



FRENCH 
£,559,000 




ALLIED 



GEEMA5 



Diagram 64.— Ration strength of the allied and enemy forces on the 
Western front at the time of the armistice. 



142 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



11*638 



wm 






7,709 




3,008 




FRENCH ITALIAN BRITISH AMERICAN 

Diagram 65.— Guns organized in batteries at the date of the armistice. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 



143 



3,321 



2,730 



1,756 



812 



740 




FRENCH GERMAN BRITISH ITALIAN AMERICAN AUSTRIAN BELGIAN 

Diagram 66.— Number of battle airplanes in each army at tlie date of 

the armistice. 



144 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



130 



102 



77 



38 




FRENCH BRITISH GERMAN AMERICAN 

Diagram 67.— Number of battle airplanes per each 100,000 men in each, 
army at the date of the armistice. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 145 



Rifles 



Great Britain: 1,963,514 

France 1,396,938 

United States 2,505,910 



Machine Guns and Automatic Rlfle3 
Great Britain 179,127 ■ 

France 223,317 ■ 

United States 181,662 ■ 



Rifle and Machine Gun Amnunition 

Great Britain 3,428,195,000 I 

France 2,959,285,000 I 

United States 2,879,148,000 I 

Smokeless Powder - Pounds 

Great Britain 291,706,000 I 

France 342,155,000 I 

United States 632,504,000 I 

High Explosives - Pound s 

Great Britain 765,110,000 I 

France 702,964,000 I 

United States 375,656,000 



Diagram 68.— Production of articles of ordnance by Great Britain, France, 
and the United States during the 19 months of American participation 
from Apr. 6, 1917, to IVov. 11, 1918. 

132966°— 19 10 



146 THE WAR WITH GERMANY, 



Great Britain 




Norway 


| 1,177 


France 


| 889 


Italy 


| 846 


United States 


■ 395 


Greece 


| 346 


Denmark 


1 241 


Holland 


| 203 


Sweden 


(201 


Germany 


| 187 


Russia 


1 183 


Spain 


I 166 


Japan 


1 120 


Portugal 


| 93 


Belgium 


| 84 


Brazil 


U 


Austria 


lis 



7,757 



Others | 16 

Diagram 69.— Thousands of gross tons of merchant shipping Jost 
through acts of war. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 

TOTAL —"42,615.000 



147 



TiEOTRALl 
MATI0N5 



6,640,000 



EMEMY 
NATIONS 



OTHER 
ALUES 



OW1TED 
STATES 



7,67 5,000 




5,719,000 



0N1TEP 
KINGDOM 



20,100,000 




1914 1918 

Diagram 70.— Seagoing merchant shipping of the world measured in 
gross tons on July 1, 1914, and Dec. 31, 1918. 



148 



THE WAR WITH GERMANY. 



HAIIOHAL WEALTH, PRB-WAK DEBT, AND P03T-WAB DKBT 

■ i mzzzzzzzzzzzm 



In Billions of Dollars 



16 



11 



Italy 



78 



67 



6.6 



27 



I 



39 



_k±B 



France 



85 



£20 



3.5 
gga 



34 



I 



24 




1.3 



Germany united Kingdom United States 



Diagram 71. — Estimated prewar national wealth, prewar national 
debts, and postwar national debts of five nations in billions of 
dollars. 



SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPAEISONS. 



149 



Vest Front, Hoy. 11, 1918 
Ration strength 

Length of front held 

Artillery In batteries 

Airplane strength 



Per cent of total for three nations 
French British American 




All Fronts, Year 1918 

Artillery ammunition 
fired, including training 

Small arms, ammunition 
fired, including training 



S§ 



^ 



%£ 



43 



46 



Diagram 72.— Comparative strength of French, British, and American 
Armies at the signing of the armistice and comparative expenditures 
of ammunition during 1918. 



INDEX. 

Page. 

Airplanes 

Airplane strength — 143, 144, 149 

Ammunition : 

Artillery 75 ' 149 

Small arms 69 > 145 > 149 

34 

Argonne battle 

. * 73, 149 

Artillery ' 

75 149 

Artillery ammunition ,tJ > iTO 

149 14Q 
Artillery in batteries x ^' x ^ 

Atlantic fleet 39 

Balloons 9B 

Battle deaths 120,121,123,124,139 

t,, , .„ 50, 51 

Blankets ' 

Breeches 

89 
Bristol planes 

British expeditionary forces 

British instructors 

Browning machine guns 

90 
Bugatti motors 

28 

Camps and cantonments 

„ ,. 107 

Cantigny 2g 

Cantonments and camps 

Caproni planes 

44 

Cargo movement 

115 r>2 123 
Casualties ii0 ' ^ ' * 

Channel fleet 

Chateau-Thierry 96 ' X ^ 

Chauchat automatic rifles 

Civil War 13, IS, 19, 110, 112, 119 124 

™ ... 60, ol 

Clothing 

Clothing consumed 

„ , 50, 51 

Coats 

Colt machine guns 

Commissioned personnel 

*S7 *^S ^9 

Construction projects ""' °°' ° ao 

47 4o 

Conversion of cargo ships ' 

Crimean War 

40 
Cross-Channel fleet 

132 

Daily cost of war 

De Havilland planes 

Deaths : 

Battle 120, 121, 123, 124, 139 

Disease I 23 ' 124 

151 



152 INDEX. 



Debarkation, ports of 42 

Depot brigades 25 

Disease 125,126 

Deaths 123, 124 

Venereal 127, 128 

Divisions : 25 

Composition 26 

In France 102 

National Guard 27 

Training of 32 

Draft : 17 

Duration of war 137 

Dutch ships 40, 41 

Embarkation, ports of 42 

Enfield rifles 63 

Engineer Corps 60 

Expenditures 131. 138 

Explosives, high 77, 145 

Field artillery 73 

Flying officers 86 

Food 60 

France, military policy 13 

Freight cars 46 

French instructors 31 

Front line held 103,104,149 

Gas 78 

Gas masks 52 

German ships 37 

Gettysburg H° 

Gloves 50 

Great Northern 44 

Handley-Page planes 89 

Helmets 52 

High explosives 77, 145 

Hispano-Suiza motors 90 

Horses and mules 46,56 

Hospitals r 128 

Induction I 8 ' I 9 

Influenza 125, 127 

Instructors 29 

Italian Army 104 

Japanese ships 40, 41 

Kilometers advanced 11° 

Krag-Jorgensen rifles 63 

Le Pere planes 90 

Lewis machine guns 66 



INDEX. 153 

Page. 

Leviathan 44 

Liberty motors 90 

Locomotives 46 

Losses at sea 47 

Machine guns 65, 145 

Marines 32 

Marlin machine guns 66 

Martin planes 90 

Meuse-Argonne 34, 97, 103, 111, 113 

Mexican War 124 

Missing 122,123 

Motor trucks 46, 54 

Mount Vernon _ 44 

Mules and horses 46, 56 

National Army 16, 26, 28 

National debts 148 

National Guard 16, 26,28 

Divisions 27 

Officers 21 

National wealth 148 

Northern Pacific ' 44 

Offensives, allied 107,108, 109 

Offensives, German 106 

Officers 21 

Physical examinations 20 

Pistols 69 

Ports of embarkation and debarkation 42 

Prisoners 122 

Railroads in France 53 

Railways, narrow gauge 54 

Rainbow Division 28 

Rations 60 

Ration strength 141, 149 

Registration 17, 18 

Regular Army 16, 26, 29 

Reserve Corps 29, 125 

Return of troops 47 

Revolutionary War 131 

Revolvers 69 

Rifles 63,145 

Rifle strength 104 

Ross rifles 71 

Seaports in France 53 

Selective service 17 

Service planes 88 

Services of Supply 52 

Shipping lost 146 

Shipping of the world 147 



154 INDEX. 

Page. 

Ships, source of S9, 41 

Shirts 51 

Shoes _ 50,51 

Small-arms ammunition 69 

Smokeless powder 77, 145 

Socks 50(, 51 

Spanish War 124 

Springfield, rifles 63 

Squadrons, air 94 

St. Mihiel 97, 102, 109 

States : 

Physical examinations 20 

Soldiers furnished 22 

Storage in France 53 

Strength : 

Of Army 13 

Ration 141,149 

Rifle 104 

Sunset Division _ 28 

Supply, Services of 52 

Swedish ships 41 

Tanks _— 80 

Telegraph and telephone lines 56, 57 

Tonnage of fleet 38 

Torpedoing of ships 47 

Tractors . 80 

Training, air 85 

Training camps, officers from 21 

Training engines - 87 

Training, length of 32 

Training planes 87 

Trans-Atlantic fleet _ 39 

Transportation of troops 37 

Transport fleet : : 38 

Trucks, motor 46, 54 

Turnarounds 43 

Venereal disease 127, 128 

Vickers machine guns 65 

Wilderness 112 

Wool 52 

Wounded 122 



O 



019 221 752 





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